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ABSTRACT 
 
Both literature and practice have investigated how the vast amount of ever-increasing 
customer information can inform marketing strategy and decision making. However, the customer 
data is often susceptible to modeling bias and misleading findings due to various factors including 
sample selection and unobservable variables. The available analytics toolkit has continued to 
develop but in the age of nearly perfect information, the customer decision making has also 
evolved. The dissertation addresses some of the challenges in deriving valid and useful consumer 
insights from customer data in the digital age. The first study addresses the limitations of traditional 
customer purchase measures to account of dynamic temporal variations in the customer purchase 
history. The study proposes a new approach for representation and summarization of customer 
purchases to improve promotion forecasts. The method also accounts for sample selection bias that 
arises due to biased selection of customers for the promotion. The second study investigates the 
impact of increasing internet penetration on the consumer choices and their response to marketing 
actions. Using the case study of physician’s drug prescribing, the study identifies how marketers 
can misallocate resources at the regional level by not accounting for variations in internet 
penetration. The third paper develops a data driven metric for measuring temporal variations in the 
brand loyalty. Using a network representation of brand and customer the study also investigates 
the spillover effects of manufacturer related information shocks on the brand’s loyalty. 
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CHAPTER 1: DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
 
The accumulation of customer data from information systems has resulted in large dynamic 
databases which provide unique opportunities for marketers and researchers to gain insights into 
consumer behavior. Customer data analytics allows firms to identify meaningful patterns and 
knowledge from databases for a deeper understanding of the consumer decision criteria for 
tailoring product, services and allocating scarce resources efficiently. The analytics initiatives of 
firms usually emphasize on improving the efficiency of marketing actions by continuous tracking 
of consumer behavior from loyalty cards, mobile platforms, information technology (IT) services 
and building proactive models to predict response to various marketing interventions.  In fact, 
major industries such as retail and healthcare are considering double digit annual growth rate of 
approximately 39.78% and 11% respectively in their analytics investment until at least 2020 
(Markets and Markets, 2014).  
The applications of customer analytics continue to evolve but underutilization of the 
available information sources and inadequate analytics competency still prevent firms from 
utilizing technologies to its full potential. It has been observed that the firms are unable to ripe 
benefits from their data driven customer retention schemes and promotional offerings. For 
instance, less than 20% of direct coupon promotions are profitable and the growth rate of firms 
offering rewards program is either same or slightly lower than those who are not offering them 
(Forbes, 2014). The customer analytics toolset that comprises of statistical and data mining 
techniques for data representation and organization, information management and predictive 
modeling should deliver actionable insights that are relevant and timely. Perhaps, the key is to 
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target the customer at right time with the appropriate marketing instrument as opposed to sending 
communications on the ad-hoc basis when they are less likely to respond (Saboo et al. 2016).  
Recent studies have found that firms either underleveraged most of the available 
information in the data or utilize modeling approaches that do not readily lend themselves to 
dynamic variations in the customer data and provide inadequate insight to the managers (Saboo, 
2016, Breiter and Huhzermeier 2014). As an example, majority of promotion decisions rely on 
superficial marketing metrics (e.g. recency, frequency and monetary value of past purchase) 
related to customer history that suppress information related to real-time variations in purchases 
(Cui, Wong, and Lui, 2006; Donkers et al. 2006; Schweidel and Knox, 2013). These limitations 
with respect to data representations and modeling techniques hinder the ability to investigate 
interesting questions and a lot is yet to accomplished in generating intelligence from data to support 
business decision making. 
The current information rich environment also poses challenges in customer retention due 
to competitive marketplace and accessibility of information across various products and services. 
The adoption of communications technologies such as smartphones, broadband and IT-enabled 
services is changing the way consumers make decisions. The IT interventions such as internet that 
lead to reduction in information gathering and processing costs for the customers have a substantial 
impact on their choices (Simonson, 2015). By virtue of web search, social media and personalized 
recommendations the comparison friction associated with navigating various choice alternatives 
is getting reduced. In addition, the composition of a customer’s consideration set while making a 
purchase is now technology and context driven, over which marketers have minimal influence. 
The firms can gain more out of their analytics initiatives if they can dig deeper into their data and 
incorporate customer information at the micro level. Although the influence of information access 
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on consumer decision making has been theorized in the consumer choice literature, very little is 
known about the impact of IT interventions on consumer choice and their response to marketing 
communications.  
It is evident that, modeling the response of customers to various types of promotional 
offerings can be challenging due to data and methodological limitations as well as customer 
specific factors arising due to an influence of modern IT on consumer choices. In my dissertation 
first, I study how can we better represent the customer purchase history and incorporate temporal 
variations in their store visits and spending over time. The traditional marketing metrics such as 
RFM aggregated the customer information and therefore almost ignore real-time dynamic patterns 
in store visits and spending. Using advanced analytics tools such as Functional Shape Analysis 
can be utilized to capture and quantify the patterns in the data and use for customer response 
modeling. In this direction the first study uses information about the response of customers under 
three treatment scenarios (no promotion, customized promotion, and mass promotion) and links 
patterns in their purchase paths to their response. The study also demonstrates the how to generate 
a pseudo population using treatment weights in scenarios with more than two treatments to reduce 
bias due to sample selection.  
Next, I investigate the impact of rising internet usage on prescription choices of the 
physicians and their response to marketing actions. In this study, I propose a theory driven 
mechanism that explains the impact of internet on the drug choices of the physicians. Again, I 
establish the causal link between the key variables using a Quasi experiment research design and 
explicitly demonstrate the impact using counter factual simulations. The insights from this study 
were mainly from the consumer perspective my next study answers questions from the brand and 
manufacturer’s perspective.  
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A brand’s loyalty is tough to measure as it varies with time and is impacted by a host of 
external events. Therefore, in this essay I propose a data driven measure to measure certain 
dimensions of customer loyalty and study how the usage of internet (responsible for nearly perfect 
information in the competitive market) is influencing it. This essay also investigates if there are 
any spillover effects of manufacturer related information shocks on the brand’s loyalty. The 
following paragraphs present the abstracts for the three essays in the dissertation.  
Essay 1: Predicting consumer response to different types of direct retailer promotions is 
key to an effective retail marketing strategy. Despite the availability of granular information on 
consumer purchases, marketers often rely on aggregated purchase metrics related to recency, 
frequency and past monetary expenditures (RFM variables) to make such predictions and 
allocation decisions Recent developments have suggested that entire historical spending 
distribution may contain richer information for predicting promotional response above and beyond 
typical RFM and other time invariant measures (Zhang et al. 2015, Breiter and Huchzermeier, 
2014). Further, despite widespread use of customized promotions and the costs of implementing 
them compared to mass promotional activities, very little is known about the consumer metrics 
that can explain heterogeneity in response to these two types of promotions.  We expound upon 
this theme by investigating how richer aspects of consumer spending distribution over time can 
predict and explain differential response to direct promotions. Using a two-stage functional data 
framework, we consider consumers’ entire history of basket expenditures (spending path) and store 
visits (visits path). Based on this novel representation and a quasi-experimental research design 
we demonstrate how different features of pre-promotion spending and visits paths make certain 
consumers better targets for direct promotions. Specifically, we quantify information in the 
purchase paths in the form of two scores associated with the trend of store expenditure and visits 
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that explain more variations in sales during direct promotion than popular aggregated measures 
such as RFM. The data driven framework adapts to variations in spending data and gives managers 
an opportunity to gain new insights in consumer behavior for improving the performance of the 
marketing operations.  
Essay 2: The use of technology in medical practice has grown significantly over the years: 
physicians use internet regularly to keep themselves updated on medical findings and guidelines. 
The patients also keep themselves involved in the prescribing decisions by learning about 
prescription drug’s side effects and efficacy through online sources. At the same time, 
pharmaceutical company representatives regularly visit physicians to influence the prescription 
choice in favor of marketed drug. Considering the increasing reliance of physicians and patients 
on online sources of medical information the study investigates impact of rising internet usage on 
the prescription choices of the physicians. The study also highlights how the emergence of the 
internet as a key information sources for medical information may influence the physician’s 
responsiveness to pharmaceutical marketing. The expectancy value theory of decision making is 
used to motivate the hypothesis which hinges on the assertion that reduction in information costs 
are associated with encourage variety seeking optimal decision making. This, in turn, reduces 
prescription persistence and the impact of pharmaceutical detailing and drug popularity on 
prescription choice. We support our hypotheses with an empirical analysis of the prescription 
choices of geographically distributed physicians using a Quasi-experimental research design. 
Further, a counterfactual simulation analysis shows that the not accounting for internet penetration 
of the physician’s prescription region could lead to under or over estimation effects of detailing 
under low and high internet penetration scenarios.  
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Essay 3: Prescription loyalty is the indicator of a physician’s commitment to continue 
prescribing the drug. Pharmaceutical firms encourage such loyalty because it increases the market 
shares of their drugs and covers cost of research and development. However, loyalty may be tough 
to maintain in the digital age as more information about the quality of competing drugs from online 
sources and higher patient engagement may reduce the impact of prior experiences and thereby 
prescription loyalty. Therefore, empirically diagnosing the prescription drug’s loyalty across the 
physicians would allow firms to optimize expenditure for the range of manufactured drugs and 
prevent unnecessary costs and overcome the criticism related to over detailing. Using a 
longitudinal dataset on prescription choices of physicians over a period of ten years we propose a 
novel approach based on bipartite network of prescriber and prescription nodes to characterize a 
drug’s loyalty in the market. Two nodes are linked when the physician prescribes the drug and 
repeat prescription determines the strength of the link This representation allows to model temporal 
variations in the loyalty of the prescription drugs. The study also investigates the impact of 
manufacturer related information shocks and rising internet penetration on the drug loyalty. Our 
findings suggest that manufacturer related information shocks negatively impact the loyalty of 
extremely loyal prescribers while has no impact on the loyalty of prescribers with extremely low 
loyalty for the drug. We connect these findings with recent literature on consumer choice in 
information rich environment and motivate the application of the approach in resource allocation 
decisions.   
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CHAPTER 2: LOOKING BEYOND RFM METRICS FOR 
UNDERSTANDING RESPONSE TO DIRECT PROMOTIONS: A 
FUNCTIONAL DATA APPROACH 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The explosion of real-time transactional data available to retailers today offers significant 
opportunities when planning direct promotion campaigns.  In fact, the data-driven approach to 
customer analytics in the retail industry is expected to rise by 40% between 2014-19 (Markets and 
Markets, 2014). The personalized and preferential nature of targeted promotions, along with their 
limited-time offers and their randomness in nature that creates consumer uncertainty about the 
timing of future discounts, all accelerate spending during promotional periods (Bell et al. 2011; 
Kahn and Schmttlein 1992).  However, resources and budget constraints force retailers to target 
only a limited number of households with such direct promotions (Cui, Wong, and Lui 2006), and 
even those are often unsuccessful (Anderson et al. 2006; Jing and Lewis, 2011; Huang et al. 2014).  
This is primarily due to retailers’ reliance on superficial marketing metrics, such as those related 
to recency and frequency of purchase and past monetary expenditures (RFM variables) (Schweidel 
and Knox 2013), when planning direct promotional campaigns.  However, it is known that this 
type of aggregation of information does not account for heterogeneous temporal variations in 
monetary spending and store visits over time, which affect promotional responsiveness (Blattberg 
et al. 1981; Johnson et al. 2013).  As such, it is crucial for retailers to develop more sophisticated 
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models that better utilize historical data to better predict household responsiveness to different 
types of direct promotions. 
In this study, we show that the rich information contained in a household’s disaggregated 
spending and store visits history can be a robust predictor for promotional responsiveness both 
regarding statistical and practical reasons. First, prior studies have found evidence of temporal 
patterns and dynamics of spending (Damon et al. 2013) that are simply not captured using 
aggregated data and measures of recency, frequency and monetary value of the purchase.  For 
example, food stamp recipients may cluster their expenditures and typically have one large grocery 
trip each month because of transportation constraints. Alternatively, consider two households with 
the same aggregate store-level spending during a window of analysis before a promotion.  One 
might exhibit a decreasing trend in spending just before promotion, while the other might 
demonstrate an increasing trend, neither of which could be discerned using aggregated data.  
Second, retailers target customers with a variety of promotions and their response to these 
promotions over time cannot be captured using summaries of spending and store visits. The entire 
trajectory of spending or store visits may uncover patterns otherwise hindered by some aggregation 
procedure. For instance, a declining trend in spending after exposure to promotion may indicate 
customer churn or lesser chance of higher spending during the subsequent promotion.  It should 
be noted that we emphasize on the customer spending and visits in this research as traditional 
marketing metrics such as RFM aggregate customer’s visits (“recency (R) and frequency (F)”) and 
store spending (Monetary (M) value) information. It would also be interesting to investigate how 
the information on the household’s entire spending and visits path (collectively referred to as 
“Purchase Path” later in the manuscript) before the promotion are related to the RFM metrics and 
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what extra information can they add to our understanding of consumer response to the direct 
promotion.     
 Despite the growth in retailer customized direct promotions, as well as the costs of 
implementing them relative to mass promotions, no study to our knowledge has empirically 
investigated household heterogeneity in response to these two types of promotions based on 
household’s disaggregated spending and visits path data prior to promotional. Also, it would be 
interesting to investigate how customer’s response to the other loyalty card variables can be related 
to dynamic changes in spending trajectory. To address this gap, we propose a Functional Data 
Analysis (FDA) based approach to include dynamic information in the customer purchase path. 
Because retailers benefit the most from promotions that increase store expenditures across 
multiple categories versus simply expenditures on the promoted brands (Venkatesan and Farris 
2012), we are interested in the impact of direct promotions on store-level expenditures. We posit 
that a household’s trajectory of spending and visits over time can be useful for informing about its 
responsiveness to different types of direct promotions and other loyalty card interventions.  To this 
end, we address the following questions:  
1. Is there a relationship between a household’s pre-promotion spending and visits path and 
its store expenditures during a direct promotion? 
2. What dynamic features of a spending path are related to greater spending during a direct 
promotion and do these features determine the response to other campaign and store 
interventions?  
3. To what degree can spending paths better predict and explain a household’s response to 
direct promotions over and above traditional RFM variables. 
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To address these questions, we employ a non-parametric functional representation of a 
household’s pre-promotion spending and visits history (Ramsey and Silverman 2006).  We 
represent this “spending and visits path” of each household as a latent, but the continuous trajectory 
of store-level expenditures and store visits over time and draw relevant information from these 
continuous functions using dimension reduction techniques. As such, the main unit of analysis is 
the set of household’s spending and visits path prior to a direct promotion, with minimal data 
compression and no aggregation biases.  
The functional data representation of a household’s spending and visits history has two 
advantages: 1) it controls for heterogeneity and noise in spending across households, and 2) it is 
suitable for sparse and time-dependent observational data such as store expenditures (Ullah and 
Finch 2013). However, a caveat implied by this non-parametric representation is the potential for 
fitting bias. This means that instead of explaining the actual signal, the model may “learn” 
irrelevant noise, compromising the quality of the predictions as well as the interpretability of the 
results. To mitigate this issue, we develop a two-stage approach that addresses the concerns of 
fitting bias both in simulations and in our empirical application.  
We empirically test the proposed framework using loyalty card data provided by a major 
grocery chain that sent mass and customized promotions to select households during the time the 
data was collected. To account bias in model estimates due to nonrandom assignment of the 
promotional campaigns to the customer we employ an Inverse Probability Treatment Weights 
(IPTW) based approach. In this approach, we weight the customers on the propensity for a 
treatment assignment to generate a pseudo-randomized treatment assignment.  
Our findings based on a quasi-experimental design show a strong relationship between 
RFM and purchase path features. However, specific purchase path associated with household’s 
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spending and visit’s trajectory over time explain further variations in within store spending during 
the direct promotion. More specifically, the increasing or decreasing trend of the purchases visits 
moderates of the response to various loyalty card and promotional campaign interventions. For 
instance, households exhibiting increasing spending and visits trend over time spend significantly 
higher in both types of promotions.  
The results of our study reveal the importance of considering dynamic variations in 
household expenditures for predicting response to direct promotions. We also show how retailers 
can quantify the features of the spending paths of households new to their databases, and with 
limited amounts of historical data, to significantly improve the forecasts of the promotional 
response for such households, and by doing so, can improve their targeting strategies.    
The rest of the essay is organized as follows.  First, we review the existing research on 
segmentation and forecasting of response to direct promotions. We then describe and explain the 
importance of examining households’ spending and visits path and how they can be used to predict 
expenditure during retailer promotions. Next, we present the method, data, results, and robustness 
checks from our empirical analysis and draw managerial insights from the findings.  Finally, we 
conclude by connecting our findings to existing research and drawing managerial implications.  
 
2.2 Background and Motivation  
 
Modeling response to direct promotions is a high priority to retailers for increasing store 
sales, reducing costs and improving store profitability. However, it can be challenging to forecast 
household expenditures during targeted promotions, making strategic decisions in this area 
difficult (Ali et al. 2009).  In fact, less than 20% of direct promotions tend to be profitable due to 
inaccurate forecasts of response to the promoted offerings. In turn these inaccuracies can lead to 
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increases in retailer inventory holding costs when the demand is overestimated or stock outs when 
demand is underestimated (Jing and Lewis 2011; Breiter and Huhzermeier 2014; Huang et al. 
2014).  
While manufacturers often provide and fund the redemption costs of their coupons that are 
part of a retailer's direct mail promotional campaign, it is the retailer who identifies the households 
that will receive the direct promotion.   Typically, retailers segment their households based on 
certain thresholds of contribution relevant to long-term profitability, such as the recency (R), 
frequency (F) and monetary (M) value of past store visits, and use these to determine which are 
most likely to respond to, and thus will receive, a targeted promotion (Donkers et al. 2006; 
Schweidel and Knox 2013).  Buckinx and Van den Poel (2005) used past purchasing behavior to 
predict the future probability of (partial) defection from a fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) 
retailer.  Others have utilized time-invariant variables such as demographics (Heilman et al. 2003; 
Zahavi and Levin 1997; Baesens et al. 2002; Buckinx and Poel 2005), promotion features (Huang 
et al. 2014; Cooper et al. 1999; Trapero et al. 2014) and store display variables (Divakar et al. 
2005; Trapero et al. 2014) to predict promotional response.    
Sophisticated Promotional Support Systems such as SCAN*PRO (Leeflang et al. 2002) or 
PromoCastTM (Cooper et al. 1999) use statistically motivated regression or time series models, 
with inputs such as RFM variables, price cuts, feature advertising, special displays, etc., but can 
easily over-fit the data and have interpretability issues.   
As an alternative to complex response models, some retailers use a “base times lift” 
approach to account for the rise in expenditures during a direct promotion (Huang et al. 2014). 
This two-step procedure generates a baseline forecast with simple time-series models and then 
adjusts for incoming promotional events.  Lee et al. (2007) and Nikolopoulos (2010) developed 
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forecasting systems where the baseline sales forecast from statistical models were adjusted based 
on information from similar prior promotions or “guesses” of the managers to account for 
accelerated spending during promotions.  The problem with these approaches is they require 
substantial longitudinal information on a household’s response to similar past promotions, which 
is impractical when no information on a similar promotion is available, as well as a manager’s 
expertise to adjust the forecasts, which can lead to subjectivity bias.    
Within non-parametric techniques, artificial neural networks (Baesens et al. 2002, Zahavi 
and Levin 1997) and regression tree methods (Rao and Steckel 1995) with RFM variables have 
also been used to predict customer response to direct promotions. However, these models provide 
little managerial insights and the selection of the best network topology is a concern as it is not 
possible to determine the fitting bias of such models on the data.  
The actions of competing stores, regulatory changes, the emergence of new retail channels, 
and the evolving customer-retailer relationship over time may also impact response to direct 
promotions (Sood et al. 2016). These temporal and dynamic variations in response to direct 
promotions call for real-time adjustments in targeting strategies based on the vast amount of data 
collected through marketing information systems. One of the challenge that most of the prior 
research and practice face while analyzing fast moving customer data is that of visualizing and 
extracting useful information for modeling. Due to limitations of majority of statistical modeling 
approaches researchers often employed aggregated or time-invariant profiling measures, ignoring 
potential temporal variations in household spending and visits and their impact on direct marketing 
efforts.   
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to utilize a households’ disaggregated 
spending path history to: 1) predict response to direct promotions, 2) identify the dynamic features 
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of spending and visit paths that significantly explain direct promotional response, and 3) assess 
the response to different types of promotion based on the pre-promotion spending patterns. 
2.2.1 Using Purchase Paths to Predict Promotion Response: A Functional Data Approach  
 
Loyalty card data provides retailers with information on the discrete store expenditures and 
purchase visits of households over time. These discrete observations can be thought of as 
realizations of an underlying continuous process, driven by household demand and resulting in a 
household’s store purchases and visits.  We will refer to this continuous process as a household’s 
spending and visits path (collectively as “Purchase Paths”).  The first Figure 1 below shows the 
spending path of a household starting at time -20 (i.e., 20 weeks before the promotion) and ending 
at time 0 (i.e., the time of the promotion), where the dots correspond to the discrete store 
expenditures, and the dashed smooth curve represents the underlying spending path. The smooth 
curve is recovered from the discrete observations via Functional Data Analysis which we motivate 
and describe next.  
In figure 2 below the dark dots represents if the household visited the store (1) or not (0) 
during a week. The smoothed curve imposed on these discrete observations corresponds to the 
continuous visits path of the customer. Usually, the aggregated RFM measures would summarize 
the past 20 weeks information in the forms of three metrics, but the methods in the FDA techniques 
would allow incorporating the information in the entire spending and visits history of the 
customers.  For instance, in the above figure, we can observe that the customer spending and store 
trips are consistently increasing before the promotion which could have some implications for their 
spending during the direct promotions. Prior studies have also documented that excess inventory 
as the result of frequent purchases before a promotion can reduce overall spending during a 
promotion (Johnson et al. 2013).   
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        Figure 1 Spending Path 
 
Figure 2 Visits Path 
 
However, declining spending and visits trend for a Household may indicate store 
switching, a decrease in bulk purchases, or a shrinking household due to external forces 
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unobserved by the retailer, but all of which could affect a household’s promotional response.  So, 
while RFM variables might identify two households that spent the same amount at a store in the 
past month, spending and visits path can identify how households differ in their temporal evolution 
in ways that might affect their promotional response.   
The central assumption of a Functional Data Approach is the existence of a differentiable 
smooth, continuous function that generates the observed data.  In the context of our study, this is 
a continuous demand for grocery items leading to observable store visits and store-level 
expenditures.  Thus, our first objective is to recover from the observed data the smooth and 
continuous underlying function. One caveat is the potential risk of over- or under-fitting the 
smooth continuous function to the data; that is, the potential risk of recovering noise rather than 
the signal (Ramsey and Silverman 2006).  We propose a six-step approach that minimizes this risk.   
We provide an outline and summary of these six steps below.     
Step 1: Generate continuous spending and visit path curves.  Using Figure 3 for illustrative 
purposes, let 𝑆𝑖(𝑡) and 𝑉𝑖(𝑡)  represent a household (‘i’) observed weekly store expenditures and 
trips (1 if customa er visited the store on week t and 0 otherwise)  respectively leading up to the 
potential exposure to a direct promotion.  In the first step, we approximate 𝑆𝑖(𝑡) and 𝑉𝑖(𝑡) using a 
smooth, continuous and differentiable functions 𝐹𝑖
𝑠(𝑡) and 𝐹𝑖
𝑣(𝑡) using smoothing splines. 
Smoothing splines for example for observations 𝑆𝑖(𝑡) would minimize the residual sum of squares 
∑ |𝑆𝑖(𝑡) −  𝐹𝑖
𝑠(𝑡)|2𝑡2𝑡=𝑡1  and control for over-fitting or local variability by imposing a roughness 
penalty (R):  
R (𝐹𝑖
𝑠)   =  ∫ |𝐹𝑖
𝑠′′(𝑡)|
2𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
𝑑𝑡   --- 1 
Locally highly variable, or “wiggly”, curves will have larger values of R.  
∑ |𝑆𝑖𝑡 – 𝐹𝑖
𝑠(𝑡)|2𝑡2𝑡=𝑡1  +   𝜆𝑗 ∫ |𝐹𝑖
𝑠′′(𝑡)|
2𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
𝑑𝑡 --- 2 
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A smoothing spline minimizes equation (2) which balances data-fit against over-fitting via 
the smoothing parameter 𝜆𝑗. Larger values of 𝜆𝑗 impose larger penalties on “wiggliness” and result 
in functions 𝐹𝑖
𝑠(𝑡) and 𝐹𝑖
𝑣(𝑡) that resemble a straight line.  As 𝜆𝑗 approaches zero, the function 
𝐹𝑖(𝑡) becomes more flexible and, in the limit, reduces the residuals to zero allowing the function 
to capture every data point perfectly.  
The choice of 𝜆𝑗 has a strong impact on the resulting curves as it controls the balance 
between under- and over-smoothing.  We optimize 𝜆𝑗 in an iterative, data-driven way as outlined 
in Step 4. More details on our smoothing spline procedure can be found in Web Appendix A.  
Step 2: Functional shape analysis and principal scores.  Step 1 identifies the continuous 
functional object 𝐹𝑖
𝑠(𝑡) and 𝐹𝑖
𝑣(𝑡) that represents a household’s continuous store-level spending 
and weekly visits path. However, a continuous curve cannot be used in a regression-like prediction 
or forecasting model, as regression models rely on discrete information as input variables. To that 
end, we employ functional shape analysis to extract basis shapes that form the building blocks for 
the functional objects.  For each basis shape, we obtain a set of scores (via principal regression 
analysis) that will be employed in the prediction model. For example, if three basis shapes best 
represent each functional object, then for each object, three separate (principal) scores are 
obtained.  These scores uniquely determine the functional object and can be used as discrete input 
variables in the prediction model. The appendix A and B provide more details on the Functional 
Principal Component Analysis (FPCA) procedure.  
Step 3: Model building. In Step 3 we use the input variables, which include the functional 
principal component scores from the previous step, to build a prediction model. Let 𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑖1~ 𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑛1 
denote the top n1 principal scores that explain at least 90% of the variation (Xiong and Bhardwaj 
2014) for the spending trajectory of customer i, 𝑉𝐶𝑆𝑖1~ 𝑉𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑛2 denote the top n2 principal scores 
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for the visits trajectory of customer i . We then model  𝑌𝑖  (total expenditure during the direct 
promotion) as:  
𝑌𝑖   = f (𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑖1~ 𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑛1, 𝑉𝐶𝑆𝑖1~ 𝑉𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑛2) + 𝜀𝑖  --- 3 
We use stepwise regression via the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for variable selection and 
to eliminate uninformative input variables.  
Step 4: Optimizing the roughness penalty 𝜆𝑗.  As pointed out earlier, the quality of 𝐹𝑖
𝑠(𝑡) 
and 𝐹𝑖
𝑣(𝑡) and, from Step 1 depends heavily on the choice of the roughness penalty parameter 𝜆𝑗. 
In fact, 𝜆𝑗 controls the trade-off between over- and under-fitting and hence between capturing the 
signal vs. modeling noise.   
To avoid fitting biases, we iterate Steps 1-3 over various values of 𝜆𝑗 and then select the 
value of 𝜆𝑗 (𝜆𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙) that results in the lowest 𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑗 for the dependent variable of interest 𝑌𝑖, 
resulting in the best model that trades off fit and complexity. Essentially, spending path curves 
approximate the latent stochastic process of a household’s spending from its longitudinal discrete 
store-level spending data, possibly perturbed by random errors assumed to be independent across 
and within customers (Wang, Chiou, and Muller 2016).  We note that lower values of 𝜆𝑗 lead to 
more flexible curves that may incorporate more noise from the household data, and this in turn 
will lead to lower explanatory power of the principal scores, implying more principal scores are 
required to summarize at least 90% (Xiong and Bhardwaj 2014) of information across the curves. 
In such cases, the final predictive models identified in Step 3 would have a greater number of 
predictors in the analysis. 
Steps 5 and 6: Final Model and prediction.  In these steps, we obtain the final model using 
significant features represented as principal component scores of the curves 𝐹𝑖
𝑠(𝑡) and 𝐹𝑖
𝑣(𝑡) 
obtained by using 𝜆𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙 . The final model (Equation 3)  is flexible enough to include other key 
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predictors or variable of interests  also added generate insights and improve predictions. It is 
important to note that the dependent variable 𝑌𝑖 in our study is the total amount spent by a 
household during the n week promotional period, as this is a key metric for retailers when 
evaluating the effectiveness of promotional efforts and is recommended for providing meaningful 
insights from household data (Xavier et al. 2004; Stilley et al. 2010). In contrast, all predictor 
variables, including the function 𝐹𝑖
𝑠(𝑡) and 𝐹𝑖
𝑣(𝑡), are computed before the start of the promotional 
period, like lagged variables in econometric models.  
We also generate insights by segmenting households on key spending path features and 
identify patterns in the spending paths that are associated with higher spending during the mass 
and customized direct promotions.  The response of the new customers to the direct promotions is 
predicted by obtaining the smoothed functions 𝐹𝑖
𝑠(𝑡) and 𝐹𝑖
𝑣(𝑡) using 𝜆𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙  and using the 
relevant principal component scores as predictors in the final model. We discuss this in more detail 
in the next section where we present an empirical application of this two-stage FDA for a grocery 
store retailer. 
 
2.3 Empirical Analysis and Results  
2.3.1 Data and Measures  
 
We utilize two years (March 2005-March 2007) of loyalty card data for 798 customers 
from a leading national grocery store chain for.  Fifty-five million customers are enrolled in the 
retailer's loyalty card program and 13M of these household’s shop at the retailer every month. 
Furthermore, 80% of the retailer's customers carry the loyalty card and 95% those households’ 
expenditures at the retailer are captured with the loyalty card.   
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The information gathered on cardholders was used by the retailer to send customized and 
mass direct mail promotional incentives to certain households based on their value to the firm. 
Despite the growth of targeted digital promotions, higher response rates of direct mail (3.7%) vs. 
digital (0.6%) promotions explain why retailers continue to rely on direct mail promotions to retain 
customers and increase store spending (Forbes Insights and Turn 2015).  The dataset contains 
information about the timing and nature of the direct mail efforts, however details about how 
households were chosen for each promotion was not disclosed by the data provider, other than 
those chosen to receive each promotion type crossed a certain threshold of revenue contribution.  
We note that we test for the potential of sample selection bias later in the paper.     
The customized promotions contained 14-16 coupons specially chosen for each household 
receiving one.  The coupons were of the form, “$5 off Category X when spending $20” and “$1 
off Brand X”, and the mailer envelope included the copy, “Thanks for being such a great customer!  
Please enjoy the savings reserved only for premier customers like you.”  Figure 4 shows an 
example of a customized promotion.  
The mass promotions took the form of a brochure with a themed event (e.g., "Back to 
School," Healthy Living," "Breakfast," etc.) and contained recipes, helpful tips, etc. along with 
approximately ten coupons for products related to the theme (i.e., pencils and notebook, health 
products, breakfast sausage, etc.).  The same set of coupons was included in every brochure for 
the same themed event and the mailer read, "Premier customer coupons inside” or “Thanks for 
shopping with us.”  Figure 4 shows a page from a brochure under the “Back to School” theme. 
Both customized and mass promotions have coupon redemption duration, and, in this study, we 
are interested in the household’s spending during this duration.    
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The dataset contained the store visits of every household (when it used its loyalty card), 
beginning with the first store visit after signing up for the retailer’s loyalty program.  Therefore, 
the first direct promotion observed for each household was the first direct communication 
between the retailer and the household.  We observe the total amount a household spent at the 
retailer on each store visit, the primary variable of interest and various other campaign-related 
variables, loyalty program variables and customer demographic information. Our dataset has a 
total of 798 unique customers whose purchase history was recorded by the retailer within a two-
year period using the loyalty card.  
 
Figure 3 Customized (left) and Mass Coupon (right) 
Since some customers were enrolled in the loyalty program towards the later part of the 
observation period, there is a difference in the time frame for which the transaction data of the 
customer is recorded.  On average, we have 92 weeks of total store expenditure and visits history 
for these customers with the maximum being 102 weeks and minimum being 25 weeks.  The 
complete list of variables and their description can be found in the Table 1 below. 
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Table 1 Variable Description 
Variable Description 
Dependent Variable 
Campaign Sales (SALES) Total amount of dollars spent during the promotional 
campaign. Includes a reference six-week period when no 
campaign was present.  
Campaign Variables 
Campaign (CAMP) Represented by two dummy indicators such that  CAMP1 =
1 (𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝐴) and CAMP2 = 1 (if 
targeted campaign is B) during the observation period. ‘No 
Campaign’ being the baseline level. 
Campaign Before (CBEF) Number of times the household is targeted with the similar 
campaign before. 
Campaign Period (CPER) Number of weeks for which the household is exposed to a 
promotional campaign  
Total Coupons (COUP) Number of coupons sent to the household if targeted with a 
promotional campaign  
Favorite Coupons (FAVC) Percentage of coupons in the household’s favorite category  
Total Campaigns (TCAMP) Total number of campaigns the household is exposed to 
during the promotion period.  
Loyalty Program Variables 
Loyalty discounts (LDISC) Average loyalty discounts advertised in the household’s 
favorite category during the promotion period.  
Weekly Mailer (MAIL) Average number of household’s top 30 favorite categories 
featured in the weekly mailer during the promotion period 
End-of-Aisle Display (DISP) Average number of household’s top 30 favorite categories 
with an end-of-aisle display during the promotion period.  
Time in Loyalty Program (TIME)  Number of weeks household is enrolled to the loyalty 
program when received the campaign  
Customer Demographics 
Age (AGE) Age of the customer 
Income (INCOME) The income in dollars of the customer  
Married (MARRIED) Dummy variable that equals 1 if a customer is married and 0 
otherwise  
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Table 2 Variable Description continued 
Household Size (HHSIZE) Total number of family members in the household 
Transaction Variables 
Recency (REC) Weeks elapsed since last purchase 
Frequency (FREQ) Number of store visits in past 20 weeks 
Monetary (MON) Monetary value of spending during past 20 weeks  
pcs.2 Second principle component score of the spending path  
vcs.2 Second principle component score of visits path 
 
Over this two-year period, the retailer targeted the customers with 24 direct promotions 
with some customers receiving up to 14 different direct promotion while some are receiving none. 
These promotional campaigns spanned from 6 to 10 weeks implying that the customers had the 
opportunity to redeem the coupons received in the direct mail within that duration. There were 
durations within the observation period when customers had the opportunity to redeem coupons 
from both types (customized and mass) of direct promotions or were targeted with multiple 
promotional campaigns during the same time.  
Out of 24 direct promotions, 3 were customized while the remaining 21 were mass 
promotions where all customers received the same set of coupons based on a particular theme. 
However, customized promotions usually in our sample, the least amount of time it took for a 
customer to receive a direct promotion discount since the beginning of the loyalty program was 21 
weeks. Therefore, for each customer, we utilize 20 weeks of prior spending and visits trajectory to 
understand the response to direct promotions. Households tend to exhibit weekly and monthly 
cyclic fluctuations in store expenditures (Damon, King and Leibtag 2013), therefore a twenty-
week spending history is sufficient to capture key patterns in the spending paths. Furthermore, due 
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to the frequent targeting of customers by the retailer in our data, it was rare for a household to go 
more than ten weeks without being targeted with a promotion.     
Table 3  Variable Summary 
 
Campaign A 
N = 2172 
Campaign B 
N = 1667 
 
No Campaign (NC) 
N = 708 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
SALES 553 399 562 369 479 400 
CBEF 3.26 2.06 4.94 3.15 0.70 1.68 
FAVC 19.19 11.11 6.05 11.04 0.00 0.00 
ALLC 1.58 0.70 2.29 0.78 0.00 0.00 
COUP 7.56 2.38 9.30 6.83 0.00 0.00 
LDISC -19.50 3.32 -19.62 3.34 -19.28 3.50 
DISP 18.50 3.71 18.94 3.65 18.06 4.56 
MAIL 20.01 3.04 20.45 3.02 19.92 4.10 
AGE 44.49 11.68 42.83 11.12 44.89 11.63 
INCOME 64.50 47.49 71.12 51.95 64.85 47.73 
MARRIED 0.42 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.50 
NUMKIDS 0.53 0.94 0.67 1.01 0.57 0.97 
TIME 58.59 14.76 65.71 16.92 39.20 19.31 
CPER 8.22 0.57 6.43 0.99 8.05 1.38 
REC 0.41 1.18 0.27 0.82 0.77 2.36 
FREQ 15.67 3.54 16.72 3.09 13.72 4.88 
MON 67.18 42.77 89.68 50.15 54.63 44.70 
pcs.2 -1.84 62.25 -2.95 72.62 12.63 63.71 
vcs.2 -0.174 0.425 -0.262 0.382 0.115 0.50 
 
The unit of analysis in our study is a customer-campaign combination and the objective is 
to study that impact of pre-promotion spending and visits trajectory and various loyalty program, 
campaign and household related factors on the spending during the promotional period. To contrast 
the promotional spending with non-promotional spending or to develop a baseline spending case 
we randomly selected a duration (uniformly drawn [6-10]) within the customer time series when 
no promotion was present and extract the 20-week prior spending and visits trajectory for model 
building. Eventually, we obtain 4547 observations for each household-campaign combination 
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(including no campaign period) and the table below summarizes the variable statistics for the 
dataset. 
For each promotional or no promotional period we implement the proposed two-stage FDA 
model to extract the trajectory information in the form of the Principal Component Scores. 
Essentially, for all customer-campaign combination we proceed through steps of FDA framework 
described before to incorporate entire information in the final model. To address the research 
questions of the study we model the total spending of a household during a promotional campaign 
as following:  
LOG(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡) =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 x 𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2 x 𝐶𝐵𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽3 x 𝐶𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽4 x 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽5 x 
𝐹𝐴𝑉𝐶𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽6 x 𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽7 x 𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽8 x 𝐿𝑀𝐴𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽9 x 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽10 x 𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡  +  
𝛽11 x 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽12 x 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽13 x 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽14 x 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽15 x 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡  +  
𝛽16 x 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽17 x 𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽𝑆 x 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽𝑉 x 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡  + 
𝜀𝑖𝑗 ;   i = 1,…n, j = 1,…. 𝑚𝑖     --- 4 
Where, 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡is the sales or total spending for customer ‘i’ in the promotional campaign 
at time ‘t’, n represents the total number of households, 𝑚𝑖 is number of repeated observations or 
promotional campaigns for the customer ‘i’ in the sample.  It should be noted that campaign 
assignment to the customers is not random and is driven by a process which is not known to us. 
Hence, we account for the endogeneity in the promotion assignment using propensity score 
weighting procedure.  
2.3.2 Accounting for Endogeneity in Campaign Assignment   
 
To address the possibility of campaign selection bias, we investigate whether there are 
systematic differences in the households that received the two types of promotions or no promotion 
based on their RFM metrics, spending and visit trajectory and demographic information. To 
address these concerns, we employ Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting (IPTW) procedure 
using propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984) that allows us to obtain statistically 
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meaningful between-group comparisons in case of confounding treatments. The IPTW procedure 
allows creating a pseudo-population (weighted groups that mimic no confounding scenario) where 
the pretreatment covariates (RFM, demographics etc.) and campaign selection would be 
independent of each other (a property of a randomized treatment).We randomize the selection of 
the customers in an Quasi-experimental fashion by assigning appropriate weights to the 
households based on their propensity to be selected into any of the three groups (no promotion, 
campaign A and campaign B).    
The selection of a household to a promotional campaign may depend on their RFM metrics, 
demographics variable (e.g., income) or spending or visits trajectory. For instance, customers with 
high prior monetary spending, income or frequent visits are usually rewarded with the discount 
coupons by the retailers. If we observe all the pretreatment variables that determine the campaign 
selection decision and some observations in the treatment groups have similar values of the 
covariates then, using the appropriate weighting the treatment sample can be reweighted to make 
the distribution of the covariates match across the groups.   
Prior studies have found that if the weights given to the households are equal to the 
reciprocal of the propensity of being selected into the treatment, then the reweighting should 
succeed in randomizing the pretreatment covariates across the treatment groups. Therefore, we 
construct the IPTWs by estimating each household’s probability of having received their 
respective treatments (No promotion, Campaign A, and Campaign B) based on observed 
pretreatment variables and then weight by the inverse of their assignment probabilities. If 𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 
is an indicator variable denoting whether the subject ‘i’ was selected for a campaign at time tor not 
and if 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the propensity score for being selected in the assigned campaign for the household 
then, the IPTW weights can be defined as: 
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𝐼𝑃𝑇𝑊𝑖 =  𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 / 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + (1-𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡) / 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  --- 5 
Once the IPTWs are generated, treatment effects are obtained by estimating the outcome 
model like equation 4 using weighted regression (Joeff et al., 2004). Therefore, the first step in 
IPTW weighting is the estimation of the propensity of being selected in their respective groups 
three groups such that: 
𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡−𝑙 , 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡−𝑙 , 𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡−𝑙, 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡,  𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡,  𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡,  𝐻𝐻𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡, 
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖−𝑙, 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑙 , 𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡−𝑙 )   --- 6 
We model the propensity of being selected for a campaign (𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡) for a household as a 
function of observable pretreatment covariates three weeks prior to the beginning of the promotion. 
We selected a lag of three weeks in the pretreatment covariates as retailers identify the appropriate 
households for the promotions up to three weeks in advance. We also experiment with other lags 
such as 2 and 4 weeks and found no significant variations in our causal estimates.  
We use Generalized Boosted Regression (GBR) to estimate the 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 as they produce more 
balanced weights than multinomial logistic regression in a multiple treatment scenario. The GBR 
models are tree-based regression models which use a recursive algorithm to describe the 
relationship between a set of pretreatment variables and the treatment assignment (McCaffrey et 
al., 2013). Unlike parametric logistic regression which assumes that the covariates are linear and 
additive on log-odds scale GBR can handle a large number of pretreatment covariates while also 
allowing for flexible, nonlinear relationships amongst the pretreatment variables.  
The recursive algorithm of GBR starts with a simple regression tree and with each iteration 
a new tree is added such that it provides the best fit to the residuals from the earlier iteration. Each 
iteration increases the likelihood of obtaining the data, and with sufficient iteration, the algorithm 
can perfectly fit the data or overfit it. In the case of propensity score matching task, the suitable 
condition for ending the iterative process would be attaining the balance of the pre-treatment 
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variables across the treatment groups. Essentially, one would like to end the iteration of the GBR 
algorithm when a statistic such as absolute standardized mean difference (ASMD) is not significant 
for all pre-treatment variables across each combination of the treatment pair (McCaffrey et al., 
2013). For example, in the final balanced sample, the ASMD of say Monetary value (M) of 
spending prior to the promotion should not be significantly different across household for all 
possible treatment pairs (e.g. No Campaign and Campaign A, Campaign A and Campaign B, 
Campaign B and No Campaign).  
2.3.3 Model Fit Statistics  
 
Applying the two-stage FDA framework approach, we start by using the spending and 
visits paths of each household for over the twenty weeks prior to the beginning of response period 
(including promotion types A and B and no promotion period) under consideration. We first related 
the total amount spent during the response period (𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡), to identify the optimal smoothing 
parameter (𝜆𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙) for the calibrated model.  To optimize 𝜆𝑗, we investigate a smoothed 
functional representation of the household’s purchase paths (spending and visits path) across a 
range of values of the parameter (𝜆𝑗).  
Given the absence of any knowledge of the spending patterns that determine 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡, we 
consider all possible principal components curves that together explain 90% of the variation across 
respective smoothed curves 𝐹𝑖
𝑠(𝑡) and 𝐹𝑖
𝑣(𝑡). The top ‘n’ principal components scores related to 
the spending trajectory function are represented as (𝑝𝑐𝑠. 1, 𝑝𝑐𝑠. 2 … . . 𝑝𝑐𝑠. 𝑛) while those related 
to the visits trajectory function are represented as (𝑣𝑐𝑠. 1, 𝑣𝑐𝑠. 2 … . 𝑣𝑐𝑠. 𝑛).  The principal 
component scores represent the similarity of the household trajectory along the identified major 
sources of variations for all households in the sample, or principal component (PC) vectors. For 
example, 𝑃𝐶𝑆1 for a household describes the extent to which its spending trajectory function 𝐹𝑖
𝑠(𝑡) 
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varies in the direction of the first principal component (𝑃𝐶1𝑆) obtained from the FPCA of the 
spending trajectories (𝐹𝑠(𝑡)) of all households in the sample. It is evaluated as 
∑  𝑃𝐶1(𝑡) (𝐹𝑖
𝑠(𝑡) – 𝐹𝑠(𝑡))𝑡 , where 𝐹𝑠(𝑡)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the mean spending path across all households (Xiong 
and Bharadwaj 2014).  Next, 𝑉𝐶𝑆2 for a household describes the extent to which a household’s 
velocity curve (𝐹𝑣(𝑡)) varies in the direction of the second principal component (𝑃𝐶2𝑉) vector 
obtained from the FPCA of the visits trajectory functions (𝐹𝑣(𝑡)) of all households in the sample.  
Table 4  Final Model for Various Smoothing Parameters 
Spar 
(𝜆′𝑗) 
 
R. Sq. AIC Model 
0 
 
0.3836 
 
10994 
 
lsales ~ pcs.1 + pcs.2 + pcs.3 + pcs.4 + pcs.5 + pcs.6 + pcs.7 + pcs.8 + pcs.9 + pcs.10 
+ pcs.11 + pcs.12 + pcs.13 + pcs.14 + pcs.15 + pcs.16 + vcs.1 + vcs.2 + vcs.3 + vcs.4 
+ vcs.5 + vcs.6 + vcs.7 + vcs.8 + vcs.9 + vcs.10 + vcs.11 + vcs.12 + vcs.13 + vcs.14 
+ vcs.15 + vcs.16 + vcs.17 + vcs.18 
0.1 
 
0.3838 
 
10992 
 
lsales ~ pcs.1 + pcs.2 + pcs.3 + pcs.4 + pcs.5 + pcs.6 + pcs.7 + pcs.8 + pcs.9 + pcs.10 
+ pcs.11 + pcs.12 + pcs.13 + pcs.14 + pcs.15 + pcs.16 + vcs.1 + vcs.2 + vcs.3 + vcs.4 
+ vcs.5 + vcs.6 + vcs.7 + vcs.8 + vcs.9 + vcs.10 + vcs.11 + vcs.12 + vcs.13 + vcs.14 
+ vcs.15 + vcs.16 + vcs.17 + vcs.18 
0.2 
 
0.3850 
 
10979 
 
lsales ~ pcs.1 + pcs.2 + pcs.3 + pcs.4 + pcs.5 + pcs.6 + pcs.7 + pcs.8 + pcs.9 + pcs.10 
+ pcs.11 + pcs.12 +  pcs.13 + pcs.14 + vcs.1 + vcs.2 + vcs.3 + vcs.4 + vcs.5 + vcs.6 + 
vcs.7 + vcs.8 + vcs.9 + vcs.10 + vcs.11 + vcs.12 + vcs.13 + vcs.14 + vcs.15 
0.3 
0.3855 
 
10965 
 
lsales ~ pcs.1 + pcs.2 + pcs.3 + pcs.4 + pcs.5 + pcs.6 + pcs.7 + pcs.8 + pcs.9 + vcs.1 + 
vcs.2 + vcs.3 + vcs.4 + vcs.5 + vcs.6 + vcs.7 + vcs.8 + vcs.9 + vcs.10 
0.4 
0.3857 
 
10957 
 
lsales ~ pcs.1 + pcs.2 + pcs.3 + pcs.4 + pcs.5 + pcs.6 + vcs.1 + vcs.2 + vcs.3 + vcs.4 + 
vcs.5 + vcs.6 + vcs.7 
0.5 
0.3858 
 
10953 
 
lsales ~ pcs.1 + pcs.2 + pcs.3 + pcs.4 + vcs.1 + vcs.2 + vcs.3 + vcs.4 + vcs.5 
0.6 
0.3851 
 
10955 
 
lsales ~ pcs.1 + pcs.2 + pcs.3 + vcs.1 + vcs.2 + vcs.3 
0.7 
0.3854 
 
10952 
 
lsales ~ pcs.1 + pcs.2 + vcs.1 + vcs.2 + vcs.3 
0.8 
0.3838 
 
10963 
 
lsales ~ pcs.1 + pcs.2 + vcs.1 + vcs.2 
0.9 
0.1970 
 
12165 
 
lsales ~ +vcs.1 + vcs.2 
1 
0.1970 
 
12165 
 
lsales ~ +vcs.1 + vcs.2 
 
Table 3 shows the fit statistics Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) for the models estimated 
in Stage 1 for different values of the smoothing parameter 𝜆𝑗. We observe that the models with 
smaller values of 𝜆𝑗 require a greater number of principal component scores of spending and visits 
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trajectory to explain approximately the same amount of variation in log(SALES) during the 
response period. This is due to higher roughness or variation in the representative functional curves 
with lower values of the smoothing parameter (𝜆𝑗). The functions with lower values of  𝜆𝑗 
incorporate more noise from the household spending and visits trajectory and therefore have 
smaller explanatory power. 
The goodness-of-fit measures are also higher for smaller values of 𝜆𝑗, but subsequently 
decrease (indicating better fit) as 𝜆𝑗 increases, before rising again for higher values of this variable. 
Although the variation explained by these models (Adjusted R-Squared) does not vary 
significantly with  𝜆𝑗, the number of component scores required to explain the variation does 
change. We conduct a simulation experiment to demonstrate how the choice of  𝜆𝑗 may influence 
the model fit and prediction errors (see Web Appendix XXX). 
Based on the above, we identify the model with 𝜆𝑗 = 0.7 in table 3 as the best fitting model 
for the customized promotion as it has the lowest AIC (10952) among all the models.  The results 
show that the pcs.1 and pcs.2 the scores associated with first and second principal components of 
the spending trajectory curves (𝐹𝑠(𝑡)) and vcs.1, vcs.2, vcs.3 the scores associated with first, 
second and third principal components of the visits trajectory curves for a household best predict 
sales during the response period.   
The above findings provide preliminary evidence of the effect of the spending and visits 
trajectory of the households on the sales. Specifically, we find that two features associated with 
the spending trajectory curves and three features associated with the visits trajectory curves of a 
household best predict the sales during the response period. Next, we study the relationship 
between the features drawn from the spending and visits trajectories and the popular RFM metrics.   
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2.3.4 Relationship Between RFM and Purchase Path Features   
 
The RFM metrics and the features of the spending and visits paths (Purchase Path) in the 
form of principal component scores are obtained from a similar information source. In the RFM 
measures of recency and frequency are drawn from the data related to the store visits of a 
household over time while the scores vcs.1, vcs.2 and vcs.3 obtained earlier summarize 
information in the visits trajectory of the households. Similarly, the monetary value of spending 
aggregate information in the prior spending of the households without considering the variations 
in the spending trajectory over time.  Table 4 below shows the correlation between the RFM 
measures derived from the raw data and the features derived from the smoothed trajectory 
functions.  
Table 5 Correlation Between RFM and Purchase Path Features 
 pcs.1 pcs.2 vcs.1 vcs.2 vcs.3 R F M 
pcs.1 1.000 0.000 0.519 0.004 -0.019 0.207 -0.519 -0.999 
pcs.2 0.000 1.000 -0.017 0.498 0.017 -0.163 0.014 -0.00068 
vcs.1 0.519 -0.017 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.451 -0.999 -0.51886 
vcs.2 0.004 0.498 0.000 1.000 0.000 -0.324 -0.005 -0.0041 
vcs.3 -0.019 0.017 0.000 0.000 1.000 -0.220 0.015 0.019633 
R 0.207 -0.163 0.451 -0.324 -0.220 1.000 -0.453 -0.20668 
F -0.519 0.014 -1.000 -0.005 0.015 -0.453 1.000 0.519107 
M -1.000 -0.001 -0.519 -0.004 0.020 -0.207 0.519 1 
 
From the above table features from the same set of functional curves (e.g. pcs.1 and pcs.2) 
are not correlated to each other due orthogonal nature of the principal component analysis. 
However, the first principal scores of the spending and visits trajectory functions are perfectly 
correlated to the frequency and monetary metrics. Next, we analyze the features in the spending 
and visits trajectory functions that explain most variations across the households to understand the 
perfect collinearity with F and M metrics. 
 
 
34 
 
Figure 4 above represents first and second principal components of the spending trajectory 
curves for the households in the dataset. The PC1 and PC2 of spending trajectory curves explain 
86% and 9.4% of the variations respectively (or 96% in total) for the spending trajectory curves in 
the sample. The PC1 assigns approximately equal weight to spending by a household through the 
20 weeks prior to the promotion. Therefore, households with higher average / overall pre-
promotion spending with the store will have higher principle component score (pcs.1) for this 
component. Therefore, pcs.1 is perfectly correlated with the M of the RFM metrics as both capture 
overall spending by a household with the store. The second principal component for spending 
trajectory curves exhibits an increasing trend and the households whose weekly spending rose 
from below to higher than average in the sample after 10 weeks prior to the promotion will have 
higher score on pcs.2   
 
Figure 4 Principal Components Spending Path 
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Figure 5 Principal Components Visits Path 
Similarly, the Figure 5 above shows the patterns (PC1, PC2, and PC3) that explain most 
variations in the visits trajectory functions of the households that significantly predict the sales 
during the response period. The PC1, PC2 and PC3 explain 70%, 17% and 10% of the variations 
(and a total of 98%) of the variations in the visits trajectories of the households. The PC1 imparts 
approximately similar weightage to all visits until 20 weeks prior to the promotion. Hence, it is no 
surprise that customer with higher visits in 20 weeks prior to the promotion would have a higher 
score (vcs.1) on this component. The household with higher visits also have higher values on the 
F metric of the RFM. Hence, it is no surprise that vcs.1 and F are almost perfectly correlated.  
On the other hand, the PC2 for the visits function imparts higher weight to visits at the 
extremes of the observation period. Meaning households for whom the visits filliped from below 
to higher than sample average at approximately 10 weeks prior to the promotion would have higher 
score on the component vcs.2. The PC3 on the other hand has a more complicated interpretation 
as it imparts positive weightage to visits before 14 weeks and after 5 weeks prior to the promotion 
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while it imparts negative weightage to the visits within 14 and 5 weeks prior to the promotion. 
Hence household exhibiting a similar pattern as that of PC3 in their visits trajectory would have 
higher score on the vcs.3. Given the complicated interpretation of the PC3 and lesser explanatory 
power in comparison to PC1 and PC2 we examine the utility of the new information form the 
spending and visits trajectories in the form of pcs.2 and vcs.2 in explaining the sales during the 
response period. As pcs.1 and vcs.1 are almost entirely correlated to the M and F measures in RFM 
metrics they do not provide any new insight from modeling perspective hence, we focus on pcs.2 
and vcs.2 to understanding their relationship with sales during the response period. 
Next, we contrast the patterns in the household’s spending and visits trajectory based on 
pcs.2 and vcs.2 to understand their influence on the sales during the promotion. Figure 6 below 
shows the spending path of households with high (more than the first quartile) pcs.2 while figure 
7 contrasts the spending path of households with low (less than the first quartile) pcs.2 score. It 
can be observed that households with high pcs.2 based on spending path until 20 weeks before the 
promotion period have increasing weekly spending trend while those with low pcs.2 have a 
decreasing weekly spending trend. Similarly, the figure 8 and 9 contrasts the household’s visits 
path based on the vcs.2. Here also we observe that the households with high (above first quartile) 
vcs.2 exhibit increasing visits probability at the store as the promotion approaches while those with 
low vcs.2 exhibit decreasing probability. From the figures below, it is evident that the scores pcs.2 
and vcs.2 capture a feature in the purchase paths of the household’s that is not captured by the 
RFM metrics. The increasing trend in the spending (higher pcs.2) and visits (higher vcs.2) may 
have implications for the response to direct promotions and retailer interventions.  
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Figure 6 Spending Path High pcs.2 
 
Figure 7 Spending Path Low pcs.2 
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Figure 8 Spending Path High vcs.2 
 
Figure 9 Spending Path Low vcs.2 
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For instance, increasing spending of a household over time may be an indicator of 
increasing buying power or improving the relationship with the retailer. While the declining trend 
before the promotion signals customer churn or reduced buying capacity. Similarly, increasing 
store visits before the promotion signals improving relationship and preference for buying at the 
store. The households with increasing spending and visits trends can be expected to spend higher 
during the direct promotions in comparison to those with a decreasing trend. Similarly, one can 
also argue that the impact of campaign-related variables such as COUP, FAVC, TCAMP, and 
CBEF should be positively moderated by transaction paths trend before the promotion.    
2.3.5 Purchase Paths and Promotion Response  
 
In this section, we analyze the variations explained by the features drawn from the purchase 
path of a household in the form of pcs.2 and vcs.2 and the response to promotional campaigns. 
Since, the campaign assignment to the households may not be random we first obtain the IPTW 
weights for the households using the GBR approach explained earlier and checked for the balance 
of the pretreatment variables. Prior studies have found that marketers often consider RFM metrics 
of the customers to target them with the direct promotions (Cui, Wong and Lui, 2006). Hence, our 
pre-treatment variables include the RFM metrics, household demographics, transaction path 
features and average spending in past direct promotion. We relate the values of the pretreatment 
variables until three weeks before the beginning of the response period to obtain IPTW weights 
using the GBR procedure. The stopping condition of the iterative algorithm of the GBR is the 
balance of the pretreatment variable values across all treatment pairs. Table XXX below 
summarizes comparison of absolute standardized mean difference (ASMD) of pretreatment 
variables between three treatment combinations (NC-A, A-B, B-NC). To limit the table size, we 
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show for each treatment variable the maximum ASMD between any of the treatment combination 
and the respective minimum p-value of the means comparison.  
Table 5 Pre-Treatment Variables Balance 
Pre-Treatment Variable  Max(ASMD) Min(P-Value) Max(ASMD) Min(P-Value) 
 (Unweighted) (Weighted) 
Age (AGE) 0.1794 0.0006 0.0848 0.6326 
Married (MARRRIED) 0.0543 0.4898 0.0426 0.9902 
Income (INCOME) 0.1343 0.0199 0.0483 0.8149 
Numkids (NUMKIDS) 0.1462 0 0.0442 0.9819 
Recency (REC) 0.4159 0 0.059 0.9623 
Frequency(FREQ) 0.8059 0 0.0985 0.287 
Monetary(MON) 0.7457 0 0.0706 0.2408 
pcs.2 0.1738 0 0.0177 0.8158 
vcs.2 0.2792 0 0.0058 0.8474 
Avg. Spending Past Promotions 
(ASPP) 0.7178 0 0.0677 0.1618 
 
From table 5 above it is apparent weighting leads to a significant reduction in the ASMD 
across the treatment combinations for each pretreatment variable. For instance, the maximum 
ASMD for REC was 0.41 in the unweighted sample but after applying weights the maximum 
ASMD gets reduced to 0.05 and is not significantly different. Figure 10,11 and 12 below 
graphically represents the variation in the ASMD of the ten pretreatment variables for all three 
combinations of the treatment groups. It is evident that for all three treatment pairs there is no 
significant difference in the values pre-treatment variables in the weighted sample. Therefore, 
IPTW weights obtained from the GBR algorithm have been successful in creating a pseudo sample 
where there is no significant variation in the pre-treatment variable values across all three treatment 
combinations.   
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Figure 10 Absolute Standard Different Pre-treatment Variables (A vs B) 
 
 
Figure 11 Absolute Standard Different Pre-treatment Variables (B vs NC) 
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Figure 12 Absolute Standard Difference (B vs NC) 
 
Table 5 below summarizes the results of generalized linear models estimated using the 
weighted least squares (WLS) procedure using the IPTW weights.  To account for heterogeneity 
in the variance of the residuals across campaigns, we report robust standard errors clustered at the 
campaign level. Model 1 shows the estimation results without the use of IPTW weights and shows 
that in comparison to the no-promotion (NP) response period the household spend significantly 
higher during the campaign type B. However, on using IPTW weights we find that there is no 
significant difference in the log(SALES) during type A and type B direct campaigns in comparison 
to NC periods. This is probably the outcome of the biased assignment of the households in the 
three groups. Probably the retailer assigned high spending households in the campaign B group.  
Consistent with the prior studies the RFM variables are significantly related to the sales 
from a household. Campaign related variables such as CBEF, FAVC and ALLC significantly 
impact the sales from a household. The loyalty card discounts advertised in the household’s 
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favorite category has a positive impact on the sales during the response period. Similarly, other 
store-related variables such as weekly mailer sent to the household and household’s favorite 
product on end-of-aisle display (DISP) also significantly affects the sales. 
Table 6 Model Summary Statistics 1 
 Model -1 Model-2 Model-3 Model -4 Model -5 
 Unweighted Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted 
CAMP_A (base NC) 0.06 0.056 0.055 0.054 0.054 
CAMP_B (base NC) 0.15** 0.083 0.078 0.078 0.076 
Campaign Before (CBEF) 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 
% Fav. Coupons (FACV) 0.0063*** 0.0047** 0.0045** 0.0046** 0.0045** 
All Campaigns (ALLC) 0.00056 0.00095 0.011 0.011 0.014 
Total Coupons (COUP) -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
Loyalty Discount (LDISC) 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
End-of-Aisle (DISP) 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
Weekly Mailer (MAIL) 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
Age (AGE) 0.0023*** 0.0028*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 
Income (INCOME) 0.00064*** 0.00064*** 0.00064*** 0.00064*** 0.00064*** 
Married (MARRIED) 0.016 0.032* 0.028* 0.029* 0.027* 
Number of Kids (NUMKIDS) -0.026*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.020*** 
Time in Loyalty Program 
(TIME) -0.0051*** -0.0040*** -0.0041*** -0.0041*** -0.0041*** 
Campaign Duration (CPER) 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
Recency (REC) -0.094*** -0.090*** -0.068** -0.066** -0.069** 
Frequency (FREQ) 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 
Monetary (MON) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
Spending Path Feature (pcs.2)   0.0011*** 0.0010*** 0.00069*** 
Visits Path Feature (vcs.2)   0.073 0.073 -0.013 
pcs.2#vcs.2    -0.00033  
CAMP_A#pcs.2     0.00024* 
CAMP_B#vcs.2     0.00082*** 
CAMP_A#pcs.2     0.15*** 
CAMP_B#vcs.2     0.12* 
N 4547 4547 4547 4547 4547 
AIC 9205.2 30541.9 30344.9 30342.9 30301.4 
BIC 9320.8 30657.5 30473.3 30477.8 30442.7 
 
The features identified in the household’s spending path (pcs.2) also significantly affect 
the sales (model 3, β = 0.0011, p <= 0.01). This implies that for the same RFM metrics values the 
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households with higher pcs.2 score will be spending higher during the response period. To be more 
precise a one standard deviation increases in the pcs.2 increases the sales by 6%. However, the 
main effect of the vcs.2 on the sales during the response period is not significant (model 3, β = 
0.073, p > 0.1). 
The effect of a promotional campaign on the sales is significantly moderated by the features 
of the spending and velocity paths of the households. For instance, on estimating the average 
marginal effect (AME) of the campaign on sales for households with low (3rd quartile) and high 
(1st quartile) of both pcs.2 and vcs.2 we find that: a) for households with low pcs.2 the sales during 
the type A campaign in 2% higher than no campaign scenario but for those with high pcs.2 score 
the sales are 9% higher in comparison to no campaign period.   While for campaign “B” the 
spending is 4% higher for households with low pcs.2 and 10% higher for households with high 
pcs.2 in comparison to no promotion period.  
Similarly, for households with low vcs.2 the spending during type “A” campaign is 2% 
higher but for those with high vcs.2 the spending is 9% higher than the normal. In campaign B the 
households with low vcs.2 would spend 5% more than normal but those with high vcs.2 would 
spending 10% more than normal. Hence, after controlling for RFM and another customer, 
campaign, and store related variables the spending and visits path features provide useful 
information about the household response to direct promotions.  
2.3.6 Moderating Effect of Purchase Paths on Response to Store and Campaign 
Interventions  
 
Table 6 shows how the features associated with the spending and visits paths impact the effect of 
RFM and other campaign interventions. We find that sales of the households with increasing visits 
trend (higher vcs.2) significantly impact the effect of the RFM on the store sales.  
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Table 7 Model Summary Statistics 2 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
 Weighted  Weighted  Weighted  Weighted  Weighted  
CAMP_A (base NC) 0.056 0.060 0.054 0.052 0.052 
CAMP_B (base NC) 0.081 0.084 0.075 0.073 0.073 
Campaign Before (CBEF) 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
% Fav. Coupons (FACV) 0.0045** 0.0045** 0.0045** 0.0045** 0.0045** 
Total Campaigns (TCAMP) 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.014 
Total Coupons (COUP) -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
Loyalty Discount (LDISC) 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
End-of-Aisle (DISP) 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
Weekly Mailer (MAIL) 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
Age (AGE) 0.0026*** 0.0027*** 0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0027*** 
Income (INCOME) 0.00064*** 0.00064*** 0.00066*** 0.00063*** 0.00065*** 
Married (MARRIED) 0.031* 0.029* 0.028* 0.029* 0.026 
Number of Kids (NUMKIDS) -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021*** 
Time in Loyalty Program 
(TIME) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
Campaign Duration (CPER) 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
Recency (REC) -0.022 -0.057** -0.063** -0.069** -0.069** 
Frequency (FREQ) 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
Monetary (MON) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
Spending Path Feature (pcs.2) 0.0010*** 0.0026** 0.0019*** 0.00089*** 0.00091*** 
Visits Path Feature (vcs.2) 0.037 0.31*** 0.16** 0.022 0.00061 
REC#pcs.2 0.00017     
REC#vcs.2 0.061*     
FREQ#pcs.2  -0.000089    
FREQ#vcs.2  -0.018*    
MON#pcs.2   -0.0000058   
MON#vcs.2   -0.0021***   
CBEF#pcs.2    0.000041  
CBEF#vcs.2    0.021*  
TCAMP#pcs.2     0.000081 
TCAMP#vcs.2     0.066*** 
N 4547 4547 4547 4547 4547 
AIC 30257.4 30312.0 30303.9 30325.4 30319.5 
BIC 30398.7 30453.3 30445.2 30466.7 30460.8 
 
For instance, for the same value of the frequency of visits the household with increasing 
trend would spend lower during the response period possibly due to higher inventory of products 
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before the response period. Prior studies have also documented that prior inventory prior to the 
promotion as the result of frequent visits or higher monetary spending prior to the promotion can 
reduce the overall spending during the promotion (Johnson et al. 2013; Dreze et al. 2004). 
The purchase path of the household also moderates the effect of number of prior direct 
promotions (CBEF) and total campaigns (TCAMP) during the response period. For instance, the 
main effect of the prior campaigns on spending is significant and positive but the effect if higher 
for the household showing growth in the store visits over time. Similarly, the effect of simultaneous 
direct promotions is also higher for households showing growth in the store visits over time. The 
growth in store visits indicates higher customer engagement with the store possible due to 
satisfaction with retailer’s services, store environment and convenience.  Table 7 below shows the 
effect of the campaign and store related factors on the spending during the response period.   
Table 8 Model Summary Statistics 3 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
 Weighted  Weighted  Weighted  Weighted  Weighted  
CAMP_A (base NC) 0.054 0.051 0.053 0.051 0.053 
CAMP_B (base NC) 0.076 0.070 0.079 0.081 0.077 
Campaign Before (CBEF) 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
% Fav. Coupons (FACV) 0.0045** 0.0045** 0.0045** 0.0044** 0.0045** 
Total Campaigns (ALLC) 0.012 0.013 0.0090 0.010 0.011 
Total Coupons (COUP) -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
Loyalty Discount (LDISC) 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 
End-of-Aisle (DISP) 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 
Weekly Mailer (MAIL) 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 
Age (AGE) 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0024** 0.0023** 0.0027*** 
Income (INCOME) 0.00064*** 0.00065*** 0.00066*** 0.00067*** 0.00066*** 
Married (MARRIED) 0.028* 0.025 0.030* 0.033** 0.027 
Number of Kids (NUMKIDS) -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
Time in Loyalty Program 
(TIME) -0.0041*** -0.0041*** -0.0040*** -0.0042*** -0.0040*** 
Campaign Duration (CPER) 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
Recency (REC) -0.068** -0.068** -0.054* -0.047 -0.067** 
Frequency (FREQ) 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 
Monetary (MON) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
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Table 9 Model Summary Statistics 3 continued  
 
Spending Path Feature (pcs.2) 0.0010*** 0.00100*** 0.0021 0.0023 0.0013*** 
Visits Path Feature (vcs.2) 0.043 -0.00092 0.65* 0.91* -0.025 
FAVC#pcs.2 0.000004     
FAVC#vcs.2 0.0039     
COUP#pcs.2  0.00001    
COUP#vcs.2  0.014***    
DISP#pcs.2   -0.00006   
DISP#vcs.2   -0.031*   
MAIL#pcs.2    -0.00006  
MAIL#vcs.2    -0.042*  
INCOME#pcs.2     -0.000004 
INCOME#vcs.2     0.0016** 
N 4547 4547 4547 4547 4547 
AIC 30336.4 30317.9 30182.6 30112.2 30328.9 
BIC 30477.6 30459.2 30323.9 30253.4 30470.2 
 
The main effect of number of coupons (after controlling for favorite coupons) in the direct 
promotions on spending is negative but is less negative for households showing increasing store 
visits prior to the promotion. However, the positive effect of household’s favorite items with end-
of-aisle display (DISP) decreases for those with increasing visits at the store over time. The 
households with frequent visits to the store are possibly aware of the item locations, and therefore 
they may be indifferent to quick access to the favorite items on the aisle. Overall, from our 
moderation analysis, we find that information in the household’s visits path may be key in 
determining the response to variation store and campaign interventions. Next, we try to understand 
the improvement in the predictions that can be derived from the use of information in the spending 
path  
2.3.7 Predicting Campaign Sales  
 
In our data sample, the 798 households are targeted with 24 direct promotion campaigns 
over a period of two years. In this study, we extract the household purchase path (spending and 
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visits path) features to understanding their explanatory power over traditional RFM metrics used 
by the retailers. Next, we compare the predictive capability of the models utilizing RFM only vs. 
RFM + purchase path features associated with a household to estimate sales during the direct 
promotion. Our model evaluation strategy consists of training the model on 23 campaigns and 
using left over campaign as the holdout test set. We also compare the performance of the models 
trained with and without the propensity score weights. The use of IPTW weights controls for 
nonrandom assignments and reduces bias in the coefficient estimates of the regression models.  
Table 10 Prediction Errors (Hold Out Campaign) 
 RFM RFM 
RFM + Purchase 
Paths 
RFM + 
Purchase Paths 
 Un-Weighted Weighted  Un-Weighted Weighted  
Mean Squared Error  50559 50393 48686 48482 
Mean Squared Error (-3)  54597 54501 49551 49397 
 
From the above table 8, the predictive models incorporating RFM and purchase path 
information in the form of pcs.2 and vcs.2 have lesser prediction error. Also, accounting for non-
random assignment using the IPTW weights also improved the sales prediction on the holdout a 
sample. We also predict the sales during a direct promotion using information until three weeks 
before the promotion and here also we obtain the similar results with a weighted model with RFM 
and purchase path information predicting with higher accuracy.  
2.3.8 Simulation Experiment 
 
We perform a simulation experiment to compare the performance of models using the 
purchase path information and the RFM metrics information in predicting the response to direct 
promotions. We generate a synthetic customer purchase data and vary the randomness in the 
consumption rate of the customers and evaluated the model fit and hold our predictions using 
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information in the purchase path and the RFM metrics. The objective of the experiment is to show 
that utilizing the disaggregated information in the spending and visits path of the customer would 
always explain and predict more variations in the customer data in comparison to the disaggregated 
RFM variables. The data generation function for customer expenditure over time is based on the 
customer inventory model (CIM) proposed by Blatterberg et al. (1981).  
We simulate the weekly expenditure of 1000 customers having optimal order quantity (𝑄0
𝑖 ) 
and consumption rate (𝐶𝑖) between the purchase cycles. The duration between two successive 
purchases (made when product inventory at home is zero or below the consumption rate) is termed 
as purchase cycle.  For each of these 1000 customers we, randomly sample a base value of 𝑄0
𝑖  and 
consumption rate 𝐶𝑖 uniformly between 1 and 1000. The demand for a product during the direct 
promotion is assumed to depend on the product inventory at home during time of the the 
promotion. The customer responds to the promotion by purchasing quantity equivalent to the 
difference between 𝑄0
𝑖  and product inventory at home (Breiter and Huhzermeier 2014). As an 
example, if 𝑄0
𝑖  associated with a customer is 10 units and 𝐶𝑖 is 5 units per week and customer 
purchases 10 units of the product in the current week (w) then the next purchase is assumed to be 
after two (w+2) weeks (the product inventory becomes zero after two weeks at  𝐶𝑖 = 5 units). 
However, if a direct promotion is scheduled after one (w+1) week, then the customer is expected 
to replenish its stock of the product at home by stockpiling 5 units (max capacity (10) – inventory 
at home (5)) at w+1.  
To induce randomness in the spending of the customer, we allow the base consumption 
rate 𝐶𝑖 between the purchase cycles to deviate from the base value by a factor ‘r’ (varies from 0% 
to 100% of the base consumption rate) such that the consumption 𝐶𝑖
𝑝
 between the purchase cycle 
is is a random draw from a normal distribution with mean 𝐶𝑖 and standard deviation r*𝐶𝑖. A direct 
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promotion is randomly introduced in the customer’s spending path and the response is predicted 
using the model utilizing spending path curves and RFM measures from the expenditure data. The 
dependent variable of interest (response to direct promotion / units purchased during promotion) 
is equivalent to the difference between the 𝑄0
𝑖  and the product inventory during the week of 
promotion. We utilize information in 10 weeks of prior spending and visits path information of 
800 customers to train the model and use the remaining 200 customers as the holdout sample for 
predictions.  
  
Figure 13 Adj. R Squared vs Randomness 
 
Figure 13 above compares the variations explained by the linear model using the 
information only from purchase paths versus the same from the aggregated RFM measures on the 
training dataset. It can be observed that when there is less randomness in the dataset the Adj. R 
Squared values are approximately the same for the two models. However, as the randomness in 
the data increases the explained variation decreases for models with both types of information. 
However, the models utilizing spending path information perform significantly better than those 
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with only RFM information with increasing randomness. This observation highlights the 
explanatory power of using the information in the entire purchase paths of the customers than 
using the information only in the aggregated metrics such as RFM. Further, the MAPE of 
predictions (figure 14 above) for the customers in the holdout dataset are lesser for the models 
utilizing information in the spending paths of the customers in comparison to model with only 
RFM variables across the various level of randomness in the customer data. 
 
Figure 14 MAPE RFM vs FDA Approach 
 
Consistent with the earlier analysis the models with the spending path incorporates only 
90% of the variations explained in the disaggregated purchase history. Further, our simulations 
confirm that the optimal 𝜆𝑓 from the first stage the model leads to best out of sample predictions 
across all degrees of randomness in the customer data. The far superior performance (low MAPE) 
for increasing randomness in customer data demonstrates the ability of the purchase path features 
to capture trends in consumer purchases. The functional model learns from the patterns in the entire 
history of store expenditure and visits which is not possible from the aggregated data measures 
such as RFM. The complete R script for simulation experiment in available in Appendix B.  
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2.4 Discussion and Conclusion   
 
The success of direct marketing campaigns relies on the accuracy of models used to predict 
promotional response. Due to limited promotional budgets and an effort to reduce waste caused 
by unredeemed promotions, marketers strive to target only those households with a high 
probability of promotional response.  This study examines the relationship between entire purchase 
path (spending and visits path) of households before receiving a mass or customized promotion 
and the household’s total expenditures at the retailer during the promotional period.   
We utilize twenty weeks of household store-level spending and visits data before exposure 
to a direct retailer promotion and use key features from this purchase path as predictor variables 
of a household’s spending during the promotional period.  The contribution of this study can be 
summarized as follows: (1) we propose a flexible, semi-parametric functional data approach to 
identify purchase path features from a household’s spending history, (2) we compare the RFM and 
purchase path feature and explain extra information obtained from purchase paths, (3) we provide 
new managerial insights on purchase path that significantly explain a household’s total spending 
during customized and mass promotions, (4) we provide a parsimonious model that adapts to 
randomness in the presence of sparse and noisy spending information, (4) we develop a method to 
help marketing managers determine the total spending of targeted households well in advance of 
(at least four weeks prior to) the start of a direct promotion.    
The results of this study suggest that essential information in a household’s purchase path 
provides information that is more useful for predicting spending during a promotional period than 
RFM, household demographics and loyalty card promotional variables. As such, the characteristics 
of a household’s spending path can explain why a given household responds more favorably to a 
specific type of direct promotion, as well as predict those that will do so in the future.  For example, 
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we find that households with increasing trend in their spending and visits before the promotion 
spend more during both types of promotions.  This is perhaps because increasing spending and 
store visits over time indicates satisfaction and convenience with shopping at the store. The 
aggregated information in the monetary spending (M) and frequency of visits (F) could not capture 
the nuances of spending and visits variations over time that can be captured using entire purchase 
path information.  
We also find that patterns in household’s store visit moderates the relationships between 
other campaign and store related variables. For instance, two households with similar prior 
campaign exposure or similar number favorite coupons in the campaign the one with increasing 
visits over time would spend significantly higher during the direct promotion. Our analysis is 
robust to potential selection bias as we control for this bias using IPTW weights and use Weighted 
Least Squared (WLS) regression to estimate the parameters of interest. We indeed found that the 
assignment of households to the treatment groups to be biased and un weighted models lead to 
biased estimates of the model coefficients. The predictive accuracy of sales during the promotions 
is also significantly higher for models incorporating RFM and purchase path features than the 
models with only RFM and other demographic information. For all predictive models under 
consideration, the models that account for the weighted models perform significantly better than 
unweighted models.  
We also conducted a simulation experiment to understand the performance of the proposed 
FDA framework in a controlled environment with varying randomness in the households’ 
consumption rate. We find that the representation of the spending path curves (determined by a 
roughness penalty) fitted on the household data positively improves out-of-sample predictions. 
Therefore, the data-driven approach adapts to the variations in the sparse household data at the 
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disposal of the managers for building marketing response models. The results of the simulation 
show that the performance of the functional approach remains consistently better than the model 
with accumulated RFM data. 
Although this paper provides many insights for managers that utilize direct promotions, 
the study is not without limitations.  First, we were unable to control for household purchases in 
other distribution channels that might affect spending at the focal retailer during the promotional 
period.  While less than 1% of total grocery sales in the US occurred online during the period of 
analysis (2005-07), future research must integrate purchasing data from multiple channels to 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of a household’s spending path.  
Second, although we adjusted for potential selection bias by using a propensity score 
matching procedure, a randomized controlled experiment would be helpful in complementing our 
empirical investigation.   
Third, we selected 20 weeks prior spending history of the households, and in some case, 
they were targeted with multiple promotions during the response period. Although, we control for 
multiple promotions by using it as a control in our explanatory model the future research must 
develop methods to disentangle and estimate the impact of simultaneous promotional efforts on a 
household.   
Finally, our findings are context specific in that we investigate household spending at a 
grocery retailer.  However, the two-stage functional data approach proposed in this study is 
exploratory and does not a priori assume patterns in the data that impact the response variable.  
Hence, it can easily be generalized to other predictive scenarios involving longitudinal data and 
can adapt to variations in that data to give the best predictive outcomes.  Given these strengths, the 
approach has been applied to the context of online auctions (Jank and Shmueli 2006), virtual stock 
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markets (Foutz and Jank 2010), and product diffusion (Sood et al. 2009).  However, the breadth 
of its applications is endless, and future studies could apply this approach to other types of 
longitudinal data and similar relationships, such as the relationship between browsing history and 
response to online advertisements or brand switching, to name a few.   
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CHAPTER 3: MODELING PHYSICIANS’ PRESCRIPTION CHOICES 
AND THEIR RESPONSE TO DETAILING IN THE AGE OF INTERNET 
 
3.1 Introduction and Motivation  
 
Physicians invest in information search, analysis and learning to provide the best treatment 
for their patients, (Janakiraman et al., 2008); they accumulate knowledge about available drugs 
and match them to the individual needs of patients (Smith 1996). However, the alternative drugs 
available and the information from an ever-increasing number of clinical trials and medical 
breakthroughs complicates the prescription decision and reduces the likelihood of a tailor-made 
treatment for patients.  
Prior studies have found significant variation in the prescription patterns for physicians in 
the same diagnostic situation (Joyce et al. 2011). The unavailability of required information or the 
higher cost of gathering information, can lead to doctors prescribing suboptimal drugs to their 
patients. Physicians resort to habitual prescribing from an armamentarium (mostly popular or 
highly detailed) to different patients to minimize overall risk due to incomplete information. The 
tendency of the physicians to avoid risks by prescribing the popular drug may lead to suboptimal 
outcomes for the patients. However, with increasing availability of health information sources and 
proactive involvement of the patient’s in the prescription decision making the consideration set for 
a physician to increase and make them more selective in their decision making.   
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The ability of a physician to discriminate between drug alternatives is affected by 
information gathering and processing costs. Pharmaceutical detailing is a timesaving source of 
drug-related information for physicians but is often considered to be biased and associated with 
increased inertia in prescription patterns (Erdem and Sun 2001, Janakiraman et al. 2008).  
However, increasing internet penetration and computers has paved way for easy access, storage 
and exchange of health information and guidance. A postal survey of general practice physicians 
in the United Kingdom (UK) found that 53% used computers for accessing electronic medical 
databases while 83% used internet to acquire clinical information (Davies, 2007). Computer-based 
decision support tools (i.e., Desk Reference in Epstein and Ketcham, 2014) offer verified drug-
related information while also reducing the marginal cost of acquiring patient information. The 
extent to which drug and patient information are incorporated into physician decision processes 
may alter the prescription outcome. 
Despite growing evidence that access to internet influences decision making (Hastings and 
Weinstein, 2008) and patients involvement in prescription choice, few studies have looked at how 
technology diffusion has impacted the prescribing behavior of physicians. Instead, the relationship 
between IT and prescription choice has mostly been inferred from self-reported measures of drug 
choice under controlled environments (Epstein and Ketcham, 2014). Although this approach 
allows for testing of moderation hypotheses, it fails to capture the actual decision choices after 
controlling for dynamic variations in the information stock from detailing of a specific drug and 
its competitors.  
Furthermore, the use of cross-sectional data makes the identification of causal effects more 
challenging. The pharmaceutical industry and government agencies regularly conduct drug trials 
and post-marketing surveillance to test the efficacy of available drugs under different conditions.  
 
 
63 
 
In 2012 alone, pharmaceutical companies in the United States invested more than $27 billion in 
marketing activities of which $24 billion alone on detailing physicians and over $3 billion in direct-
to-consumer (DTC) advertising (Pharma Marketing News, 2013). The DTC advertising accounts 
for around 10% of total advertising spending in the US and is not allowed in the United Kingdom. 
Pharmaceutical detailing is a timesaving source of information for physicians as pharmaceutical 
sales representatives personally visit primary care physicians, inform them on the outcomes of 
recent clinical studies, and remind them about specific drug information. 
          However, the literature on the impact of detailing on the demand for prescription drugs 
suggests an intricate relationship. The heterogeneity in prescribing behavior has been attributed to 
intrinsic characteristics of doctors (Janakiraman et al. 2008), drug efficacy (Venkataraman and 
Stremersch, 2007) and advertising content (Kappe and Stremersch, 2016). The use of aggregated 
sales or prescription data in most studies also excludes decision variables for modeling individual 
prescription choice. On the other hand, there is some evidence of variation in prescription across 
geographical regions (Timmermans and Mauck 2005), but most of studies do not consider 
heterogeneity in prescribing due to spatial variation. Finally, a significant omission in the literature 
to date and one, which is the core of our analyses, is the relationship between increasing internet 
penetration on prescribing decisions and the resulting response to pharmaceutical detailing.   
This knowledge gap is vital as ever-increasing healthcare expenditure coupled with the 
increase in longevity in developed countries is attracting stricter scrutiny of physician prescribing 
decisions, and it is estimated that the UK National Health Service (NHS) wastes about £2.5 billion 
each year on preventable errors mostly related to prescription medication (Torjesen, 2014). 
Moreover, as multinational pharmaceutical firms look to expand activities in less developed 
markets an understanding of the regional disparity in IT penetration and the resulting impact on 
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detailing elasticity could inform resource allocation decisions. Therefore, this study aims to answer 
the following research questions:  
1. Is increasing internet penetration influencing physician’s prescription behavior? If so, then 
how? 
2. How does internet usage impact the influence of prior prescriptions and drug popularity on 
the physician’s prescription choice? 
3. Can spatial variation in the internet penetration explain heterogeneity in physician’s 
response to pharmaceutical detailing? 
The study combines longitudinal data on individual physician prescription choices; 
detailing of drug alternatives to the individual physician and variations in regional demographics 
over time to address the research questions. The primary data comprises of 32,177 prescription 
choices and 7286 detailing meetings of a sample of 135 general physicians, serving approximately 
500,000 people enrolled in the NHS1, distributed across ten geographical regions of the UK 
between the years 1997-2006. The dataset also contains detailed information on physician’s 
practice size, experience, patient diagnosis and drug type.   We augment this data with information 
regarding internet penetration, general patient profile and information related from regional 
variations in health markets from British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).  
The longitudinal nature of the data and significant regional variation in IT diffusion during 
the observation period allows us to identify the impact of increasing IT on prescribing decisions2. 
The choice of the time horizon also compares favorably with the established literature in 
                                                          
1 The estimate of the total number of people enrolled in the system during the observational period under 
consideration is based on the summaries presented in Hawe (2009). 
2 It is also important to notice that during this period of the practice e-detailing had not started and a similar study 
conducted today would be subject to confounds which would make the effects we study more difficult to identify 
and isolate. 
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prescribing inertia (Jankiraman et al.  2008; Stern and Trajtenberg, 1998) the impact of detailing 
(Ching and Ishihara, 2012) and the general literature studying effects of IT diffusion on firm 
productivity and society (see Greenstein, 2010 for an excellent review). Finally, and importantly, 
regulatory changes during these years allow us to derive a quasi-exogenous design and explore the 
effect of the endogenous detailing efforts of the manufacturers. Section 5 describes the model 
identification strategy in detail. 
Our empirical work is based on well-established notions rooted in Expectancy-Value 
Theory (EVT) which proposes that physicians assign a value to various drug attributes given the 
patient diagnosis and subsequently prescribe the drug with maximum utility. We enrich this notion 
using literature on the cost-reducing effect of IT and theories of informational influence to 
understand the impact of IT on prescribing decisions and detailing effectiveness.  
The essay is organized as follows; in Section 2 we describe the prescribing process from 
the theoretical lens of EVT. Next, we identify the information processing costs associated with 
drug decision-making and their impact on inertia in prescribing behavior. We also discuss the role 
of internet in reducing prescribing costs and detailing utility. Section 4 describes the market 
characteristics and the data. Section 5 discusses the analytical approach including the empirical 
strategy to address endogeneity. The results, managerial implications, and their transportability are 
discussed in sections 6.  
 
3.2 Drug Prescription Process  
 
The drug prescription process is complicated: it involves patient diagnostic information, 
drug alternatives, their attributes and the respective utility values associated with those attributes. 
We examine the physician prescription decision using the theoretical framework of the 
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expectancy-value theory (Chinburapa et al. 1993), which proposes that physicians follow a linear 
and additive compensatory decision process for choosing the optimal drug for a patient.  This rule 
links the attributes of the relevant drug as well as the patient diagnosis and prior medical history 
to the medical outcome. Given a set of alternative drugs, each characterized by a set of attributes, 
the drug with highest overall evaluation is chosen for the prescription. The drug attributes are 
determined by the patient's medical condition, prior history, and other environmental factors. 
These attributes are related to issues such as side effects, withdrawal symptoms and sensitivity of 
the drug to other medications.  
The choice of compensatory decision process is dependent on the task complexity or other 
environmental factors related to the physician. The complexity of a prescription task is directly 
proportional to the number of drug alternatives available and the number of drugs attributes to 
process based on patient’s characteristics (e.g. side effect and medical history). Similarly, the 
motivation of the physician to provide the best-fit drug encourages more analytical and careful 
decision-making where physicians refrain from utilizing a subset of the drug information. In this 
study, we assume that physicians are rational decision makers and will prescribe the optimal drug 
to their patients. 
Another stream of research in marketing and information systems explain prescription 
choices as the outcome of the physician's beliefs about the effectiveness, side effects, patient's 
characteristics, and feedback (Chintagunta et al. 2012; Narayanan and Manchanda 2009). These 
studies argue that physicians often make decisions with incomplete information and so, marketing 
activities or patient feedback serve as important drivers for determining the drug prescription. In 
some instances, physicians' risk attitude and forward-looking behavior also influence drug choice 
(Ching and Ishihara 2010).   
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3.2.1 Prescription Inertia and its Consequences  
 
Persistence in physician prescription behavior is an aspect of concern to the health care and 
marketing organizations.  This refers to the tendency of a physician to prescribe the same drug to 
different patients to avoid search or information gathering cost (Janakiraman et al. 2008). It is 
important to notice that the repeat prescription of a drug to the same patient due to the continuation 
of the therapy is excluded from this definition of persistence. Persistence in prescribing is a 
consequence of the high information processing costs in either compensatory or non-compensatory 
decision-making adopted by the physician. Also, referred as habitual prescribing, persistence in 
drug choice is clinically suboptimal and economically wasteful for patients in a drug class with 
heterogeneous interactions between the drugs and patient conditions (Stern & Trajtenberg, 1998). 
A higher number of medication errors stem from habitual prescribing of similar drugs to different 
patients, for example, some anti-depressants drugs are sensitive to a variety of patient conditions 
and ongoing medications and have different withdrawal symptoms. Habitual prescribing also 
hinders diffusion of innovation and competition in the pharmaceutical market (Stern and 
Trajtenberg, 1998). 
Persistence in prescribing may vary across the physicians, and it has been reported that 
physicians remain persistent on 55% of prescription occasions with only about 6% of physicians 
switching states from persistent to non-persistent (Janakiraman et al. 2008). The evidence of 
persistence in prescribing behavior is well documented in prior studies in health care (Mizik and 
Jacobson 2004, Coscelli 2000; Hellerstein 1998) and the concentration of the armamentarium is 
also linked to the observable drug characteristics and marketing efforts (Stern & Trajtenberg, 
1998).  Drugs which are detailed more or those with higher market shares are consistently 
prescribed to mitigate risks arising from incomplete information. Physician characteristics such as 
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experience, insufficient diagnosis skills or the lack of incentive to gather information, influence 
the capability of a physician to assess alternatives and encourages habitual prescribing. A key point 
to be noted here is that physicians may not prescribe a different drug on each patient visit. They 
can persist with a drug if two patients with similar unobservable characteristics and diagnosis visit. 
3.2.2 Physician Information Seeking Behavior and the Role of Internet 
 
Information processing from different sources (e.g. patient, peers, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers) is a key aspect of the prescribing process (Gorman, 1995; Smith 1995). When 
selecting a drug, a physician processes information from various sources including the patient 
history, diagnosis, and the current portfolio of available drugs that can be administered. The 
pharmaceutical industry and government agencies regularly conduct drug trials and post-
marketing surveillance to test the efficacy of the available drugs under different conditions and 
subsequently inform physicians about them. Irrespective of the distribution channel (online or 
offline) the preferred external information sources for a physician include: (1) medical journals, 
(2) sales representatives (3) peers and area opinion leaders and (4) patient feedback.  
The urgency of the patient’s problem, peer pressure to adhere to medical norms and belief 
that an optimal solution exists encourages physicians to seek information from external sources 
(Robson & Robinson, 2015; Gorman and Helmand, 1995). Practice and geographical variables 
such as job role and environment, and health service location also drive information needs of 
physicians. For example, specialists seek more in-depth information and are more likely to 
research existing literature than the generalists. Arroll et. al (2002) and Davies, (2007) found that 
50% of the physicians seek answers to questions related to medical facts (e.g. side effects) while 
30% search for a medical opinion on patient management.  
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The growth of communication technologies such as broadband, email, and the availability 
of electronic databases has provided access to new sources of information. The internet has become 
a useful tool for the dissemination of medical research evidence and guidance. For example, the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) uses the internet to enable access to full-
text documents and guidelines via electronic databases. Several studies have evaluated the internet 
as an information resource for doctors, and a survey of British general practitioners found that 82% 
used the internet and around 53% used electronic biomedical databases for their information needs 
(Davies, 2007). The online health portals such as Health Web, MedicinePlus.gov are nowadays 
used by the physicians and patients alike to gather health-related information. 
3.2.3 IT and Prescribing Decision  
 
The key to optimal drug prescribing and variety seeking on the part of the physician is their 
capability to compare all possible drug alternatives based on the attributes that determine patient 
outcomes. Alternative drugs, time pressure and limited information processing capability lead to 
decision-making costs for optimal prescribing. In general, four distinct types of cost 
(communication, cognition, coordination, and capability) hinder the tailoring of medication at the 
patient level (Frank and Zeckhauser, 2007). These costs are closely related to the cost of thinking 
from the choice literature (Shugan, 1980).  
Communication costs are related to the challenges faced by physicians in eliciting 
information from patients for determining optimal therapy. The patients often visit with the models 
of illness, agendas, and expectations from the treatment (Kleinman 1987). The physicians face the 
task of persuading the patients to accept the proposed medication or accurately gathering additional 
medical information.  On the other side of the consultation the freely available medical information 
from the internet, educates patients on drug efficacy and side effects and encourages them to 
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express their preference in the prescription decision. The coordination costs are related to the 
exchange of medical information between patient and physician for monitoring medical progress 
or sharing drug-related information. 
The third cost associated with a prescription decision process is the cost of learning about 
a newer or less accustomed therapy. General practitioners prescribe drugs for a variety of patient 
conditions, but they may have gained substantial experience in some selected therapies. Hence, 
when prescribing a newer class of treatment, the physician may need to gather information from 
some external sources. 
Finally, in drug prescribing the cognition costs are related to the effort a physician expends 
to discriminate between various alternatives and diagnostic information. This cost is directly 
proportional to the number of attributes (m) across all possible drugs (n) being compared (Figure 
1). Under a linear compensatory process, the decision-making costs monotonically increase with 
the number of comparisons. The higher cognitive effort in the rational calculation of the utility of 
various alternatives, also leads the physicians to resort to satisficing behavior (Simon 1958) or the 
use of heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, Frank 1987) such as the prescription of a most 
recently prescribed or most popular drug which may in fact be a suboptimal choice for the specific 
patient.  
The capabilities of a physician to manage these four costs determine the level of 
personalization based on patient symptoms and possible preferences. The physician may choose 
not to personalize treatments when the returns from customizing are lower than the cognitive 
efforts of a highly customized prescription. To minimize the cost of thinking, doctors select a 
minimal number of attributes (m) across the drugs for comparison. They often resort to established 
norms or rule of thumbs when there is: a) uncertainty over patient diagnosis and their 
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responsiveness to various treatments, b) treatment is of short duration c) when the possible 
treatments are comparable d) high information gathering cost (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; 
Frank 1987; Frank & Zeckhauser, 2007).  
The advances in information technology and the use of computers and digital media since 
the early 1990s have influenced the medical practice and have significantly reduced the four costs 
described earlier. Before the adoption of computers, patient records were recorded on paper and 
stored at a central location contributing to higher information search and cost. The nature of 
computer data entry today facilitates efficient updating of patient records, problems and 
prescription lists. Providers often allow patients to view information such as medication lists, 
problem lists, allergies, lab results and other customized materials through secure patient portals. 
The availability of online information streamlines doctor-patient communication, reduces errors 
and empowers patients to play an active role in decision-making. 
The diffusion of internet over time has reduced decision costs for obtaining clinical 
information and guidance through email services, electronic databases, and the Internet. 
Healthcare authorities across the globe are taking steps to coordinate clinical research through IT-
enabled networks. In the context of the prescription decision costs described earlier, diffusion of 
IT lowers learning costs by providing access to codified knowledge, while, digital communication 
channels (enabled through IT) reduce the costs of communicating with patients and coordinating 
with other physicians. IT facilitates efficient updating of patient records, problems and prescription 
lists thus contributing to lower cognition cost. The engagement of patients in the prescription 
process is also enhanced by the availability of medication lists, contra-indications, lab results and 
other customized materials through secure patient portals. 
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The use of computers and the emergence of online information sources and information 
sharing using digital media have reduced 4 C's linked to the prescription decision process. The 
popularity of online resources amongst the physicians to seek patient related information (e.g. 
diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis) or drug has been documented (Davis 2007). Online forums 
provide outlets for physicians and patients alike to learn about clinical findings and experiences of 
other patients sharing the same treatments. Healthcare authorities across the nations are also taking 
steps to support the coordination of clinical and research activities in regional or inter-regional 
networks of institutions. While information search and thinking, costs encourage physicians to 
stick to their prior prescriptions or most popular drug, the cost reducing effect of internet use 
encourages self-learning and patient engagement in the prescribing process. Therefore, the internet 
diffusion undermines the impact of drug popularity and prescribing inertia on the prescription 
choices.   
H1(a): The effect of drug popularity on prescription choice will reduce with the increase in 
internet penetration.  
H1(b): The physician’s prescribing inertia will reduce with increase in the internet 
penetration  
Previous studies in marketing and psychology have also found that the ability to process 
complex information encourages exploratory behavior amongst the customer and influences brand 
choice (Houston and Mednick 1963, Pearson and Maddi 1966). In addition, the influence of 
technology-enabled social learning on a choice decision is studied in detail in the context of 
sponsored health-plan options (Sorensen, 2006) or retirement plan choice (Duflo and Saez, 2003). 
Other studies in public health literature have provided evidence of similarity between drug 
prescriptions of physicians within the same hospital or neighborhood (Epstein and Nicholson, 
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2009) and the negative impact of health information technology adoption by hospitals on adverse 
reaction (Roberts et al., 2010). However, we are not aware of any study that empirically 
investigated the effect of technology use on the drug choices of the physicians. 
 
3.3 Pharmaceutical Detailing as an Information Source   
 
Pharmaceutical detailing is a convenient source of information for physicians as 
pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs) share materials related to drug effectiveness, side 
effects, and prescription guidelines. The impact of detailing on prescribing behavior is a matter of 
concern for the policymakers as it has the potential to influence patient wellbeing and healthcare 
costs. The proponents of detailing argue that timely and detailed information improves prescription 
choices while opponents argue that a persuasive sales pitch of PSRs may be biased and can mislead 
physicians into prescribing expensive branded drugs.  
At the brand level, Azoulay (2002) found that detailing could turn minute differences in 
the efficacy of the drugs to a considerable advantage in the market. Similarly, Berndt et al. (1995) 
showed that the sales elasticity is largest for detailing when compared to direct mailings and Direct 
to Consumer (DTC) advertising. Other studies observe that the impact of detailing is determined 
by the product life cycle (Narayan et al. 2004), actual effectiveness and side effects (Venkataraman 
and Stremersch, 2007) and the information content of the detail (Kappe and Stremersch, 2016). 
Some scholars propose a different effect of detailing due to the lack of expertise of PSRs, with 
physicians failing to give much weight to messages, accepting details for personal benefit (e.g., to 
get free samples) instead. Some studies have found a negative (Parsons and Abeele, 1981) or non-
significant associations between detailing and demand for branded drugs (Rosenthal et al., 2003). 
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Other studies found that the association between detailing and drug choice is modest and strong 
effects may actually be due to unobserved selection bias or data aggregation (Mizik and Jacobson, 
2004; Datta and Dave, 2016). For a recent review of these issues see Wieringa et al. (2015). 
Regulations also impact detailing effectiveness, for example, in the UK (the context of our 
study) there are strict rules on hospitality and gifts to physicians from PSRs, the provision of free 
samples to is prohibited, and there is no direct to consumer advertising (DTCA) which is explicitly 
banned in the UK.  
Thus, from the theoretical lens of EVT, PSR visits are expected to result in physicians 
assigning higher values to certain drug attributes leading to the increased overall utility of the 
detailed drug. Meetings would update a physician’s information set regarding the drug and counter 
memory decay to reduce cognition cost on a prescription occasion. Sales meetings build awareness 
of the brand, which is higher for more recent exposures and lower for older ones (Broadbent, S. 
1979). Therefore, PSR visits serve as a peripheral cue and salient stimuli to influence prescription 
choice, and so our next hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 2(a): Pharmaceutical detailing would positively influence the prescribing of the 
detailed drug. 
Physicians choose between alternative drugs with distinct modes of action and side effects 
for the same clinical outcome. The marketing of these competing alternatives can negatively 
impact the demand for a focal drug via substitution while, but it can also positively impact demand 
by increasing overall category sales (Fischer and Albers, 2010).  
Competing pharmaceutical firms do not coordinate and have limited information about 
competitive detailing. These constraints have also restricted research aiming to understand the 
impact of competitor detailing efforts on prescription choices. However, there is evidence of a 
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negative substitution effect on the demand for a drug in a co-marketing arrangement (Ching and 
Ishihara, 2012). In the case of combination therapies, detailing of other prescription drugs can 
increase demand through complementing a focal drug or decrease the demand due to substitution 
(Liu et al., 2015). Using aggregated sales data at the monthly level Fischer and Albers (2010) 
found that for some brands the substitution effect is greater than the market expansion effect while 
for some others the opposite appears to be true.  
Ignoring competitor detailing efforts has a negligible impact on the elasticity estimates of 
drug detailing (Mizik and Jacobson, 2004) but including it would reduce potential omitted variable 
bias. The complexity related to treating nervous system diseases, the absence of any ground-
breaking competitive molecule and restrictions on DTC advertising implies limited market 
expansion effects of competing drugs in our study context. However, the willingness of a physician 
to entertain detailing of competing drugs indicates their desire to look for substitutes or explore 
other options. Therefore, competitor-detailing efforts would disrupt the relative evaluation of a 
focal drug by influencing the utility values associated with the attributes of the competing drugs. 
Hence, our next hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 2(b): The pharmaceutical detailing of competing drugs would reduce prescribing of 
the focal drug.  
3.3.1 The Impact of the Internet on Response to Pharmaceutical Detailing 
 
The utility of an information source such as detailing depends on its perceived value, 
importance, timeliness, and accessibility (Robson and Robinson, 2015). Physicians tend to give 
precedence and more weight to information that is likely to produce useful task resolution in a 
choice-based decision process (Feldman and Lynch, 1988). Theories of informational influence 
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also suggest that individuals are inclined to accept information received from others if they assess 
it as useful evidence about reality (Sussman and Siegal, 2003). 
Hence, PSR credibility as perceived by physicians will determine the impact of detailing 
on subsequent prescription decisions (Briñol and Petty, 2009). However, a study conducted by 
IBM (2006) found that 76% of the doctors perceive the information they receive from sales 
meetings to be biased and only 50% believe that they take place at a convenient time. Since 
physicians seek timely and reliable clinical information; they continuously keep looking for 
alternative information sources. 
The increasing diffusion of internet is opening an array of new and reliable information 
channels for evidence-based medical information. Technologies such as electronic health records, 
biometric and telemedicine devices and wired (and wireless) internet devices assist in the 
maintenance and exchange of health information. User-generated information arising from sources 
such as discussion forums, online portals, and peer groups should be less biased than from 
individuals such as PSRs. For instance, signaling theory suggests that aggregate opinions from 
multiple sources are less likely to be less biased than a single contributor’s opinion (Donath, 2007). 
The influence of internet in increasing productivity at the individual and organizational 
level has also been studied: IT significantly increases labor productivity (Doms,1997), economic 
growth (Oliner and Sichel, 2000), business creation (Fairlie, 2006) and academic, scientific 
productivity (Ding et al., 2010). IT helps expedite business decisions and encourages entrepreneurs 
to invest by timely information about regulations, tax codes and competitors (Fairlie, 2006). 
Access to IT in hospitals not only provides equipment, services, and information but also enables 
knowledge workers to collaborate and increase their productivity (Menon et al., 2000). 
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Therefore, the information cost-reducing and productivity-enhancing effects of internet 
may mitigate the impact of detailing on prescribing through two cognitive mechanisms. First, a 
physician may give higher relative weighting to information from other credible channels such as 
medical databases, peers, and patients for updating their drug-related information set. They may 
also choose to scrutinize information from PSRs before incorporating it into their decisions, which 
in turn would undermine the persuasive effect of detailing. On the other hand, the efficiency gains 
as the result of the IT allow the physician to consider more alternative drugs and their attributes 
when prescribing. Hence, we expect that the extent of IT diffusion will moderate the impact of 
detailing. 
Hypothesis 3(a): The positive impact of pharmaceutical detailing on the prescription of the 
detailed drug will decrease with increasing internet diffusion.  
Similarly, detailing of competing for drugs influences the utility of alternatives, and 
increasing IT diffusion should reduce the relative weight of information from PSRs about 
competing drugs and so our final hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3(b): The negative impact of competitive detailing on the prescription of a focal drug 
will decrease with increasing internet diffusion.  
In our hypotheses, we assume that patients are heterogeneous in their medical 
characteristics and no single drug that suits all patients in the treatment category. This is a 
reasonable assumption, especially for drugs in the antidepressant category due to their interactions 
with other medicines and patient characteristics. Figure 14 below shows the conceptual model 
summarizing the mechanism through which IT influences prescription behavior. To minimize the 
information matching costs doctors, select a minimal number of attributes (m) across the available 
drug alternatives (n) for comparison leading to smaller personalization while the cost-reducing 
 
 
78 
 
effect of IT promotes higher personalization.  Physicians also gain greater insight into a patient’s 
diagnosis from electronic channels to evaluate drugs across a higher number of attributes (m). 
Clinical information from credible online sources is given more weight and so updates the utility 
values of drug attributes reducing the influence of pharmaceutical detailing.  
 
Figure 15 Conceptual Model 
 
3.4 Methodology  
 
3.4.1 Data and Market Description  
 
The study employs a unique longitudinal dataset of the prescription choices of 135 general 
practice physicians in the anti-depressant drug category. The dataset is obtained from a market 
research firm and comprises the daily record of new prescription decisions, detailing visits and 
some patient-specific information for a duration of ten years (1997-2006) in the United Kingdom 
(UK). The physician practices are located across ten Government Office Region (GOR) of the 
United Kingdom. Table X1 in the below details the distribution of physicians, prescriptions and 
detailing across the GORs.  
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Table 11 Distribution of the Physicians 
Region Physicians Prescriptions Detailing Total Practice 
Size 
Average 
Practice Size 
East Midlands  12 3191 355 34 3.7 
East of England  10 2113 456 69 5.3 
London 15 1928 760 55 3.4 
North West  14 3867 863 59 3.6 
Scotland  13 3914 916 42 7 
South East  21 6453 1233 65 5 
South West  14 2692 608 60 5.4 
West Midlands  10 1967 291 21 3.5 
Yorkshire &Humber  20 4229 1492 53 4.07 
Wales 06 1703 291 23 3.8 
Total 135 32177 7486 481 4.36 
 
We consider the 32177 prescription choices and 7486 detailing visits for 135 physicians in 
the anti-depressant category. The mean size of practice of these physicians is 4.46 implying that 
we consider practices with around 481 active physicians. During the observation period, each 
practice had an average of about five thousand registered patients.      
The drugs in the anti-depressant category are used to treat different types of depression and 
other nervous system related disorders. The Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (ATC) code 
for the drugs in this category is “N6A”.  Most anti-depressant drugs available in the market interact 
with other medications and are sensitive to patient medical conditions, and Desai et al. (2013) 
estimate that around 4.1 % of the medication errors involve antidepressant drugs. The prescription 
protocol for anti-depressants requires physicians to actively engage with their patients to elicit past 
medical information for an optimal outcome.  
Each prescription written by the physicians in our dataset is linked to the patient’s diagnosis 
through an ICD (International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision) code. The code indicates 
the diagnosis as perceived by the physician and the prescription choice is linked to it.  Apparently, 
the antidepressants were prescribed for 47 distinct diagnosis codes but the ICD code “9” comprised 
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the major chunk (~93.2%) of the prescriptions in the category. Therefore, we control for patient 
diagnosis in the study by considering the prescriptions by the physicians in the ICD code “9”. The 
optimal prescription should vary across the patient diagnosis and not controlling for it in the 
empirical analysis would lead under estimation of the persistence in the drug prescribing. Further, 
we only consider new or ‘switch’ prescriptions written by the physicians as these represent active 
decisions as opposed to repeat medication for returning patients.  
During the observation period, the physicians prescribed a total of 33 different drugs for 
the treatment of depression. Around 6 of the prescribed 33 drugs entered the market for the first 
time between the observation period 1997-2006.  
Because of a large number of possible alternatives, we restrict our analysis to branded drugs 
with at least 5% of the market share in prescription choices during the observation period 
consistent with other prior studies in the domain (Ching and Ishihara 2012; Jankiraman et al. 2006). 
This selection criterion yields five molecules: Venlafaxine(VENL), Fluoxetine(FLO3), Paroxetine 
(PARO), Citalopram (CITA) and Sertraline (SERT). These five drugs collectively contribute to 
approximately 70% of all prescriptions in the antidepressant category for the diagnosis code “9” 
in the sample. All five drugs under consideration belong of a newer generation of the anti-
depressants also known as Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor (SSRI) anti-depressants. These 
drugs are used to treat similar medical conditions and are similar in their mode of action. They do 
however differ in their efficacies, side effects and propensity to interact with patient’s 
characteristics and prior medications. For instance, VENL is linked with higher rates of nausea 
and vomiting than other SSRIs while SERT is associated with increased risk of diarrhea. PARO is 
associated with higher rates of sexual dysfunction. 
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The SSRI’s function by regulating the absorption of the neurotransmitter Serotonin in the 
brain and are selective in their impact on the other neurotransmitters. These drugs are also effective 
in disorders related to anxiety such as Bulimia, obsessive-compulsive disorder and panic disorder. 
SSRI’s also interact with other anti-depressants and are not recommended for patients with kidney 
or liver disease. For instance, the consumption of SSRI class of drugs along with products that 
cause drowsiness including alcohol, drugs for sleep anxiety, muscle relaxants and narcotic pain 
relievers increase the risk of Serotonin toxicity. Use of common prescription drugs such as Asprin 
with SSRI’s can increase the risk of bleeding (Labos et al., 2011) 
Table 12 Drug Distributions 
Drug Category  Share Prescriptions Detailing Year of Introduction 
Fluoxetine (FLOU) SSRI 35.8 11548 1047 1987 
Paroxetine (PARO) SSRI 22.9 7936 1573 1992 
Citalopram (CITA) SSRI 20.0 6450  1140 1989 
Venlafaxine(VENL) SSRI 10.2 3291 2104 1993 
Sertraline (SERT) SSRI 9.17 2952 1622 1990 
Total  100% 32177 7486  
 
The sample considers 32177 prescription choices and 7486 detailing visits for five SSRI 
type anti-depressants. All five prescription drugs were available in the market at least three years 
prior to beginning of the observations period and were prescribed and detailed at least once by the 
physicians under consideration. The figures 15 and 16 below shows the progression of detailing 
visits and prescriptions over time for the physicians under consideration.  Both VENL and SERT 
were under patent protection during the observation period and the first generic versions of the 
these drugs were approved in the year 2011 and 2007 respectively. It should be noted that the 
generic variants of the branded drugs are chemically equivalent and do not significantly differ in 
terms of their mode of action and side effects FDA.gov (2016).  
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Figure 16 Prescriptions Over Time 
 
   
Figure 17 Detailing Over Time 
However, PARO, FLOR and CITA were not under the patent protection and the first 
generic versions of these drugs were approved in 2003,2001 and 2004 respectively. The effect of 
patent expiration on the detailing of these drugs can be observed from figure 16 as their detailing 
was considerably reduced towards the end of the sample period. We utilize these variations in the 
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pharmaceutical detailing to identify its effect on the prescription choices of the physicians and test 
our proposed hypothesis.   
The cost of providing health care services to the residents of the United Kingdom is borne 
by the National Health Services (NHS), which contracts virtually all GPs. Patients under 18, 
pregnant women and those over 60 receive their medication free of charge. The rest of the 
population pay a fixed ‘prescription charge’ which bears no relationship to the cost of the 
medication to the NHS, it is estimated that about 80% of the total UK drug costs is dispensed 
without charge to the patient.  By the end of 1999 only 11.6% of the UK population had some form 
of private medical insurance cover (Euro.who.int, 2016), but this is almost exclusively linked to 
surgical procedures and largely associated with employment benefits.  The centralized nature of 
the health care system compels pharmaceutical companies to communicate directly with NHS for 
approval of new drugs and the conditions under which they can be prescribed. (Magrini & Font, 
2007; Gov.uk, 2014).  
          The advertising of prescription only drugs directly to the consumers (patients) is strictly 
regulated under the advertising regulation act of 1994. Unlike the US, pharmaceutical companies 
are not permitted to advertise directly on broadcast media, but they may under certain conditions 
to answer specific questions, provide facts and reference materials without making any product 
claims or reference to the brand.   
We assume that physicians have a sense of professional integrity and they take rational 
decisions to avoid malpractice suits or any harm to their reputation (Narayanan et al. 2005). 
Specifically, the British standards and ethics guidance clearly states “when prescribing medicines, 
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you must ensure that your prescribing is appropriate and responsible and in the patient’s, best 
interests” (Gov.uk, 20173).  
The physician’s professional network and patient profile in the region may contribute to 
heterogeneity in the prescription choices. To account for variations in regional demographics, 
patient profile, insured population we utilize data from British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 
(Bardasi et al. 2012; University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research, 2014). 
BHPS is a nationally representative annual survey of approximately 10,000 households. The BHPS 
is also the source of data on the internet penetration in the prescription region of the physician.    
In the British health care system, National Health Service (NHS) is providing care to the 
citizens since 1948 irrespective of their ability to pay for it. NHS is supported by the Department 
of Health and the local health authorities based on their assessment allocate budget and funds to 
NHS affiliated trusts, hospitals, and primary care agencies. Except for the cases of emergencies, 
the referral of a General Practitioner (GP) is required for hospital treatments. 
Since, the beginning of the 21st century NHS has been taking several steps to modernize 
its IT infrastructure and provide more efficient services to the citizens of UK. For instance, the 
creation of a special NHS information authority was undertaken in 1999 for developing 
infrastructure for electronic medical records, health information services and electronic healthcare 
delivery. As a part of this expansion plan, NHS initiated several services including: 
1. NHS Direct: Established in 1998, NHS Direct provided 24-hour health inquiry and information 
services over internet and telephone. The objective of this service was to increase the patient 
participation in care.  
                                                          
3 See also https://www.medicalcouncil.ie/Existing-Registrants-/Complaints/Guide-to-Professional-
Conduct-and-Ethics-for-Registered-Medical-Practitioners.pdf 
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2. National Electronic Library for Health (NELH): The NELH service was stated by NHS in 1998 
for health care professionals and public. This service connected various health information sources 
such as Chrocrane library and medical research review services such as the Data Base of Abstract 
of Reviews of Effectiveness (DARE). The objective of this service was to promote evidence-based 
medicine and physician learning.  
3. NHSnet : NHSnet is the secure wide area network for the NHS. This service was available 
during the observation period form the British Telecom and Cable and Wireless Communications. 
NHSnet incorporates secure and dedicated NHS network to provide health information service like 
internet. Some of the services that were available on NHSnet included: electronic mail service, 
NHSweb for health professionals, IT support services for medical practices, secure internet 
connection and website hosting, online patient appointments.  
The IT initiatives of the NHS were supported by the increasing number of internet users 
across various regions of UK. These initiatives promoted evidence-based medicine, innovation 
adoption and quality control.  
3.4.3 Measures  
 
The response variable of interest in our study is the prescription choice (𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑡 )  of the drug 
‘d’ by the physician ‘i’ at occasion ‘t’ of a new patient visit with a certain diagnosis (depression in 
our study). The physicians can prescribe any of the five prescription drugs (FLOU, PARO, CITA, 
SERT, and VENL) with a maximum prescription utility on a patient visit. Since, all the four 
prescription drugs belong to the same SSRI category none is inferior or superior to other. Instead, 
physicians experience and patient requirements would determine the most appropriate drug on a 
prescription occasion.     
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The other independent variables are the stock of detailing for the drug d (𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇)), the 
stock of detailing for the competing drugs d’ (𝑓(𝐶𝐷𝐸𝑇)), learning from prior prescription 
experience of drug d 𝑓(LER), internet penetration in the physician’s region (INTERNET) and 
prescription choice on most recent prior patient visit (𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑡−1 ). The  𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇),  𝑓(𝐶𝐷𝐸𝑇)  and 
𝑓(LER) are time-variant variables and differ across physicians and drug on each prescription 
occasion ‘t’. The persuasive effect of promotional tools such as detailing depends not only on the 
current detailing efforts but also on the past detailing. Prior studies in marketing and advertising 
utilized a stock variable to reflect memory decay and carryover effect from the prior marketing 
actions (Berndt et al. 1997; Gonul et al. 2001; Janakiraman et al. 2008). Consistent with these prior 
studies, we operationalize the detailing stock of the focal drug 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇) as:  
𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇𝑑𝑖𝑡) = 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇𝑑𝑖𝑡) =  𝐷𝐸𝑇𝑑𝑖𝑤  + 𝜆𝑑  𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇𝑑𝑖(𝑤−1))  --- 7 
In the above equation, 𝐷𝐸𝑇𝑑𝑖𝑤  is the number of detailing meetings in the week ‘w’ prior 
to the prescription occasion ‘t’, 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇𝑑𝑖(𝑤−1)) is the stock of detailing in w-1 and 𝜆𝑑 is the decay 
factor to incorporate memory decay. We fix the discount rate,  𝜆𝑑 = 0.98 consistent with prior 
studies in this domain with the weekly observed data (Gönül and Carter 2009). As a robustness 
check we also considered the alternative two alternative discount rates, 0.90, 0.95 and found no 
significant changes in the estimates of the model parameters. Similarly, the stock of competitive 
detailing and drug learning for a physician is computed implicitly, given the discounting rate, by 
recursive discounting (equation 3). We match the prescription occasion ‘t’ and the prescription 
week ‘w’ to operationalize the stock of detailing on the instances when the drugs are prescribed 
by the physician.  
Prior prescription experience of a drug informs the physicians about the drug effectiveness 
and this learning is also incorporated in the physician decision making. Like detailing the impact 
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of prior experience on the prescription choices would also be impacted by the memory decay. He 
we operationalize the learning from past prescription experience as a stock function similar to 
detailing stock such that: 
𝑓(𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑑𝑖𝑡) = 𝑓(𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑑𝑖𝑡) =  𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑑𝑖𝑤  + 𝜆𝑑  𝑓(𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑑𝑖(𝑤−1)) - 8 
We also consider the impact of peers’ choices on the prescription decision by controlling 
for the popularity (POP) of the prescription drug. The popularity of the drug is a dynamically 
measured variable (evaluated on each patient’s visit) and is equivalent to the percentage of times 
the prescription drug is prescribed by other physicians in past six months to the patients with 
depression. We experiment with past four months and one year as well but did not observe 
significant variations in the model estimates.  It should be noted that 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇), 𝑓(𝐶𝐷𝐸𝑇), 𝑓(𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑁) 
and POP are drug alternative specific variables and would differ in their values for each drug 
during a prescription occasion.   
The level of internet diffusion (INTERNET) in the physician practice is measured as the 
percentage of households with internet connection in the GOR of the physician. INTERNET is a 
time and geography dependent variable (varies with the GOR of the physician) and is measured 
annually. This measure is more reliable than the country-level annually measured ICT variables 
such as internet use as they are aggregated across the regions. The variation in INTERNET across 
the GORs of UK also allows for the identification of the effect of IT on persistence in prescribing 
and the impact of detailing even after controlling for time trend (Wooldridge, 2008).  
Another key variable of interest is previous prescription (𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑡−1 ) written by the physician. 
It is a binary variable and is equal to 1 if the physician prescribed the drug d under consideration 
on the most recent visit by a patient presenting with depression. Prior studies have found a strong 
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positive impact of prior prescription choices on the subsequent prescriptions (Janakiraman et al. 
2008; Mizik & Jacobson, 2004; Coscelli 2003). 
 
Figure 18 Internet Penetration Over Time 
We expect a negative interaction effect in our empirical analysis implying that the higher 
diffusion of the internet reduces the tendency for prescribing the previously specified drug ‘d’ at 
the next patient visit. The introduction of a lagged dependent variable controls for autocorrelation 
in the series arising due to inertia and persistence in prescription behavior.  
We control for a variety of confounding variables which might impact the prescription of 
a drug by the physician. First, the patient’s condition on a prescription occasion would determine 
the drug choice therefore, we only consider prescriptions written to ‘new’ patients diagnosed with 
depression (ICD-9). Second, we control for the age of the patient visiting the physician 
(PAT_AGE). PAT_AGE is a time dependent variable measured at each prescription occasion ‘t’. 
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SSRI anti-depressants such as Prozac are generally not recommended for elderly patients due to 
their side effects and longer withdrawal protocols (Buffam & Buffum, 2005). Due to unavailability 
of data or missing observations we are unable to control for other patient specific factors. However, 
to account for a general patient profile and preference in the physician’s practice region we control 
for percentage of individuals with private insurance (INSU) and their average income (INCOM). 
The variables INSU, INCOME are annually measured at the GOR level and are obtained from 
BHPS. The tension to adhere to the private insurers’ guidelines may impact the prescription choice 
of a drug while the variations in INCOME may make one drug more preferable than another for a 
patient.  
Further, we also control for market characteristics such as the number of new prescription 
drugs (NEW_D) for treating depression released during the prescription year. The availability of 
new drugs may impact the relative utility of prescribing a prescription drug. We also control for 
the patent expiration (PAT_EXP) of the prescription drug under consideration using a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the patent of the drug under consideration is expired or 0 
otherwise. The prescription trend is controlled by using a time trend variable represented as the 
year of prescription.  
We also control for time invariant physician variables such as sex (SEX), year of 
qualification (YOQ), size of practice (SOP) to account for heterogeneity in choices due to 
physician characteristics. The older physicians may prefer to prescribe a drug based on an older 
formula and may be reluctant to adopt new innovations due to knowledge accumulation over time. 
Drug preferences may develop differently for physicians in smaller practices compared to those in 
a larger practice due to network effects and the disparity in patients visiting large practices with 
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the availability of information from colleagues influences physician’s persistence, drug choice as 
well as detailing visits.  
Table 11 below summarizes the alternative specific variables over observations period and 
across all GORs under consideration. The alternative specific variables vary for each of the five 
prescription alternatives on a prescription occasion.  
Table 13 Alternative Specific Variables  
Drug Variable Minimum  Mean Maximum SD 
CITA      
 Detailing Stock (f(DET)) 0 1.361436 14.02303 1.798181 
 Competitive Detailing Stock (f(CDET)) 0 9.553868 63.95528 8.845459 
 Learning Stock (f(LER)) 0 9.94372 74.68462 13.17023 
 Prior Prescription (PP) 0 0.19918 1 0.39939 
 Popularity (POP) 0 0.190688 0.477778 0.117513 
FLOU      
 Detailing Stock (f(DET)) 0 1.30171 17.71856 1.811654 
 Competitive Detailing Stock (f(CDET)) 0 9.613594 65.11171 9.030859 
 Learning Stock (f(LER)) 0 19.8172 88.62664 17.72986 
 Prior Prescription (PP) 0 0.357336 1 0.479222 
 Popularity (POP) 0 0.358583 0.455006 0.034214 
PARO      
 Detailing Stock (f(DET)) 0 1.861123 16.4229 1.966272 
 Competitive Detailing Stock (f(CDET)) 0 9.054181 67.40995 8.783061 
 Learning Stock (f(LER)) 0 14.40099 120.2243 15.781 
 Prior Prescription (PP) 0 0.246108 1 0.430749 
 Popularity (POP) 0 0.254393 0.409091 0.104822 
SERT      
 Detailing Stock (f(DET)) 0 1.945365 15.24806 2.2577 
 Competitive Detailing Stock (f(CDET)) 0 8.969939 59.16053 8.460762 
 Learning Stock (f(LER)) 0 4.865118 54.02011 7.291484 
 Prior Prescription (PP) 0 0.091463 1 0.288271 
 Popularity (POP) 0 0.093763 0.235294 0.01971 
VENL      
 Detailing Stock (f(DET)) 0 1.973041 13.19042 2.082636 
 Competitive Detailing Stock (f(CDET)) 0 8.942263 62.36562 8.521542 
 Learning Stock (f(LER)) 0 5.312027 36.28799 6.006011 
 Prior Prescription (PP) 0 0.101719 1 0.302283 
 Popularity (POP) 0 0.101951 0.163951 0.027438 
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The table 12 below summarizes the case specific variables averaged across ten years and 
all government office regions. These variables do not vary across the drug alternatives on a 
prescription occasion.  
Table 14 Case Specific Variables 
Variables  Minimum  Mean Maximum SD 
New Drugs (NEW_D) 0 0.618485 3 1.034441 
Prescription Size (PR_SIZE) 1 4.422786 7 1.88933 
Qualification Date (QUAL_DATE) 1940 1971.302 1990 7.225068 
Doctor Sex (DR_SEX) 0 0.79563 1 0.403247 
Income (INCOM) 833.3103 1131.212 1716.716 179.6667 
Private Insurance (INSU) 0.0097051 0.039624 0.095065 0.014955 
Internet (INTERNET)  0.19 0.4669 0.77 0.156 
 
3.4.4 Model Specification and Estimation   
 
To address our research questions and test the underlying hypotheses we first model 
prescription decision of a physician using the probabilistic choice modeling approach (McFadden, 
1981). This approach is suitable in our study’s context as physicians maximize the utility of the 
prescription drug for the patients after considering the attributes of available alternatives and 
patient’s characteristics. For instance, let 𝐶𝑝𝑖 = 1,2,.. N be the prescription choice of a physician 
‘p’ (where N is the number of prescription alternatives) on a prescription occasion ‘i’. Let 𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑖 be 
the unobserved utility associated with prescribing drug ‘d’ for the physician ‘p’. Under the 
assumption of the utility maximization the physician would prescribe the drug ‘d’ if 𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑖 > 𝑈𝑝𝑑′𝑖 
for all d’ != d. The choice modeling literature assumes this unobserved utility to be a combination 
of a systematic (𝑆𝑝𝑑𝑖) and a stochastic component such that,  
𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑖 = 𝑆𝑝𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑝𝑑𝑖 --- 9 
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Therefore, on the prescription occasion the probability that the physician chooses the drug 
‘d’ (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑝𝑑𝑖 ~ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝐶𝑝𝑑𝑖 = 1) would be determined by the comparison of the unobserved 
utilities of the drud ‘d’ and other alternatives (Pr(𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑖 > 𝑈𝑝𝑑′𝑖). We model the systematic 
component of the unobserved utility of prescribing a drug using a combined Conditional Logit 
Model framework where we account to alternative specific variability as well as the variations in 
the individual characteristics of the decision maker.  Hence, we model the systematic component 
of the utility as: 
𝑆𝑝𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽 ∗ 𝐷𝑟𝑢𝑔 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑑𝑖 + 𝛼𝑑*𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑝𝑖--- 10 
 
In the above equation, the 𝐷𝑟𝑢𝑔 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 includes: 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇), 𝑓(𝐶𝐷𝐸𝑇), 𝑓(𝐿𝐸𝑅), 
PROIR and POP as these vary for each alternative on a prescription occasion. While, the 
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 controls for NEW_D, YEAR, PAT_AGE, PR_SIZE, 
QUAL_DATE, DR_SEX, INCOME and INSU.  
Assuming the stochastic component follows a standard Type-I maximum extreme value 
distribution with a variance equivalent to (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑝𝑑𝑖
2
 / 6) and satisfies the independence assumption 
(Expectation [𝜀𝑝𝑑𝑖 , 𝜀𝑝𝑑′𝑖] = 0 for any d ≠ d’ then 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑝𝑑𝑖 can be represented as: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑝𝑑𝑖 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽∗𝐷𝑟𝑢𝑔 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑑𝑖 + 𝛼𝑑∗𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑝𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽∗𝐷𝑟𝑢𝑔 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑘𝑖 + 𝛼𝑘∗𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑝𝑖)
𝑁
𝑘=1
 --- 11 
Suppose, 𝐶𝑝𝑑𝑖 =1 if the drug ‘d’ is prescribed by the physician on the prescription occasion and 0 
otherwise. Then the likelihood for obtaining the observed data can be expressed as: 
£ =       ∏ ∏ ∏ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑝𝑑𝑖
𝐶𝑝𝑑𝑖𝑁
𝑑=1
𝑖𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑀
𝑝=1   --- 12 
To get parameter estimates we maximize the log likelihood using the following expression  
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∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑝𝑑𝑖𝑙𝑛
𝑁
𝑑=1 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑝𝑑𝑖
𝑖𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑀
𝑝=1  --- 13 
In the above equations, M refers to the total number of physicians, 𝑖𝑝 is the total number 
of prescription occasion for the physician p and N is the number of drug alternatives. In the model 
the marginal effect of the change in an attribute ‘l’ associated with the alternative ‘k’ 𝑋𝑙𝑘 is 
represented by: 
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑
𝜕𝑋𝑙𝑘
 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 (r-𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑘)𝛽𝑙 --- 14 
where r = 1 if d = k and 0 otherwise 
The marginal effect of an attribute is a function of the values all other attributes hence the 
average marginal effect can be evaluated as.  
∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑝𝑑𝑖 (𝑟 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑝𝑘𝑖)𝛽𝑙
𝑖𝑝
𝑖=1
𝑀
𝑝=1  / ∑ 𝑖
𝑝𝑀
𝑝=1  --- 15 
 
3.4.5 Accounting for Endogeneity in Detailing  
Detailing visits are planned to maximize the return from marketing investment. Sales 
representatives may detail physicians, who are more responsive to detailing or easily approachable, 
more frequently than less accessible doctors. Therefore, detailing visits are not assigned randomly 
but are planned at the individual level based on certain unobserved physician-specific 
characteristics. It is possible that some unobserved variables (represented by stochastic component 
𝜀) are correlated with the detailing 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇) which can contribute to unbiased estimates of the 
effects of detailing on prescription choice. The approach posits that the endogenous 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇) can 
be represented as a function of the variables entering the utility function (Drug Attributes and 
Decision Maker Characteristics) and instruments that do not directly affect the prescription utility 
but do impact the prescription choice.  
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𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇)𝑝𝑑𝑖 =   𝑓(𝐷𝑟𝑢𝑔 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑑𝑖, 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑝𝑑𝑖, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑝𝑑𝑖, 
€𝑝𝑑𝑖) --- 16 
The approach assumes that the stochastic terms 𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑖 and 𝜀𝑝𝑑𝑖 are independent of 
𝐷𝑟𝑢𝑔 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑑𝑖 and 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑝𝑑𝑖 and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑝𝑑𝑖 but are not 
independent of each other. The feasibility of the approach depends on the recovered €𝑝𝑑𝑖 which 
enters the second stage utility equation to control for the unobserved bias. The stochastic 
component is represented in the terms of the control function (CF) as: 
𝜀𝑝𝑑𝑖 = CF(€𝑝𝑑𝑖,δ) + 𝜀?̃?𝑑𝑖 --- 17 
Where CF(€𝑝𝑑𝑖,δ) is the control function with the parameters δ. The CF is approximated 
to be linear in the parameters δ such that CF(€𝑝𝑑𝑖,δ) = δ*€𝑝𝑑𝑖. Therefore, the utility of prescribing 
a drug on a prescription occasion can be written as   
𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑖 = 𝑆𝑝𝑑𝑖 + δ*€𝑝𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀?̃?𝑑𝑖 --- 18 
The utility function parameters in the presence of endogeneity using the control function 
approach are estimated in two steps: First, the endogenous detailing variable 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇)𝑝𝑑𝑖 is 
regressed with observed Drug Attributes, Decision Maker Characteristics and instruments. The 
residuals from this first are then used to estimate the control function. In the second stage, the 
choice model is estimated using the observed variables and control functions or residuals obtained 
from the first stage.  
The CF approach has also been shown to be useful for addressing endogeneity concerns 
for discrete choice models (Petrin and Train, 2010). The approach relies on similar identification 
conditions as 2SLS which require valid instruments for the endogenous variables. However, CF is 
preferred to 2SLS for estimating average partial effects (APE) in the nonlinear models and in the 
presence of endogenous interaction terms (𝑒. 𝑔.  𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇)𝑥𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑇) (Wooldridge, 2008).  
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To establish a causal link and we explore exogenous variable that impact 𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇) but does 
not affect the utility of prescribing a drug and therefore choice ( 𝐶𝑝𝑑𝑖 ) on a prescription occasion. 
We identify that the patent expiration (PAT_EXP) of certain prescription drugs (FLOU, PARO, 
CITA) in the sample are adversely impacting the detailing for those prescription drugs. The 
availability of a generic variant of the prescription drug should not impact the utility of the drug 
for the physicians or patients in a centralized health care system as that of UK. Since, NHS is the 
key buyer of the prescription drugs it is safe to assume that patients and physicians are indifferent 
to generic or branded prescription choices. In addition, we model the choice of a particular 
molecule by the physician irrespective of its branded or generic variant.    
The detailing plan is formulated annually or semi-annually, and pharmaceutical 
representatives aggressively target top decile of the drug-prescribing physicians (Manchanda et al. 
2004) therefore we also use the relative share of detailing (SHARE_DET) of a drug received by 
the physicians in past six months. This comparative measure is irrelevant to the physicians but 
represents the importance of the physician for the drug manufacturers. For the model with the 
endogenous interaction term (𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇)𝑥𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑇) we also include the interaction instrument 
(INTERNET x SHARE_DET, INTERNETxPAT_EXP) in our first stage equation (Wooldridge, 
2008).  
To summarize, in the first stage we run a pooled OLS regression of  𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇) with all 
exogenous variables (including instruments) and obtain the residuals €𝑝𝑑?̂?. In the second stage, we 
run the combined conditional logit model for prescription utility using exogenous variables 
(excluding instruments) and €𝑝𝑑?̂?. The presence of endogeneity in the equation can be tested 
through a t-test on the coefficient of €𝑝𝑑?̂?. We adjust for two step estimation procedure and serial 
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correlation by calculating bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the physician level 
(Wooldridge, 2008). 
 
3.6 Results 
 
The descriptive statistics of the alternative specific numerical variables in our study are 
reported in table 11 while table 12 describes the case specific variables which are constant across 
alternatives during each prescription occasion for a physician.  
Table 13-16 presents the results of various conditional logit models to test the proposed 
hypothesis in our study. The models 1-4 show the estimates of the main effects of various 
explanatory variables under consideration. For each model we have a specification that controls 
for endogeneity in detailing of prescription drugs using a control function (CF). The CF variable 
is obtained by regressing the endogenous detailing stock on each prescription occasion using all 
external variables and the instruments (patent expiration dummy and relative physician’s 
prescription share) using OLS regression. The first stage OLS regression results show that the 
patent expiration of a prescription drug indeed has a negative impact on its detailing while higher 
relative share of a prescription for a physician has a significant positive impact on the detailing 
stock of a physician.        
Table 15 Conditional Logit Models Statistics 1 
VARIABLE MODEL 1 MODEL 1 (CF) MODEL 2 MODEL 2(CF) 
 Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
DETAILING 0.095*** -0.018 0.23*** -0.050 0.097*** -0.018 0.23*** -0.051 
LEARNING 0.058*** -0.006 0.054*** -0.006 0.057*** -0.006 0.054*** -0.006 
POPULARITY 0.032*** -0.005 0.029*** -0.005 0.029*** -0.005 0.027*** -0.005 
RESIDUALS(CF)   -0.14** -0.055   -0.14** -0.056 
FLOU 4.430 -17.100 8.040 -16.900 4.420 -17.200 8.630 -16.800 
PARO 12.800 -20.900 7.140 -21.100 13.500 -21.100 7.940 -21.400 
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Table 16 Conditional Logit Models Statistics 1 continued  
SERT 0.990 -24.200 -2.500 -24.200 0.890 -24.400 -2.390 -24.40 
VENL -11.100 -15.200 -18.600 -16.100 -11.200 -15.200 -18.500 -16.100 
FLOUxPAT_AGE -0.016*** -0.003 -0.016*** -0.003 -0.016*** -0.003 -0.016*** -0.003 
PAROxPAT_AGE -0.0080** -0.002 -0.0078** -0.002 -0.0080** -0.002 -0.0078** -0.002 
SERTxPAT_AGE -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 
VENLxPAT_AGE -0.0042* -0.002 -0.0040* -0.002 -0.0041* -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 
FLOUxNEW_D 0.034 -0.049 0.022 -0.052 0.040 -0.050 0.027 -0.053 
PAROxNEW_D 0.074 -0.046 0.050 -0.050 0.078* -0.046 0.051 -0.051 
SERTxNEW_D 0.049 -0.051 0.042 -0.053 0.053 -0.052 0.045 -0.054 
VENLxNEW_D 0.054 -0.052 0.041 -0.054 0.058 -0.053 0.044 -0.055 
FLOUxYEAR 0.033 -0.027 0.041 -0.028 0.013 -0.032 0.024 -0.033 
PAROxYEAR -0.037 -0.048 -0.067 -0.045 -0.066 -0.050 -0.099** -0.048 
SERTxYEAR 0.021 -0.033 0.011 -0.032 0.017 -0.038 0.008 -0.037 
VENLxYEAR 0.026 -0.032 -0.004 -0.030 0.032 -0.031 -0.004 -0.031 
FLOUxPR_SIZE 0.048 -0.033 0.044 -0.032 0.047 -0.033 0.043 -0.032 
PAROxPR_SIZE 0.028 -0.026 0.024 -0.026 0.026 -0.026 0.020 -0.026 
SERTxPR_SIZE 0.048 -0.043 0.049 -0.043 0.049 -0.043 0.050 -0.043 
VENLxPR_SIZE 0.021 -0.029 0.016 -0.029 0.022 -0.029 0.016 -0.029 
FLOUxQUAL_DATE -0.002 -0.009 -0.004 -0.009 -0.002 -0.009 -0.004 -0.008 
PAROxQUAL_DATE -0.006 -0.011 -0.003 -0.011 -0.007 -0.011 -0.004 -0.011 
SERTxQUAL_DATE 0.000 -0.012 0.001 -0.012 0.000 -0.012 0.001 -0.012 
VENLxQUAL_DATE 0.006 -0.008 0.010 -0.008 0.006 -0.008 0.010 -0.008 
FLOUxDR_SEX -0.31*** -0.093 -0.32*** -0.092 -0.31*** -0.092 -0.32*** -0.091 
PAROxDR_SEX -0.19* -0.110 -0.19* -0.110 -0.19* -0.110 -0.18* -0.110 
SERTxDR_SEX -0.28* -0.170 -0.30* -0.170 -0.280 -0.170 -0.30* -0.170 
VENLxDR_SEX -0.084 -0.140 -0.087 -0.130 -0.083 -0.130 -0.093 -0.130 
FLOUxINSU     -0.010 -0.032 0.021 -0.034 
PAROxINSU     -0.097*** -0.033 -0.10*** -0.033 
SERTxINSU     -0.028 -0.027 -0.021 -0.026 
VENLxINSU     0.042 -0.029 0.057* -0.029 
FLOUxINCOME     0.160 -0.390 0.160 -0.380 
PAROxINCOME     0.550 -0.350 0.74** -0.360 
SERTxINCOME     -0.130 -0.510 -0.080 -0.510 
VENLxINCOME     -0.590 -0.380 -0.440 -0.390 
AIC 81044.800  80990.600  80970.600  80917.100  
BIC 81354.500  81310.200  81360.100  81316.600  
 
Table 13 above gives the estimated parameter for model 1 and model 2 with and without 
endogeneity correction using the control function approach. Model 2 has additional controls in the 
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form of regional variables (private insurance – INSU and income -INCOME). The variables that 
enter into these models can be classified in to alternative specific (DETAILING, LEARNING 
POPULARITY, CF (RESIDUALS)) and case specific (PAT_AGE, DR_SEX, QUAL_DATE, 
PR_SIZE, YEAR, INSU and INCOME). As the case specific variables do not vary across the drug 
alternatives on each prescription occasion, they are interreacted with the drug alternatives (CITA 
being the baseline) for identification. In the conditional logit models the sign of the alternative 
specific variables coefficients are directly interpretable and represents the effect of the variable on 
the choice probability of the alternatives. However, unlike linear regression the marginal effects 
of the variables in the non-linear is a function of other model variables and hence, vary at each 
observation. We do a separate Average Marginal Effect (AME) analysis later.   
Model 1 shows that the stock of detailing for a drug, its popularity and learning for the 
physician have a positive impact on its prescription choice. On correcting for endogeneity due to 
the stock of detailing using control function (CF) approach we find that the stock of detailing is 
indeed endogenous (residuals significant at p < 0.01, model 2 (CF)) and there are omitted drug 
specific characteristics that are correlated with the detailing stock. The models including the 
control function residuals fit better (lesser AIC and BIC values) and increases the impact of 
detailing by two-fold (β = 0.01 in model 1 vs β = 0.023 in model 1(CF)). The control function 
residuals themselves have significant negative coefficients implying that unobserved factors that 
determine stock of detailing for a prescription drug negatively influence the prescription choice. 
This may imply that drug manufacturers preferably detail physicians who heavily prescribe their 
drugs, but they might also be prescribing in other competing drugs which is undermining the 
impact of detailing on the prescription choice. From model 2 we also find that variations in the 
INSU and INCOME of citizens in the GOR of the physician significantly influence the choice of 
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the five alternatives on a prescription occasion. More specifically, we find that in comparison to 
CITA (baseline drug) the probability of prescribing PARO differs significantly with changes in 
INSU and INCOME.  
Table 17 Conditional Logit Model Statistics 2 
VARIABLE Model 3 Model 3 (CF) Model 4 Model 4(CF) 
 Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
DETAILING      0.089*** 0.016 0.21*** 0.045 
PRIOR PRESCRIPTION      0.51*** 0.031 0.50*** 0.031 
COMPETITIVE DETAILING  -0.097*** 0.018 -0.16*** 0.032     
LEARNING 0.057*** 0.006 0.062*** 0.005 0.050*** 0.005 0.047*** 0.005 
POPULARITY 0.029*** 0.005 0.035*** 0.005 0.026*** 0.004 0.025*** 
0.00
4 
FLOU 4.42 17.2 5.08 17.2 3.24 15.3 6.91 14.9 
PARO 13.5 21.1 8.32 21.2 12.2 19.2 7.36 19.4 
SERT 0.89 24.4 -2.47 24.2 0.0071 22.6 -2.79 22.5 
VENL -11.2 15.2 -17.4 14.8 -11.5 14.0 -17.8 14.7 
FLOUxPAT_AGE -0.016*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 
PAROxPAT_AGE -0.008*** 0.002 -0.008*** 0.002 -0.008*** 0.002 -0.007*** 0.002 
SERTxPAT_AGE -0.00052 0.002 -0.00031 0.002 -0.00055 0.002 -0.00035 0.002 
VENLxPAT_AGE -0.0041* 0.002 -0.0039* 0.002 -0.0042* 0.002 -0.0040 0.002 
FLOU+xNEW_D 0.040 0.050 -0.0016 0.047 0.038 0.045 0.026 0.047 
PAROxNEW_D 0.078* 0.046 0.051 0.043 0.073* 0.042 0.049 0.046 
SERTxNEW_D 0.053 0.052 0.024 0.050 0.051 0.048 0.043 0.049 
VENLxNEW_D 0.058 0.053 0.025 0.050 0.056 0.049 0.044 0.051 
FLOUxYEAR 0.013 0.032 0.061* 0.033 0.011 0.028 0.020 0.029 
PAROxYEAR -0.066 0.050 -0.002 0.050 -0.062 0.044 -0.090** 0.043 
SERTxYEAR 0.017 0.038 0.062 0.042 0.012 0.035 0.0048 0.034 
VENLxYEAR 0.032 0.031 0.059** 0.030 0.028 0.029 -0.0033 0.028 
FLOUxPR_SIZE 0.047 0.033 0.047 0.033 0.044 0.029 0.040 0.028 
PAROxPR_SIZE 0.026 0.026 0.034 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.019 0.023 
SERTxPR_SIZE 0.049 0.043 0.055 0.042 0.043 0.041 0.043 
0.04
0 
VENLxPR_SIZE 0.022 0.029 0.022 0.029 0.020 0.027 0.015 0.027 
FLOUxQUAL_DATE -0.001 0.008 -0.002 0.008 -0.001 0.007 -0.003 0.007 
PAROxQUAL_DATE -0.006 0.011 -0.004 0.011 -0.006 0.009 -0.003 
0.00
9 
SERTxQUAL_DATE -0.0003 0.012 0.001 0.012 0.0001 0.011 0.002 0.011 
VENLxQUAL_DATE 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.007 
FLOUxDR_SEX -0.31*** 0.092 -0.32*** 0.093 -0.26*** 0.082 -0.28*** 0.081 
PAROxDR_SEX -0.19* 0.11 -0.17 0.11 -0.16* 0.098 -0.16* 0.097 
SERTxDR_SEX -0.28 0.17 -0.26 0.17 -0.24 0.16 -0.26* 0.15 
VENLxDR_SEX -0.083 0.13 -0.073 0.13 -0.060 0.12 -0.069 0.12 
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Table 18 Conditional Logit Model Statistics 2 continued  
FLOUxINSU -0.010 0.032 0.011 0.033 -0.011 0.029 0.017 0.031 
PAROxINSU -0.097*** 0.033 -0.10*** 0.033 -0.087*** 0.029 -0.090*** 0.029 
SERTxINSU -0.028 0.027 -0.027 0.027 -0.026 0.025 -0.020 0.025 
VENLxINSU 0.042 0.029 0.041 0.028 0.041 0.027 0.054** 0.027 
FLOUxINCOME 0.16 0.39 0.16 0.40 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.34 
PAROxINCOME 0.55 0.35 0.73** 0.35 0.50 0.31 0.66** 0.32 
SERTxINCOME -0.13 0.51 -0.076 0.51 -0.12 0.48 -0.073 0.48 
VENLxINCOME -0.59 0.38 -0.50 0.37 -0.55 0.35 -0.41 0.36 
RESIDUALS    0.061*** 0.020   -0.12** 0.049 
AIC 80970.6  80900.7  79553.5  79514.7  
BIC 81360.1  81300.2  79953.1  79924.2  
 
Table 14 above introduces new explanatory variables of competitive detailing stock and 
prior prescription choice to Model 2. Model 3 does not include the variable DETAILING due to 
perfect collinearity with the COMPETITIVE DETAILING within each case. The effect of 
COMPETITIVE DETAILING is significant and negative. This finding is consistent with our 
hypothesis 2(b) arguing negative effect of competing detailing efforts on the probability of 
prescribing a focal drug. Similarly, on control for prior prescription choice we find that choice of 
a drug on previous prescription occasion would have a strong positive significant effect on the 
choice probability. Model 4 fits the observed data best as it has the least value of the model 
goodness of fit statistics AIC and BIC. Therefore, to test the moderation hypothesis we build upon 
the specification of the model 4. 
Table 19 Conditional Logit Model Statistics 3 
VARIABLES MODEL 5 MODEL 6 MODEL 7 MODEL 8 
 Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
DETAILING  0.43*** 0.067   0.20*** 0.049 0.21*** 0.045 
LEARNING 0.044*** 0.0051 0.050*** 0.0050 0.047*** 0.0052 0.047*** 0.0052 
POPULARITY 0.023*** 0.0042 0.026*** 0.0043 0.039*** 0.0093 0.025*** 0.0042 
PRIOR PRESCRIPTION  0.49*** 0.031 0.51*** 0.032 0.50*** 0.031 0.69*** 0.093 
DETAILINGxINTERNET -0.26** 0.13       
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Table 20 Conditional Logit Model Statistics 3 continued 
 
COMP. DETAILING    -0.18*** 0.060     
COMP. DETAILING x 
INTERNET    0.24* 0.13     
POPULARITYxINTERNET     -0.031* 0.018   
PRIOR PRES.xINTERNET        -0.48** 0.20 
RESIDUALS (CF) -0.24*** 0.049 0.0002 0.019 -0.12** 0.054 -0.13** 0.050 
FLOU 10.6 14.8 3.35 15.3 6.62 14.9 7.18 15.0 
PARO 2.44 19.8 12.0 19.8 7.60 19.3 8.01 19.1 
SERT -6.86 22.2 -1.40 22.6 -2.12 22.3 -1.95 22.3 
VENL -23.4 15.3 -10.7 14.1 -17.0 14.8 -17.3 14.7 
FLOU#PAT_AGE -0.016*** 0.0026 -0.016*** 0.0025 -0.016*** 0.0025 -0.016*** 0.0025 
PARO#PAT_AGE -0.007*** 0.0023 -0.008*** 0.0023 -0.008*** 0.0023 -0.007*** 0.0023 
SERT#PAT_AGE 0.000 0.0025 0.000 0.0025 0.000 0.0025 0.000 0.0025 
VENL#PAT_AGE -0.0038 0.0024 -0.0042* 0.0024 -0.0041* 0.0025 -0.0039 0.0024 
FLOU#NEW_D 0.014 0.046 0.035 0.045 0.0025 0.047 0.024 0.047 
PARO#NEW_D 0.026 0.045 0.069 0.042 0.030 0.044 0.046 0.045 
SERT#NEW_D 0.036 0.047 0.045 0.049 0.023 0.048 0.041 0.049 
VENL#NEW_D 0.034 0.049 0.053 0.050 0.022 0.049 0.041 0.050 
FLOU#YEAR 0.029 0.029 0.010 0.029 0.035 0.028 0.022 0.029 
PARO#YEAR -0.11*** 0.041 -0.058 0.044 -0.080* 0.043 -0.091** 0.042 
SERT#YEAR 0.0034 0.033 0.013 0.036 -0.012 0.035 0.0015 0.034 
VENL#YEAR -0.020 0.028 0.038 0.028 -0.020 0.029 -0.0081 0.028 
FLOU#PR_SIZE 0.038 0.028 0.045 0.029 0.041 0.028 0.039 0.029 
PARO#PR_SIZE 0.014 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.018 0.023 
SERT#PR_SIZE 0.045 0.040 0.042 0.040 0.043 0.040 0.042 0.040 
VENL#PR_SIZE 0.012 0.027 0.021 0.027 0.015 0.027 0.014 0.027 
FLOU#QUAL_DATE -0.0051 0.0074 -0.001 0.0077 -0.0032 0.0075 -0.0034 0.0075 
PARO#QUAL_DATE -0.0012 0.0100 -0.006 0.010 -0.0039 0.0097 -0.0040 0.0097 
SERT#QUAL_DATE 0.0035 0.011 0.0008 0.011 0.0012 0.011 0.0011 0.011 
VENL#QUAL_DATE 0.012 0.0078 0.0056 0.0072 0.0089 0.0075 0.0090 0.0075 
FLOU#DR_SEX -0.29*** 0.079 -0.27*** 0.082 -0.28*** 0.080 -0.28*** 0.082 
PARO#DR_SEX -0.16 0.096 -0.16* 0.098 -0.17* 0.096 -0.17* 0.097 
SERT#DR_SEX -0.26* 0.15 -0.24 0.15 -0.26* 0.15 -0.26* 0.15 
VENL#DR_SEX -0.072 0.12 -0.061 0.12 -0.077 0.12 -0.073 0.12 
FLOU#INSU 0.039 0.029 -0.014 0.031 0.027 0.030 0.018 0.030 
PARO#INSU -0.094*** 0.029 -0.086*** 0.029 -0.068** 0.031 -0.087*** 0.029 
SERT#INSU -0.015 0.024 -0.025 0.025 -0.0022 0.025 -0.017 0.025 
VENL#INSU 0.059** 0.027 0.036 0.027 0.072** 0.030 0.058** 0.027 
FLOU#INCOME 0.089 0.33 0.11 0.35 0.22 0.34 0.15 0.34 
PARO#INCOME 0.79** 0.31 0.47 0.32 0.65** 0.32 0.66** 0.32 
SERT#INCOME -0.0032 0.48 -0.12 0.48 -0.21 0.50 -0.10 0.48 
VENL#INCOME -0.26 0.36 -0.52 0.34 -0.55 0.38 -0.44 0.36 
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Table 21 Conditional Logit Model Statistics 3 continued 
 
AIC 79371.2  79528.9  79485.8  79472.7  
BIC 79790.7  79948.5  79905.3  79892.2  
 
Next, we analyze the hypothesis 1(a), 1(b) and 3(a), 3(b) pertaining to moderating effects 
of internet on the impact of key explanatory variables. Table 15 above presents the estimates of 
conditional logit models with the interaction terms of variables of interest and the internet 
diffusion. It can be observed that the inclusion of interaction terms in each model across all four 
drugs substantially improves the model fit. 
Model 5 in Table 15 accounts for the moderating effect of the internet on response to 
detailing. We observe that the impact of detailing on the probability of prescribing a drug 
alternative is significantly moderated by the internet diffusion.  Although the internet significantly 
moderates the impact of detailing on prescription choice the interpretation of the effects in the 
nonlinear models is not straightforward (Ai & Norton, 2003). The marginal effect depends on the 
values of other model covariates and hence for some combinations, the effect may be positive and 
may be negative for others. Therefore, we estimate the average marginal effects (AME) of detailing 
at different values of internet diffusion using the margins command in STATA. The procedure 
accounts for the relationship between the main effect and the interaction covariates and correctly 
estimates the overall effect. Figure 19 below displays the variation in the AME of detailing for an 
increasing internet diffusion. It can be observed that with increase in internet diffusion from 20% 
(sample minimum) to 70% (sample maximum) the AME of detailing decreases by 26% from 0.068 
to 0.050. AME represents the change in the probability of prescribing a drug for a unit change in 
the detailing stock.  
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Hypothesis 3(b) predicts positive moderating effect of internet on the impact on 
competitive detailing on the prescription choice. From model 6 in table 15 we conclude that the 
internet significantly moderates the relationship between competitive detailing and prescription 
probability. The effect of competitive detailing is reduced by 84% for an increase in internet 
diffusion from 20% to 70% hence, our hypothesis 3(b) holds for the sample under investigation.  
 
Figure 19 AME of Detailing 
 
Figure 20 AME Competitive Detailing 
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Hypothesis 1(a) predicts that with an increase in internet penetration the effect of drug 
popularity on the prescription choice would decrease. From model 7 in table 15 we find that 
internet indeed significantly moderates the influence on drug popularity on prescription choice. 
The AME of drug popularity on prescription choice decreases by 38% (from 0.0048 to 0.0029) for 
an increase in internet penetration from 20% to 70% (Figure 21).  
 
Figure 21 AME Drug Popularity 
In the earlier analysis, the drug popularity is measured as the percentage of times other 
physicians in the sample prescribed the reference drug. This formulation does not differentiate 
between drug popularity within and outside of the GOR of the physician. As an addition analysis, 
we also compare the impact of drug popularity within the GOR of the physicians and outside the 
GOR of the physician. Figure 21 below compares the impact of the popularity of a drug within 
and outside of the GOR of the physician. It is evident that a 1 percent increase in the drug 
popularity in the regions outside the GOR of the physician will have higher impact on the 
prescription probability of the drug than a similar rise in prescription probability within the 
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the market and prescribing the best drug. However, with an increase in internet penetration the 
difference between the impact of the popularity of the drug within and outside the GOR decreases  
 
Figure 22 AME of Popularity Within and Outside GOR of the Physician  
 
Finally, hypothesis 1(b) predicts that the probability of a physician to persist with the prior 
prescription would decrease with an increase in internet penetration. The information cost reducing 
and efficiency enhancing effect of internet would reduce satisficing behavior from the physicians 
and encourage them to experiment with alternative drugs. The coefficient of the interaction term 
PRIOR PRESCRIPTION x INTERNET is indeed significant implying strong moderation effect. 
The AME analysis of the relationship finds that the effect prior prescription decreases by 39% for 
an increase in INTERNET diffusion from 20% to 70%. 
All models have a sample size of 32177 and a cluster size (physician) of 135. We report 
the cluster robust standard errors estimated used bootstrapping to account for two step control 
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function estimation procedure in the table 13-15. The coefficient estimates for other control 
variables remain consistent across various specifications for corrected and uncorrected models.  
 
Figure 23 AME Prior Prescription 
 
3.6.1 Robustness Tests   
 
In the control function approach, we first regress the suspected endogenous variable 
𝑓(𝐷𝐸𝑇) against the instruments (Drug Patent Expiration and Relative Detailing to a physician) 
and other exogenous variables in the second stage using pooled OLS regression and obtain the 
residuals (RES) for each ‘i’ and ‘t’. The second stage involves inserting the residuals from the first 
stage into the conditional logit models. We test the strength of the instruments used in our study 
using the partial F-test on first stage models with and without our exogenous instruments. Table 
16  below displays the results of the partial F-test for all model’s specifications used in the study. 
For all the models we reject the null that the coefficients associated with the exogenous instruments 
is 0. Instead, Chi-square test statistics for all the models is more than 10 indicating that the 
instruments are not weak.  
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The conditional logit model assumes that all else being equal a physician’s choice between 
two drug alternatives (e.g. CITA or PARO) is unaffected by other choices (e.g. PARO) that are 
available. This assumption is also referred to as Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) 
Since, the physicians in general rationally compare two drug alternatives based on the information 
they have about them, the presence of other alternatives would possibly not influence the choice 
of between any pair of drug alternatives. For instance, it is certainly not possible that introduction 
of the drug PARO would make FLO3 preferable over CITA. Since, these drugs are independent 
in their composition and outcomes the expansion of alternatives should not impact their relative 
odds. However, we test for this assumption in all our model specification using Hausman Test 
where we randomly exclude one alternative from the sample and compare the coefficients of the 
incomplete model with the complete model (including all drug alternatives). If the IIA assumption 
is satisfied, then the coefficients across the two models should not be significantly different. 
Hausman test tests the null hypothesis of no difference in the model coefficients for the models 
with incomplete and complete data. Table  
Table 22 Test for Instruments and IIA 
Test 
 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 MODEL 6 MODEL 7 MODEL 8 
H0: Weak 
Instruments  
 
Test  
Statistic 78.2 76.42 44.15 76.61 50 71 20.56 68 
P-Val. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H0 : IIA 
Hausman 
Test  
Test  
Statistic -36.11 22.36 7.56 8.3 9.32 10.26 10.73 8.55 
P-Val. 
0.99 0.49 0.99 0.998 0.9989 0.9975 0.99 0.9991 
 
As a robustness check, we also conduct Likelihood Ratio Test (LR test) to ascertain if the 
coefficients associated with the interaction terms are significantly different from zero and 
significantly adds to the explained variation. We test for the interaction terms of the explanatory 
variables of interest in the models 5-8. The null hypothesis of the LR test is that the coefficient of 
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the interaction terms is zero.  Table 17 below confirms that the internet penetration significantly 
moderates the relationship between the explanatory variables of interest and prescription choice 
and leads to a better model fit.  
Table 23 Likelihood Ratio Test 
Model  Observation  LL(NULL) LL(MODEL) DF AIC BIC 
CHI 
(PvaluE) 
MODEL 5 160885 -51786.9 -39717.7 41 79517.3 79926.83 33.54 
 160885 -51786.9 -39700.9 42 79485.76 79905.28 0 
MODEL 6 160,885 -51786.9 -39722.5 41 79526.94 79936.47 157.78 
 160,885 -51786.9 -39643.6 42 79371.16 79790.68 0 
MODEL 7 160885 -51786.9 -39736.8 40 79553.53 79953.06 28.58 
 160885 -51786.9 -39722.5 42 79528.94 79948.46 0 
MODEL 8 160885 -51786.9 -39715.2 41 79512.37 79921.89 41.64 
 160885 -51786.9 -39694.4 42 79472.72 79892.24 0 
 
3.6.3 Counterfactual Analysis  
 
Our analysis finds that internet penetration in the physician’s prescription region negatively 
moderates the positive impact of pharmaceutical detailing on the brand prescription. A marketing 
manager who does not account for regional internet adoption may end up overestimating the effect 
of detailing on the prescription choice. When making resource allocation decisions, such as 
planning the routes for the salesmen, it is important for marketers to consider technology related 
factors. To understand the joint impact of the main and interaction effect of computer use (COMP) 
across various GORs we obtain counterfactual estimates of the impact of detailing under low 
(Minimum Internet = 20 %) and high (Max. Internet = 70 %) internet penetration (INTERNET) 
scenarios. In the counterfactual analysis, we set all the other explanatory variables at their mean 
level and vary INTERNET from minimum to high across all GORs. We then utilize the parameter 
estimates from the fitted model to derive the impact of detailing on the elasticity of prescription 
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probability for each GOR. Elasticities are important for the resource allocation as traditional 
research in advertising relates them to optimal policies (Dorfman and Steiner, 1954). At the mean 
value of the covariates across all the GORs we estimate the % change in the probability of 
prescribing a drug for a one percent change in the detailing to a physician.  
 
Figure 24 Elasticity of Detailing 
From the above figure 23, it can be observed that not accounting for internet penetration in 
the physician’s prescription region leads to a general overestimation of the impact of detailing 
(under high internet scenario) in all GOR. This result also complements and generalizes the earlier 
analysis (Table 13-15) where we found the negative moderating effect. More specifically, the 
models that do not account for internet penetration in the GOR of the physicians (Without Internet) 
would overestimate the elasticity of detailing under high internet scenario while they may 
underestimate the elasticity of detailing in the high internet scenario. 
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Figure 25 Elasticity of Competitive Detailing 
Similarly, figure 24 above shows the elasticity of competitive detailing on the prescription 
probability (i.e. % change in the prescription probability of a drug for a 1 % change in stock of 
competitive detailing. From the above figure, it is clear that in the presence of high internet 
penetration the marketers can overestimate the negative effect of the competitor’s detailing efforts 
while in the low internet penetration scenario they can underestimate the negative effect of 
competitor detailing efforts.  
 
3.7 Discussion and Conclusion  
 
The internet and other advances in the IT are influencing the way physicians interact with 
the patients and the information available at their disposal for decision making. The growth in 
internet penetration is contributing to an information rich eco-system where physicians are more 
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efficient and patients more engaging. Yet the knowledge concerning how the diffusion of internet 
has affected the physicians’ prescription behavior over time is limited. Further, any variation in 
the prescribing pattern of the physicians have ramifications for the marketing actions of the drug 
manufacturers as well. Although the influence of information access on consumer decision making 
and loyalty has been theorized in the consumer choice literature, very little is known about the 
impact of internet on physicians’ response to pharmaceutical detailing. 
The study contributes to existing literature by providing a better understanding of pathways 
through which internet influences prescribing decisions and relative usefulness of detailing as an 
information source. Our integrated decision model based on expectancy value theory explains how 
the information from different sources is analyzed and applied in the prescribing decisions. 
Augmenting the data on new prescription decisions and detailing in the anti-depressant category 
with internet penetration and patient profile information in the physician’s practice region we 
empirically characterize the effect of internet on prescribing inertia of physicians. In addition, we 
identify the influence of internet on the effect of detailing using quasi experimental variations in 
marketing actions due to exogenous changes such as drug patent expiration.   
Our central finding is that the diffusion of internet is significantly reducing inertia or 
persistence in the prescription decisions of the physicians. Essentially, the prescribing inertia 
reduced by 39% for an increase in internet penetration from 20% to 70%. While, on average the 
positive impact of detailing and the negative impact of competitor’s detailing decreased by 24% 
and 84% respectively. We control for a variety of confounding variables related to physician, 
patient, drug and location of the medical practice that may impact drug choice in our empirical 
analysis. In addition, from managerial perspective, counterfactual simulations confirm that not 
accounting for internet penetration leads to over estimation of the elasticity of detailing under high 
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IT penetration across all geographical regions while under low internet penetration scenarios the 
marketers can underestimate the effect of detailing. These findings lend support to our argument 
that reduction in comparison friction of various drug alternatives by the virtue of cost reducing 
effect of internet allows physicians to personalize the drugs better for their patients.   
Our findings have implications for healthcare providers, suggesting that information 
sharing and internet use at medical practice can reduce suboptimal drug prescribing and foster 
evidence-based medicine (EBM). The availability and ease of knowledge discovery would allow 
physicians to anchor their decisions on evidence rather than personal habits or outdated medical 
norms. In addition, with the advent of medical apps, wearables and avenues for remote monitoring 
the engagement of patients in medical decisions in rising hence, catching up with latest IT 
innovations will be the key to reducing costs and improving patient satisfaction.  
However, obstacles in the seamless movement from patient information from different 
service providers and IT platforms still poses challenges for efficient health services. The 
inequality in the access of technology due to costs and differences in internet connectivity or 
patient information due to the reluctance of health providers to share records create obstacles in 
taking full advantage of IT potential (Blumenthal, 2016). For instance, a recent (2016) data shows 
that only 50% of the physician’s in united states have access to their patient health information 
outside their medical practice ("cdc.gov", 2016). Hence, on policy side our findings suggest that 
improving ease of access to patient information would be a positive step towards personalized 
health care.   
Our findings have implications for marketers as well. The results suggest that not 
accounting for internet penetration the physician prescription region would lead to over or under 
estimation of the effect of marketing actions on the physicians. Though we were not able to test it 
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because of our research design engagement of patients in decision making due to advances in 
digital technology may also be a contributing factor to it. Most of the pharmaceutical firms make 
their detailing policies for the nation but internet diffusion in the physician’s practice is something 
they should consider while making these decisions. Finally, the academic detailing initiatives taken 
by the governments for better utilization of the treatment options available to the patients should 
also consider targeting physicians with lesser IT resources at their disposal.  
The empirical findings derived from this research have implications for the pharmaceutical 
industry as well as governmental agencies. Firstly, the pharmaceutical industry can benefit by 
incorporating physician’s practice variables, as well as summaries derived from household panel 
survey into their targeting algorithms to improve their drug’s market share. An industry report 
(SAS, 2018) has found that despite changes in the medical trends and practice marketing models 
have in general remained the same. Most the marketers have information on physician prescription 
choices and detailing through the third-party data collection sources but augmenting them with 
geographical information, internet usage and overall patient profile would give more insight on 
the utility of a drug for a certain physician. More specifically, the information on the disparity in 
the adoption of Electronic Medical Records (EMRs) in the medical practice can be utilized to 
target physicians selectively.  
We expect that the use of EMRs would lead to more customization at the patient level and 
hence the persuasive effect of the detailing would be lesser for these physicians. The marketers 
should tap the targeting opportunities in the regions where there is greater potential and need for 
drug information. The prescription customization as the result of reduced persistence leads to 
reduction in the impact of pharmaceutical detailing on the prescription choices. Therefore, the 
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firms should account for digital divide in the physician prescription region while investing in the 
emerging economies.  
In addition to heavy spending on detailing by pharmaceutical company’s governments also 
spend money on educational programs and this is especially true in developing countries. These 
publicly funded initiatives encourage evidence-based drug choices rather than influencing the sales 
of a drug. These programs operate on meager budgets and lack of physician interest leads to their 
cessation. From the policy perspective, regulatory organizations should target physicians who have 
less developed access to IT resources in their practice compared to those who have access to a 
variety of information sources. By doing so, these programs can be made more sustainable, and 
their benefits transferred more effectively.  
Lastly, in future, we wish to estimate the welfare gains from the of internet use for the 
physicians. Since the physicians maximize their utility amongst the drug alternatives the use of 
internet would allow them the better distinguish between the drugs at each prescription occasion. 
The research findings will have implications for regulatory policies for subsidizing the use of the 
computers for social welfare.  
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CHAPTER 4: INVESTIGATING TEMPORAL VARIATIONS 
PRESCRIPTION LOYALTY USING PRESCRIBER-PRESCRIPTION 
NETWORK 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The modern internet services such as web search, blogs, and online discussions forum 
contribute to information proliferation and its use in decision making. Recent studies have 
suggested that the more information about the quality of competing brands may reduce the impact 
of prior brand experiences and thereby the loyalty towards a brand (Simonson, 2015). Essentially, 
the quantity of information and the ease with which it can be obtained through the internet has led 
to an increase in the scope of brand comparison and has brought more rationality in the customer 
decision making. While, some other researchers are of the view that customer would remain loyal 
to the brands that satisfy their needs irrespective of IT (Heskett, 2014). Taking this discussion 
forward in this study we investigate the impact of internet on the loyalty of prescription drugs.  
Prescription loyalty is the indicator of a physician’s commitment to continue prescribing a 
drug possibly due to a satisfactory outcome, detailing or costs associated with exploring new 
prescriptions (Frank and Zeckhauser, 2007). Prior, studies assumed that loyalty does not change 
over time, but this assumption may not be true in the current information-rich environment. Hence, 
to study the impact of internet diffusion on the drug loyalty it is necessary to obtain a loyalty 
measure that incorporates information related to extent and intensity of prescription loyalty in the 
physicians’ prescriptions over time.  
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The physician’s prescription decision is based on several factors (including patient 
diagnosis, drug attributes etc.) they cannot be loyal on one prescription occasion while disloyal on 
another. Moreover, the loyalty of the same drug may vary across the physicians. Hence, to 
effectively utilize the available information the loyalty measure should incorporate the extent of 
loyalty across the physicians on a continuous scale and should be able to summarize information 
in the loyalty distribution in the dataset.  
In this paper, we measure the loyalty of a prescription drug across physicians using the 
prescriber-prescription bipartite network that is induced during the drug prescribing process. Every 
time a physician prescribes a drug to a patient, both physician and drug are linked. Prescribing a 
drug indicates that the physician perceives the drug to be best fit for the patient- thus establishes a 
link or relationship between the prescriber and prescription. As other patients keep on visiting the 
physician, the repeat prescription of the same drug in the presence of other drug alternatives 
measures the strength of the physician’s loyalty to the prescription drug.   
Studying loyalty in the context of the prescription drugs is new. Much of the existing 
literature focuses on the prescription inertia of a physician with respect to a drug (Erdem and Sun 
2001; Janakiraman et al. 2008). Persistence in the prescription of a drug is a pre-requisite for drug 
loyalty but by itself, it does not inform about the loyalty of the drug across all the physicians in the 
market. Therefore, the studied dichotomous measure of the physician level persistence essentially 
provides no actionable insight on drug’s loyalty for strategic planning.  
Hence, our goal is to understand and learn about the prescription loyalty from the 
prescriber-prescription network. To that end, we first use the information in the prescriber-
prescription network to obtain a drug’s loyalty distribution across the physicians. Then, borrowing 
from the ideas of the functional data analysis, we capture key elements of that distribution using 
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functional principal component analysis and characterize the drug’s loyalty across all physicians. 
Essentially, our goal is mine the rich prescription choice data in health care for new patterns and 
knowledge  
  We utilize a unique dataset on prescription choices (105949 in total) of 145 general practice 
physicians over a period of 10 years (1997-2006). The longitudinal panel structure of the data and 
significant variation in internet diffusion during the observation period allows us to assess the 
influence of internet on prescription loyalty.     
In the next sections, we describe the drug prescription mechanism in general and the dataset 
we use in the study. Next, we motivate the network structure induced by the physicians’ 
prescription choices and characterize the loyalty distribution. The empirical model follows next.  
 
4.2 Prescription Drug Choice 
 
The drug prescription process is complex: it involves patient diagnostic information, drug 
alternatives, their attributes and the respective utility values associated with those attributes. The 
theoretical framework of the expectancy-value theory proposes that physicians follow a linear and 
additive compensatory decision process for choosing the optimal drug for a patient (Chinburapa 
et al. 1993). According to this decision rule the physicians’ link the attributes of the relevant drug 
as well as the patient diagnosis and prior medical history to the medical outcome. Therefore, given 
a set of competing drugs, each characterized by a set of attributes, the drug with the highest overall 
evaluation is chosen for the prescription.  
Physicians therefore, invest in information search, analysis and learning to provide the best 
medication to patients, (Janakiraman et al., 2008); they accumulate knowledge about available 
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drugs and match them to the individual needs of the patients (Smith 1996, Gorman 1995).     
Pharmaceutical detailing is a timesaving source of information for physicians as pharmaceutical 
sales representatives personally visit primary care physicians and provide them the latest 
information related to relevant clinical trials (Greene, 2004; Ventura et. al 2012).  Detailing has 
been shown to positively influence the prescription of detailed drug by the physicians (Narayanan 
and Manchanda, 2009).  
The detailing of prescription drugs may also increase inertia in prescription patterns of the 
physicians (Janakiraman et al. 2008). Drugs which are detailed more and/or those with higher 
market shares are consistently prescribed to mitigate risks arising from incomplete information or 
costs involved in information gathering. This persistence in prescription choice builds loyalty with 
respect to a medication or a prescription drug. Pharmaceutical firms encourage such loyalty 
because it increases the market shares of their drugs. Hence, empirically diagnosing the drug’s 
loyalty amongst the physicians would allow firms to optimize firm’s expenditure across the range 
of manufactured drugs and prevent unnecessary costs and overcome the criticism related to over 
detailing. Therefore, in this paper we first propose a data driven measure for characterizing drug’s 
loyalty in the drug market.  
 
4.3 The Prescription Dataset 
 
In this paper, we study the 109272 prescription choices of 145 general practice physicians 
for the diseases related to the nervous system. The dataset is obtained from a market research firm 
and comprises the daily record of new prescription decisions, detailing visits and patient-specific 
information for patient visits in the United Kingdom (UK). We consider drugs in six therapeutic 
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categories (Anti-migraine, Antipyretics, Anti-psychotic, Anxiolytics, Sedatives, and 
Antidepressants) with at least two competing drugs, as we are concerned with the loyalty of the 
prescription. If a drug/disease category consists of only one influential drug, then the physicians 
will be 100% loyal to that drug in the absence of other viable alternatives.  
The drugs within the same therapeutic category would be competitors as they can be 
prescribed for the same diagnosis conditional on patient history and side effects. Because of a 
larger number of alternatives and to avoid outliers we restrict out analysis to drugs with at least 
1% of market share. These selection criteria yield ‘54’ unique prescription drugs that were 
prescribed by the physicians across six therapeutic drug categories under consideration.  
Table 18 below provides the details of summary statistics associated with the 54 
prescriptions (such as the total number of prescription, market share, total detailing visits, detailing 
of competitive drugs). We also observe that for about 39 prescription drugs the generic variants 
were available in the market while for remaining 15 drugs the generic variants were introduced 
within the observation period. Since, we are concerned with the loyalty patterns of the physicians 
towards a prescription choice we do not distinguish between the branded and generic prescriptions. 
However, we do control from the availability of generic molecule while empirically modeling the 
loyalty distributions of the brand.         
Table 24 Summary Statistics of Prescription Drugs 
 Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
No of Prescription  1672 2500 24 10676 
Total Detailing  251 485 0 2132 
Competitor Detailing  2923 3378 94 10789 
Average Market Share  0.12 0.14 0.011 0.81 
 
The cost of providing health care services to the residents of the United Kingdom is borne 
by the National Health Services (NHS), which contracts virtually all GPs. It is estimated that about 
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80% of the total UK drug costs is dispensed without charge to the patient.  The centralized nature 
of the health care system compels pharmaceutical companies to communicate directly with NHS 
for approval of new drugs and the conditions under which they can be prescribed. (Magrini and 
Font, 2007; Gov.uk, 2014). Therefore, it can be safely assumed that physicians had no personal 
incentive in being loyal to a drug in the market.  
 
4.4 The Prescriber-Prescription Network  
 
The physician patent interaction can be visualized as a network linking physician and 
prescription. The prospective drugs that could have been prescribed to the patient based on his/her 
diagnosis are all part of the network. The physician can prescribe the same drug to different 
patients thus, the repeat prescription measures the strength of the physician-prescription 
relationship. For instance, if within anti-depressant therapeutic category, a physician prescribes 
the drug ‘d1’ 8 times and drug ‘d2’ 2 times during last 10 patient visits then, we can say that 
physician has a stronger link (80% loyalty) with prescription drug ‘d1’ in comparison to drug ‘d2’ 
(20% loyalty within this category. Similarly, in any other therapeutic categories the physician may 
have liked some other drugs. Since, firms usually plan their marketing strategy annually we 
measure the loyalty of a drug at the annual level and allow it to vary over time.  
Consider the figure 1 which shows the top 1% of highly prescribed drugs in Antidepressant 
category for year the 1999. A (black) line between a drug and a physician represents a transaction 
or the act of prescribing the drug on a patient visit. The width of the line is proportional to the 
number of repeat prescription during the time interval (one year) of observation. The width of the 
line/edge measures the strength of a link. We can see that some physicians prescribe more than 
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one type of drug to patients with diagnosis in antidepressant category while some are completely 
loyal to a single drug within the sample period (Figure 26).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Figure 26 Prescriber – Prescription Network for 
Analgesic Category (Year – 2005) 
Figure 27 Prescriber – Prescription Network 
for Antidepressant Category (Year – 2005) 
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Note that in our data the prescriber and prescription drug form disjoint groups, that is, a 
node in the network is either a physician or a drug but not both at a time. Therefore, the network 
is a bipartite network. Next, we extract the loyalty measures from these bipartite networks  
4.4.1 Extracting Loyalty Measures from the Network 
 
To obtain the annual loyalty measure for each drug we first summarize the proportion of 
loyal physicians and the degree of their loyalty using a loyalty distribution. For instance, the loyalty 
distribution of the two-drug is shown in the figure 28 and 29. The x-axis denotes the degree of 
loyalty (e.g., 50% or 70% loyal), and y-axis denotes the corresponding density. For instance, for 
the drug Zimovane we can say that about 40%of the physicians who prescribed it in 2006 showed 
loyalty between 90-100% (Figure 28). Further, we see that the shape of loyalty distribution of two 
drugs is very different: while drug Prozac’s distribution is very right skewed (high frequency of 
less loyal physicians) while drug Zimovane’s distribution is very left skewed (mostly high-loyal 
physicians). 
 
Figure 28 Loyalty Distribution 1 
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Next, we obtain the loyalty distributions for all 54 drugs for each of 10 years (1997-2006) 
under consideration. The information in the distribution plots should be summarized using a few 
numbers to use in an empirical model. The statistics such as mean, median or mode can be used to 
summarize the distributions, but it would lead to information loss due to data aggregation. Figure 
28 and 29 also suggests that the loyalty distribution is too heterogenous and too dispersed. Hence, 
consistent with other prior studies (Jank and Yahav,2010) on a similar data structure we employ a 
very flexible dimension reduction approach via functional principal component analysis (fPCA).  
 
Figure 29 Loyalty Distribution 2 
 
The fPCA is similar in nature to ordinary principal component analysis; however, it 
operates on functional objects such as continuous plots, images etc. rather than on data vectors. In 
our context, we take the observed loyalty distribution (e.g. smoothed histograms, figure 3 and 4) 
for each drug ‘d’ across all years ‘t’ as input. More specifically assume that we have a set of curves 
𝑥𝑑𝑡(𝑠) (where ‘d’ (drug) varies from 1 to 54 and ‘t’ (year) varies from 1 to 10) each measured on 
a continuous scale indexed by s. The next goal is to find a corresponding set of principle component 
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PC curves 𝐶𝑖(𝑠), that, maximize the variance along each component and are orthogonal to each 
other. In other words, we first find the PC function, 𝐶1(𝑠), whose principal component score (PCS) 
𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑑𝑡1 = ∫ 𝐶1(𝑠) 𝑥𝑑𝑡(𝑠)d - (1), maximize ∑ 𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑑𝑡1
2
𝑑𝑥𝑡  , subject to  ∫ 𝐶1
2ds   = ||𝑪𝟏|| 
2. The nest 
step involves finding another component 𝐶2(𝑠) for which the 𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑑𝑡2 = ∫ 𝐶2(𝑠) 𝑥𝑑𝑡(𝑠)ds maximize 
∑ 𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑑𝑡2
2
𝑑𝑥𝑡  subject to  ||𝑪𝟐|| 
2 = 1 and the additional constraint      
∫ 𝑪𝟏(𝒔) 𝑪𝟐(𝒔)ds = 0 --- 19 
We use a grid-based approach to approximate the integrals 1-3 to get the eigenvectors that 
correspond to the largest eigenvalues (Ramsey and Silverman (2005)). Next, we choose the 
eigenvectors that explain most of the variation across the distribution curves 𝑥𝑑𝑡(𝑠). By discarding 
the eigenvectors that explain very small proportion of variation we capture most important patterns 
in the loyalty distribution without losing much of the information. In our dataset, the first two 
principal components (PC1 and PC2) capture 79% and 16% (i.e. 95.8% in total) variation in the 
annual loyalty distributions of drugs in the sample.  
The loyalty distributions are characterized based on the interpretation of PC1 and PC2 and 
therefore should be done with care. The first principle component (PC1) shows a declining trend 
with steep decline for smaller values of loyalty. PC1 puts a large positive weight on the lowest 
loyalty scores (between 0 and 0.2) while putting slight negative weight on loyalty between 0.2 - 
0.4 and 0.9 - 0.1. We can say that PC1 contrasts extremely disloyal loyalty distribution from the 
rest. The large negative correlation with the mean and skewness suggests that PC1 truly captures 
extremes in the loyalty distributions’ scores and shape (Table 19). Hence drugs with high scores 
PCS1 would have a high frequency of disloyal physicians. The second PC has a different shape. It 
puts most positive weight on the highest loyalty scores (between 0.8 and 1) and negative weight 
on the loyalty scores between 01 and 0.4. Hence, this component contrast extremely high loyalty 
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from below average loyalty. From table 19 also we observe that drugs with high score (PCS2) on 
PC2 have a higher mean of the loyalty distribution (0.41 correlation) and long left tail (-0.01 
correlation with skewness). This implies that high PCS2 indicates that the drug enjoys ‘extreme’ 
loyalty (within range of 0.8-1) from the majority of the physicians.  
  
Figure 30 PC1 for Loyalty Distributions 
 
Figure 31 PC2 for Loyalty Distributions 
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The data driven loyalty scores PCS1 and PCS2 obtained from the analysis to an extent 
distinguish prescription drugs that exhibit high disloyalty and high loyalty respectively amongst 
the physicians (Figure 34 and 35). Though, the interpretation of drug loyalty based on PC scores 
informs about patterns in loyalty distributions, the actual distribution, however, would comprise 
of a different mix of PC1 and PC2 by the nature of principle component decomposition.   
 
Figure 32 Variations Explained by PC 
Table 25 Correlation between PC scores and summary statistics of the drugs’ loyalty 
distributions 
 Mean Median Std.Dev Kurtosis Skewness 
PCS1  -0.85 -0.78 -0.65 0.47 0.66 
PCS2  0.41 0.45 0.29 0.001 -0.1 
 
4.5 The Impact of the Internet on Prescription Loyalty 
 
To access the impact the internet has on prescription loyalty, we model the measured 
loyalty scores (𝑃𝐶𝑆1𝑑𝑡𝑟 and 𝑃𝐶𝑆2𝑑𝑡𝑟) for a drug ‘d’ in the year ‘t’ in the physicians GOR ‘r’ using 
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a linear regression framework. For the choice of the covariates, we are primarily interested in the 
effect of internet diffusion (% of internet users in the GOR of the physician).  
  
Figure 33 Distribution Segmentation Based on PCS1 
 
Figure 34 Distribution Segmentation Based on PCS2 
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However, we also control for other factors that can have an impact on the drug’ loyalty; 
these factors include total detailing for the drug ‘d’ and its competing drugs, availability of generic 
variant in the market and time effects (Year).  
The drug related variables are repeatedly observed over a period of 10 years (1997-2006) 
therefore, the observations are clustered at the drug-region level. The Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) estimators are not feasible in this case due to violation of assumption of independence and 
homogeneity of the error terms. Therefore, we use panel data estimators (fixed effect (FE) and 
random effect (RE)) to estimate the coefficients of the regression model. Both estimators account 
for heterogeneity due to drug specific characteristics but differ in their model assumptions. The 
FE estimator assumes that drug specific effects are correlated with independent variables and 
therefore the inference from FE estimation is limited to the data in the sample. While, RE estimator 
assumes that unobserved drug specific effects are uncorrelated with independent variables and 
therefore, the inference from RE estimation can be generalized to the whole population. Since we 
do not have any prior intuition regarding the assumed relationship we use both estimators to ensure 
the consistency of the findings. 
The increase in PCS1 for a drug in a region indicates a higher number of disloyal physicians 
for the prescription drug. The internet diffusion has positive sign and is statistically insignificant 
for models with PCS1 as the dependent variable implying that internet has no impact on the 
frequency of extremely disloyal physicians of a prescription drug. However, with the arrival of 
generic variant in the market the frequency of extremely disloyal physicians decreases (Coef = -
0.074**, Model 3, Table 21). The availability of low cost generic variant may entice disloyal 
physicians or patients to accept them as a viable alternative.  
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Table 26 Model Estimation Results PCS1 1 
 
Variables Model 1 (FE) Model 1 (RE) Model 2 (FE) 
PCS1 Coefficients SE Coefficients SE Coefficients SE 
DETAILING  -0.0032*** -0.0006 -0.0030*** -0.0006 0.0008 -0.0014 
COMP. DETAILING  -0.00033** -0.0001 -0.00034*** -0.0001 -0.00043*** -0.0002 
INTERNET  -0.1600 -0.1500 -0.1300 -0.1300 -0.1400 -0.1500 
YEAR 0.0100 -0.0072 0.0087 -0.0067 0.0097 -0.0072 
GENERIC  -0.063*** -0.0140 -0.064*** -0.0140 -0.059*** -0.0140 
PRIVATE INSU 0.0350 -0.1400 0.0500 -0.1200 0.0590 -0.1400 
DETAILINGxINTERNET     -0.011*** -0.0036 
COMP. DETAILINGxINTERNET       
N 5066.0000  5066.0000  5066.0000  
R-sq 0.0130    0.0150  
AIC -2948.6000  -874.3000  -2957.3000  
BIC -2902.9000  -815.5000  -2905.0000  
Note: FE – Drug Fixed Effect Model Specification; RE – Drug Random Effect Model Specification; 
P-Values of the coefficient estimates are based on Cluster Robust Standard Errors; +p < 0.1, *p < 0.05 and **p < 0.01; 
 
Table 27 Model Estimation Results PCS1 2 
Variables Model 2 (RE) Model 3 (FE) Model 3 (RE) 
PCS1 Coefficients SE Coefficients  Coefficients SE 
DETAILING  0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0027*** -0.0006 -0.0027*** -0.0006 
COMP. DETAILING  -0.00040*** -0.0001 -0.0011*** -0.0002 -0.0010*** -0.0002 
INTERNET  -0.1100 -0.1300 -0.2300 -0.1500 -0.2000 -0.1300 
YEAR 0.0082 -0.0067 0.0110 -0.0072 0.0099 -0.0067 
GENERIC  -0.060*** -0.0140 -0.073*** -0.0140 -0.072*** -0.0140 
PRIVATE INSU 0.0690 -0.1200 -0.0180 -0.1400 -0.0036 -0.1200 
DETAILINGxINTERNET -0.0087** -0.0034     
COMP. 
DETAILINGxINTERNET   0.0035*** -0.0007 0.0026*** -0.0006 
N 5066.0000  5066.0000  5066.0000  
R-sq   0.0190    
AIC -878.7000  -2974.4000  -889.2000  
BIC -813.4000  -2922.2000  -823.9000  
 
On the other hand, the frequency of loyal physicians (higher PCS2) of a prescription drug 
in region, however significantly decreases with increase in internet diffusion. Since, higher value 
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PCS2 for a drug during a year indicates higher frequency of extremely loyal physicians hence, 
negative coefficients (Coef = -0.016**, Model 1, Table 22) associated with internet variable 
confirms significant negative impact.  
Table 28 Model Estimation Results PCS2 1 
Variables Model 1 (FE) Model 1 (RE) Model 2 (FE) 
PCS2 Coefficients SE Coefficients SE Coefficients SE 
DETAILING -0.0013*** -0.0003 -0.0015*** -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0008 
COMP. DETAILING -0.00035*** -0.0001 -0.00045*** -0.0001 -0.00037*** -0.0001 
INTERNET -0.16** -0.0780 -0.0770 -0.0690 -0.15** -0.0780 
YEAR 0.0044 -0.0038 0.0001 -0.0034 0.0043 -0.0038 
GENERIC -0.0069 -0.0075 -0.0043 -0.0072 -0.0061 -0.0075 
PRIVATE INSU -0.25*** -0.0760 -0.15** -0.0620 -0.24*** -0.0760 
DETAILINGxINTERNET     -0.0022 -0.0019 
COMP. 
DETAILINGxINTERNET       
N 5066.0000  5066.0000  5066.0000  
R-sq 0.0120    0.0130  
AIC -9372.0000  -7542.2000  -9371.5000  
BIC -9326.2000  -7483.5000  -9319.3000  
 
Table 29 Model Estimation Results PCS2 2 
Variables Model 2 (RE) Model 3 (FE) Model 3 (RE) 
PCS1 Coefficients SE Coefficients SE Coefficients SE 
DETAILING  -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.00092*** -0.0003 -0.0013*** -0.0003 
COMP. DETAILING  -0.00047*** -0.0001 -0.00095*** -0.0001 -0.00079*** -0.0001 
INTERNET  -0.0710 -0.0690 -0.21*** -0.0780 -0.1100 -0.0690 
YEAR 0.0000 -0.0034 0.0053 -0.0038 0.0008 -0.0034 
GENERIC  -0.0032 -0.0073 -0.014* -0.0075 -0.0080 -0.0073 
PRIVATE INSU -0.14** -0.0620 -0.29*** -0.0750 -0.17*** -0.0630 
DETAILINGxINTERNET -0.0028 -0.0018     
COMP. 
DETAILINGxINTERNET   0.0026*** -0.0004 0.0012*** -0.0003 
N 5066.0000  5066.0000  5066.0000  
R-sq   0.0230    
AIC -7542.6000  -9423.5000  -7553.5000  
BIC -7477.3000  -9371.3000  -7488.2000  
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Therefore, as internet technologies are diffusing extremely loyal physicians of a 
prescription drug are switching to other alternatives possibly, due to more information about other 
competing brands or higher patient engagement. The detailing of competing drugs also 
significantly reduces the number of extremely loyal prescribers of a drug and its impact is 
moderated by internet. Interestingly, the availability of generic variant in the market has no impact 
on the number of extremely loyal prescribers.       
 
4.6 Spillover Effects of Manufacturer Related Information Shocks on Brand’s 
Loyalty 
 
Next, we study if there are spillover effects of the manufacturer related information shocks 
on the branded drug’s loyalty across the physicians. The prescription drugs consistently undergo 
medical trails and information related to their efficacy and side effects is frequently circulated to 
the physicians through drug manufacturers via sales representatives and regulatory agencies. 
However, in a shocking incident of medical negligence in 2001 a study led by Dr. Martin Keller a 
professor of psychiatry at the Brown University found that the manufacturers of the 
PAROXETINE misled the physicians by undermining the negative effects of the drug on the 
children by not disclosing them. Several pharmaceutical drug manufacturers have brands in 
multiple treatment categories and these unethical tactics by them have the potential to malign their 
brand’s images in other categories as well.  Therefore, next, we study how manufacturer related 
information shocks impact the loyalty of a branded drug. To address the above research question, 
we identify the brands in our dataset whose manufacturers were involved in unethical activities 
during the observations. Table 24 represents major prosecutions or settlements in the 
pharmaceutical industry by some of the brand manufacturers. 
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Table 30 Data Summary (Information Shocks) 
BRAND VARIABLE MIN MEAN MAX SD SUM 
YEAR OF SHOCK 
(REASON) 
MIRT PCS1 -0.22 0.18 0.24 0.10 18.32 
2002 
 
 
(Poor Manufacturing 
Practices) 
 PCS2 -0.23 0.01 0.15 0.05 1.04 
 DETAILING  0.00 5.89 30.00 6.21 607.00 
 COMP. DETAILING  16.00 94.56 299.00 66.15 9740.00 
 MEAN LOYALTY 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.03 2.46 
 TOTAL PRESCRIPTIONS  0.00 11.43 95.00 16.14 1177.00 
PARO PCS1 -0.78 -0.20 0.24 0.30 -20.75 
2001 
 
 
 
(False Drug Claims) 
 PCS2 -0.35 -0.14 0.04 0.12 -14.64 
 DETAILING  0.00 14.83 57.00 14.34 1527.00 
 COMP. DETAILING  15.00 85.63 276.00 58.77 8820.00 
 MEAN LOYALTY 0.00 0.14 0.50 0.11 14.44 
 TOTAL PRESCRIPTIONS  0.00 80.18 269.00 74.81 8259.00 
QUET PCS1 -0.83 0.16 0.24 0.19 16.28 
2003 
(335 Million settlement 
Illegal Marketing Bribing 
Doctors) 
 PCS2 -0.59 0.01 0.37 0.11 1.43 
 DETAILING  0.00 0.74 8.00 1.42 74.00 
 COMP. DETAILING  0.00 8.57 34.00 8.31 857.00 
 MEAN LOYALTY 0.00 0.03 0.50 0.08 2.64 
 TOTAL PRESCRIPTIONS  0.00 0.24 3.00 0.55 24.00 
SERT PCS1 -0.32 0.05 0.24 0.13 5.29 
2004 
 
 
(Off Label Promotion 
Settlement) 
 PCS2 -0.20 -0.05 0.04 0.06 -5.42 
 DETAILING  0.00 15.33 60.00 16.24 1579.00 
 COMP. DETAILING  16.00 85.13 274.00 56.37 8768.00 
 MEAN LOYALTY 0.00 0.06 0.23 0.04 5.73 
 TOTAL PRESCRIPTIONS  0.00 29.54 115.00 26.78 3043.00 
TRIF PCS1 -1.00 0.10 0.24 0.24 10.37 
 
 
 
2003 
 
 
 
(False Drug Claims) 
 PCS2 -0.59 0.04 0.70 0.13 3.85 
 DETAILING  0.00 0.02 1.00 0.14 2.00 
 COMP. DETAILING  0.00 9.29 35.00 8.86 929.00 
 MEAN LOYALTY 0.00 0.07 1.00 0.15 7.37 
 TOTAL PRESCRIPTIONS  0.00 0.87 9.00 1.71 87.00 
ZOLM PCS1 -0.86 -0.02 0.24 0.19 -1.72 
2003 
 
(Illegal Marketing Bribing 
Doctors) 
 PCS2 -0.27 -0.04 0.09 0.07 -4.05 
 DETAILING  0.00 5.46 47.00 9.93 508.00 
 COMP. DETAILING  1.00 22.88 99.00 19.18 2128.00 
 MEAN LOYALTY 0.00 0.10 0.45 0.08 8.98 
 TOTAL PRESCRIPTIONS  0.00 6.95 35.00 6.66 646.00 
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For instance, the manufactures of the prescription drug QUET were involved in 335 million 
settlements in 2003 for using unethical practices such as bribing to entice physicians to prescribe 
another branded drug. We use our brand loyalty formulation described in the earlier sections to 
investigate if these information shocks related to manufacturers impact the loyalty of a branded 
drug or not.  
We take a subsample of the six drugs that are featured in the table 24 and link their loyalty 
scores PCS1 and PCS2 in each region across the years 1996-2006 in the presence of other control 
variables. We account of unobserved heterogeneity in the drug-region effects using the fixed (FE) 
and random effects (RE) formulation of the linear models. Table 25 before details the estimation 
results for the model with PCS1 as the dependent variable. The information shock is represented 
by a dummy variable which takes value 1 after the shock is reported and zero otherwise.  It should 
be noted that higher PCS1 indicates higher disloyalty or higher frequency of disloyal physicians 
in the drug’s loyalty distribution. As evident the coefficient of detailing is negative (Coef = -
0.0064**, Model 1, Table 25) for both FE and RE specifications implying increasing in detailing 
leads to lesser number of extremely disloyal physicians. However, information shocks seem to 
have no impact on the extent of extremely disloyal physicians of a prescription drug (Coef = -
0.035, Model 1-2, Table 25). Similarly, information shocks do not moderate the impact of detailing 
on the distribution of extremely disloyal physicians.  
However, the impact of competitive detailing on the loyalty of extremely disloyal 
physicians is significantly higher in the presences of an information shock (Coef = 0.0012**, 
Model 3, Table 26). Interestingly, the significance of moderation effects varies across FE 
(significant) and RE (non-significant) models, however the estimates from FE models are more 
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reliable as confirmed by Hausman tests (later) and the better fit on the observed data (lower AIC 
values).   
Table 31 Impact of Information Shocks on PCS1 – 1  
Variables Model 1 (FE) Model 1 (RE) Model 2 (FE) 
 Coefficients SE Coefficients SE Coefficients SE 
DETAILING  -0.0064*** -0.0015 -0.0072** -0.0031 -0.0071*** -0.0016 
COMP. DETAILING  -0.000015 -0.00031 0.00024 -0.00044 0.00019 -0.00028 
INTERNET  -0.55 -0.4 -0.33 -0.28 -0.62 -0.4 
SHOCK -0.035 -0.026 -0.061 -0.042 -0.064* -0.032 
YEAR 0.035 -0.022 0.031*** -0.0082 0.041* -0.022 
GENERIC  -0.10*** -0.033 -0.12 -0.095 -0.098*** -0.032 
PRIVATE INSU -0.43 -0.47 -0.073 -0.2 -0.72 -0.51 
DETAILINGxSHOCK     0.0050** -0.0019 
COMP. 
DETAILINGxSHOCK       
N 602  602  602  
R-sq 0.128    0.134  
AIC -386.5  -211.1  -388.9  
BIC -355.7  -167.1  -353.7  
 
Table 32 Impact of Information Shocks on PCS1 – 2 
Variables Model 2 (RE) Model 3 (FE) Model 3 (RE) 
 Coefficients SE Coefficients PCS2 Coefficients SE 
DETAILING  -0.0075** -0.0036 -0.0057*** -0.0016 -0.0069** -0.0031 
COMP. DETAILING  0.00029 -0.0004 0.00019 -0.00028 0.00019 -0.00051 
INTERNET  -0.34 -0.27 -0.6 -0.39 -0.36 -0.26 
SHOCK -0.072 -0.057 -0.086** -0.038 -0.088 -0.061 
YEAR 0.032*** -0.0087 0.041* -0.021 0.033*** -0.0086 
GENERIC  -0.12 -0.094 -0.097*** -0.033 -0.12 -0.095 
PRIVATE INSU -0.12 -0.26 -0.65 -0.49 -0.13 -0.24 
DETAILINGxSHOCK 0.002 -0.0027     
COMP 
DETAILINGxSHOCK   0.0012** -0.00052 0.00062 -0.0005 
N 602  602  602  
R-sq   0.138    
AIC -210.4  -391.5  -212.4  
BIC -162  -356.3  -164  
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Table 33 Impact of Information Shocks on PCS2 – 1  
Variables Model 1 (FE) Model 1 (RE) Model 2 (FE) 
PCS2 Coefficients SE Coefficients PCS2 Coefficients SE 
DETAILING  -0.0018*** -0.0006 -0.0025** -0.0013 -0.0021*** -0.0006 
COMP. DETAILING  0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 
INTERNET  -0.1300 -0.1500 -0.0190 -0.0620 -0.1600 -0.1500 
SHOCK -0.028** -0.0140 -0.041* -0.0230 -0.039** -0.0160 
YEAR 0.015* -0.0077 0.0100** -0.0047 0.017** -0.0078 
GENERIC  -0.054*** -0.0130 -0.057* -0.0340 -0.053*** -0.0120 
PRIVATE INSU -0.2400 -0.2300 -0.1000 -0.1000 -0.3500 -0.2500 
DETAILINGxSHOCK     0.0018* -0.0009 
COMP 
DETAILINGxSHOCK       
N 602  602  602  
R-sq -1248.7  -1089.5  -1249.2  
AIC -1217.9  -1045.5  -1214  
BIC -0.0018*** -0.0006 -0.0025** -0.0013 -0.0021*** -0.0006 
 
Table 34 Impact of Information Shocks on PCS2 - 2 
Variables Model 2 (RE) Model 3 (FE) Model 3 (RE) 
PCS2 Coefficients SE Coefficients PCS2 Coefficients SE 
DETAILING  -0.0025* -0.0014 -0.0015** -0.0006 -0.0026** -0.0012 
COMP. DETAILING  -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 
INTERNET  -0.0190 -0.0600 -0.1500 -0.1500 -0.0180 -0.0540 
SHOCK -0.0390 -0.0290 -0.050*** -0.0190 -0.0400 -0.0320 
YEAR 0.0098** -0.0049 0.017** -0.0074 0.0099** -0.0049 
GENERIC  -0.057* -0.0340 -0.053*** -0.0130 -0.057* -0.0340 
PRIVATE INSU -0.0990 -0.1200 -0.3400 -0.2400 -0.1000 -0.1100 
DETAILINGxSHOCK -0.0003 -0.0013     
COMP DETAILINGxSHOCK   0.00050* -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 
N 602  602  602  
R-sq -1087.5  -1251.9  -1087.6  
AIC -1039.1  -1216.7  -1039.2  
BIC -0.0025* -0.0014 -0.0015** -0.0006 -0.0026** -0.0012 
 
Next on modeling PCS2 with the information shocks and other control variables we find 
that information shocks do have a significant negative impact on the loyalty of extremely loyal 
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physicians (Coef = 0.028**, Model 1(FE), Table 28). This finding is consistent with our hypothesis 
that manufacturer related information shocks may have spillover effects over brand’s loyalty.  
As a robustness test, we test the correlation between the regressors and model errors to test 
the model assumptions of RE and FE estimation methods. The random effects (RE) methods have 
some more stringent assumptions that the fixed effects methods and they assume that model errors 
are not corrected with the explanatory variables for unbiased parameter estimates. The null 
hypothesis of the Hausman test is that there is no correlation between the model errors and the 
explanatory variables. We find that for all the models in tables 25-28 the null hypothesis is not 
accepted and therefore the FE estimates for the above models can be considered more reliable.   
 
4.7 Discussion and Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we characterize the loyalty distribution of a drug using a bipartite network 
and access the impact of internet diffusion on the drug’s loyalty. Our approach identifies two key 
dimensions of variations in the loyalty distribution across the prescription drugs. The prescription 
drugs vary in the number of extremely loyal prescribers and extremely disloyal prescribers. We 
quantify the extent of extreme loyalty and disloyalty in the loyalty distributions of the prescription 
drugs and study the impact of external interventions in influencing them.  
We find that internet has a significant negative impact on the loyalty of extremely loyal 
prescribers of the drug while we do not find evidence of its effect on the loyalty of the less loyal 
prescribers. Meaning, with an increase in internet penetration the loyalty of extremely loyal 
prescribers of the drug is expected to decrease possible due to brand switching or variety seeking. 
The excessive loyalty of a physician may be the result of prescribing inertia which results from the 
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high cost of information gathering about other drugs. Therefore, it is possible that internet plays a 
role in reducing the prescribing inertia. To that end, we want to point out that we do not determine 
the causes for this finding. However, our study is first (to best of our knowledge) to empirically 
characterize a drug’s loyalty across physicians and study the impact of internet over it.  
In addition, we also find that the manufacturer related information shocks such as 
settlements related to false claims, unethical marketing, and manufacturing practices etc. 
significantly impact the loyalty of extremely loyal prescribers of the prescription drug, however 
those shocks does not impact the loyalty of extremely disloyal prescribers of the prescription drug.  
Through the findings are intruding and intuitive the study is not free from some major 
limitations. Since, our approach is data driven we were only able to identify two dimensions of the 
loyalty distribution (extreme disloyalty and extreme loyalty). The loyalty distribution is extremely 
heterogenous and there are other facets of it which are not captured by the two measures quantified 
in this study. Future research can investigate a better more comprehensive instrument for 
quantifying loyalty distribution.  
The loyalty distribution for a drug may also depend on the prescription category, the 
condition of patients visiting the physicians and their preference for the drug. Nevertheless, it 
would be equally important for the marketers to understand what factors drive loyalty and we 
believe that prescriber-prescription networks are a way to address this question. Further, unlike 
prior studies that assumed loyalty to be static over time (Jank and Yahav, 2011, Fader and Hardie 
(2007)), we incorporate temporal variation in loyalty at the annual level by analyzing the network 
with a one year sliding window in the empirical model.   
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In this study, we are not unable to identify the effect of patient engagement in the 
prescription decisions in influencing the loyalty of a prescription drug. In the digital age, patients 
feel empowered by the vast amount of information available online and on apps, and by the array 
of health and fitness wearables such as FitBit and Apple Watch.  Future research can investigate 
the pathways (via patient or physician) through which internet is influencing the prescription 
loyalty.   
Further, studies in this direction can investigate if “internet will punish brands faster and 
more severely than in the past” (Simonson, & Rosen, 2014). Essentially, it would be interesting to 
study how new technologies influence the impact of drug related information shocks (e.g. negative 
news such as failed drug trial) on the prescription loyalty. Finally, based on spatial variation in the 
loyalty distribution of the prescription drug, future studies can formulate some optimal marketing 
resource allocation strategies for different regions.  
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Appendix A: Functional Data Analysis 
 
FDA techniques usually operate on continuous functional objects but due to limitations in 
the data collection the customer spending time series that we analyze in this paper is discrete in 
nature. The monetary spending of a customer at store is measured on weekly basis. Hence, the first 
step is to obtain the continuous functional curves from this weekly data. To accomplish this, we 
fit a penalized smoothing spline on discrete spending observations for each customer (Ramsey and 
Silverman 2005; Jank and Foutz,).  
A polynomial spline of order p is represented as f(t) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1t + 𝛽2𝑡
2 + … + 𝛽𝑡𝑡
𝑝 + 
∑ (𝑡 − 𝑤1)+
𝑝𝐿
𝑖=1 . Where + indicates that only positive values are considered in the expression 
(𝑡 − 𝑤1)+
𝑝
. Let 𝑤1,…. 𝑤𝐿 represent the set of knots or the breakpoints where the polynomial 
function is joined end to end. In this study, we place the knot at each week of the 10-week prior 
spending history of the customer. The roughness penalty of a polynomial spline is defined as 
𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑚(𝑡) = ∫[𝐷
𝑚f(t)]2 dt where 𝐷𝑚𝑓 denotes the mth derivative of the function f(f). In order to 
estimate the unknown parameter vectors  𝛽  = (𝛽0, 𝛽1,… 𝛽𝑝, 𝛽𝑝1,… 𝛽𝑝𝐿)′ of length (L +p + 1) we 
minimize the penalized squared error 𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑆𝜆,𝑚 = ∫[𝑠(𝑡) − 𝑓(𝑡)]
2 dt + λ𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑚(𝑡). Here, 𝑠(𝑡) 
denotes the observed data which is customer spending history in this study. The choice of λ 
determines the tradeoff between the smoothness and data fit and in this study we use a model 
selection heuristic   to determine the appropriate value of λ. 
However, for a given value of λ the parameter vector β is estimated using the ordinary least 
squares procedure. Let x(t) represent the vector of the spline basis functions x(t) = (1, t, 𝑡2 … 
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𝑡𝑝 , (𝑡 − 𝑤1)+
𝑝
….(𝑡 − 𝑤𝐿)+
𝑝
). Then the f(t) can be presented as x(t)β and the roughness penalty can 
be expressed as 𝑃𝑚 = β’Dβ, where D is defined as D = ∫[𝐷
𝑚f(t)]′ [𝐷𝑚f(t)] dt. The penalized 
residual sum of squares is equivalent to 𝑄𝜆,𝑚 = 𝜆𝛽′𝐷𝛽 + ∑ [𝑠𝑖− 𝑥(𝑡𝑖)β] 
210
𝑖=1  where 𝑠 = (𝑠1,….. 𝑠𝑛)’ 
denotes the vector of the observed spending at times t = (𝑡1,….. 𝑡𝑛) for a customer. Representing 
the vector of spline basis functions for different values of t as X = (x (𝑡1), x(𝑡2), x(𝑡3), x(𝑡𝑛))’ the 
expression for penalized residual sum of squares 𝑄𝜆,𝑚  =  𝜆𝛽′𝐷𝛽 + (s – Xβ)’ (s – Xβ). The values 
of vector β that maximizes 𝑄𝜆,𝑚   can be obtained by minimizing the gradient of 𝑄𝜆,𝑚 with respect 
to β. The solution of the equations (X’X + λD) β =X’s obtained after minimizing the objective 
function 𝑄𝜆,𝑚 gives the penalized spline estimator of the vector β as 𝛽𝑝?̂? = (𝑋
′𝑋 +  𝜆𝐷)−1𝑋′𝑦. The 
second order partial derivative of 𝑄𝜆,𝑚 with respect to the vector β or the Hessian matrix is equal 
to 2(X’X + λD). The term X’X is positive definite and λD is positive semidefinite therefore 2(X’X 
+ λD) is positive definite. Hence, 𝛽𝑝?̂?  meets the second order condition of the optimization and 
therefore maximizes  𝑄𝜆,𝑚.  
Dimension Reduction of the Functional Curves:  We obtain the functional spending curves 
f(t) for each customer using the estimation procedure described in the appendix 2. Taking the first 
and second order derivative of f(t) we get f’(t) and f’’(t). In order to include the information in 
these curves into the predictive model we use principal component analysis (PCA) technique to 
reduce the dimensions. First, we obtain a set of data vectors 𝐹(𝑡) = [𝑓1(𝑡), 𝑓2(𝑡),… 𝑓𝑛(𝑡)], 𝐹′(𝑡) 
= [𝑓1′(𝑡), 𝑓2′(𝑡),… 𝑓𝑛′(𝑡)], 𝐹′′(𝑡) = [𝑓1′(𝑡), 𝑓2′(𝑡),… 𝑓𝑛′(𝑡)],  where say 𝑓𝑛(𝑡) is a p dimensional 
data vector for a customer ‘n’. The 𝑓𝑛(𝑡) = [𝑓𝑛(𝑡1), 𝑓𝑛(𝑡2),.. 𝑓𝑛(𝑡𝑝)] represents the values of the 
functional spending curve (𝑓𝑛(𝑡))  of a customer n at the times 𝑡1….𝑡𝑝.   The goal of PCA is to 
project the set of data vectors F(t), F’(t) and F’’(t) on to a new space of the orthogonal dimensions 
while maximizing variance along these dimensions. The idea is to obtain a principle component 
 
 
153 
 
(PC) vector 𝑝𝑐1 = [𝑝𝑐11, 𝑝𝑐12,……. 𝑝𝑐1𝑝] such that its principle component score PCS, 𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑖1 = 
∑ 𝑝𝑐1𝑗𝑗 𝑓𝑖(𝑡𝑗) = 𝑝𝑐1
𝑇𝑓𝑖(𝑡), maximizes ∑ 𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑖1
2
𝑖  subject to ∑ 𝑝𝑐1𝑗
2
𝑗  = ||𝑝𝑐1||
2 = 1. Similarly, in the 
next step a second PC 𝑝𝑐2 = [𝑝𝑐21, 𝑝𝑐22,……. 𝑝𝑐2𝑝] is computed for which the PCS 𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑖2  = 
𝑝𝑐2
𝑇𝑓𝑖(𝑡) maximizes ∑ 𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑖2
2
𝑖  subject to ||𝑝𝑐2||
2 and the additional constraint ∑ 𝑝𝑐1𝑗𝑗 𝑝𝑐2𝑗 = 
𝑝𝑐2
𝑇𝑝𝑐1
𝑇 = 0 to ensure the orthogonality of the principle components. Since we have p unique 
observations for each customer a total of p principle component vectors are generated which 
together explain 100% of the variations. The same step is repeated for the data vectors F’(t), F’’(t) 
obtained from the first and second order derivative of the smoothed spending curves.     
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Appendix B: Simulation Script for Replication 
 
First, we draw the base optimal order quantity (Q0f) and base consumption rate (cmf) for 
1,000 customers in the interval 1 and 1,000. 
Q0f <- NULL; cmf <- NULL  
v1 <- seq(1,1000,1) ## Sequence to draw consumption rate and optimal up to or
der quantity  
total <- 1000 ## total number of the customers  
seed <- 11 
for(k in 1:total) 
{ 
  set.seed(k*seed) 
  Q0f[k] = sample(v1[10:1000],1) ## a sample of optimal order quantity for th
e customer  
  cmf[k] = sample(v1[which((v1< Q0f[k]) & (v1 > Q0f[k]/10))],1)  
  set.seed(k*seed) 
  ## sample based consumption rate of the household such that it is greater t
han optimal order quantity and greater than Q0f[k]/10 (to ensure that the cus
tomer shops at least once in 10 week pre promotion duration) 
} 
> summary(Q0f) 
   Min. 1st Qu.  Median    Mean 3rd Qu.    Max.  
   10.0   258.5   496.5   500.3   746.0  1000.0  
> summary(cmf) 
   Min. 1st Qu.  Median    Mean 3rd Qu.    Max.  
    2.0    95.0   212.0   269.8   388.5   964.0  
 
# Next, we simulate product inventory (q) of a household over time using a variable consumption 
rate (cmc) between subsequent purchase cycles and estimate the expected spending (y) during a randomly 
introduced promotion. The variation in consumption rate is determined by the deviation parameter (r). The 
final output data-frame (custsv) contains 10 weeks of store spending (s), visits frequency (f) and inventory 
(q) prior (past = 10) to the promotion. We also display the last 10-week purchase history of a customer with 
id = 3 and randomness 10%. 
custsv <- NULL ## customers with varying consumption rate 
tf <- 10;  
for(l in 1:11) 
{ 
  r = (l-1)*tf ## To change the variations  
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  ## Level of Randomness (Standard Deviation)  
  custf <- NULL ##  
  for(k in 1:total) 
  { 
    cust <- NULL 
    cmc <- NULL ## Consumption rate within purchase cycles  
    q <- NULL ## inventory at home during each week  
    s <- NULL ## spending at store during each week  
    week = NULL 
    past = 10 ## Prior promotion spending history to be considered  
    j = 1      ## initialization index  
    price = 10 ## The price of each unit of product. 
    ## track of spending  
    Q0 = Q0f[k] ## a sample of optimal order quantity for the customer  
    cm = cmf[k] ## for at least one cycle in 10 weeks   
    q[j] <- Q0  ## initialize the series with customer buying Q0 product at t
he store  
    s[j] <- Q0*price ## spending of the customer during first week  
    week[j] <- j 
    cmc[j] <- cm ## starting with base consumption rate within first purchase 
cycle  
    Q = Q0   
    C = cm 
    for(i in 1:100) ## We consider 10 purchase cycles so that we have at leas
t  ## 10 observations prior to the promotion  
    {  
      while(Q > C) ## the model assumes that the customer shops only when the 
product inventory is less than consumption rate  
      {  
        Q <- Q-C 
        j = j+1 
        q[j] <- Q  
        s[j] <- 0  
        week[j] <- j 
        cmc[j] <- C 
      } 
      j = j+1 
      s[j] <- (Q0 + (C-Q))*price ## monetary amount the product the household 
will buy at the store visit  
      q[j] <- Q0 ## the product inventory after the purchase  
      Q =  q[j] ## BEgenning inventory for the next purchase cycle  
      week[j] <- j 
      set.seed(k*i*seed) 
      C = abs(rnorm(1,cm,(r/100)*cm)) ## A randim draw of consumption rate of 
next purchase cycle  
      cmc[j] <- C ## New consumption rate  
    } 
    cust <- data.frame(cbind(week,q,s,cmc)) ## inventory spending and consump
tion rate  
    cust$f <- 0 
    cust[cust$s!=0,"f"] = 1  ## f = 1 if store trip made on that week or  0 
    cust$cm <- cm ## Base consumption rate  
    cust$Q0 <- Q0 ## Base Optimal inventory fixed  
    cust$id <- k  ## The id of customer  
    ind <- nrow(cust) - 4 ## Index to introduce the promotion.  
    hist <- past-1  
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    cust$y<- (Q0 - (cust$q[ind-1] - cmc[ind]))*price ## Spendig during the pr
omotion  
    cust <- cust[((ind-hist):ind),] ## 10 weeks prior to the start of the pro
motion  
    cust$prior <- c(1:(past)) 
    cust$r <- r ## Extent of random Variation 
    custsv <- rbind(custsv,cust) ## Change this value for the cust  
    print(k); 
    #print(k); 
  } 
} 
} 
custsv[custfsvid == 3 & custsv$r==10,] ## Past 10 weeks spending and visits 
and inventory for a customer with id = 3 and randomness 10% 
 
    week         q        s      cmc f  cm  Q0 id        y prior  r 
273  273 451.00000 4655.988 196.5845 1 205 451  3 3822.211     1 10 
274  274 254.41549    0.000 196.5845 0 205 451  3 3822.211     2 10 
275  275  57.83098    0.000 196.5845 0 205 451  3 3822.211     3 10 
276  276 451.00000 5897.535 137.2304 1 205 451  3 3822.211     4 10 
277  277 313.76961    0.000 137.2304 0 205 451  3 3822.211     5 10 
278  278 176.53923    0.000 137.2304 0 205 451  3 3822.211     6 10 
279  279  39.30884    0.000 137.2304 0 205 451  3 3822.211     7 10 
280  280 451.00000 5489.215 191.1105 1 205 451  3 3822.211     8 10 
281  281 259.88946    0.000 191.1105 0 205 451  3 3822.211     9 10 
282  282  68.77891    0.000 191.1105 0 205 451  3 3822.211    10 10 
 
The data-frame (custsv) has information on the past 10 weeks of expenditure (s) and visits 
(f) history for varying randomness in consumption rate of 1,000 households prior to the promotion. 
We fit our linear models on this data and predict household spending during the randomly induced 
promotion using the spending path information and the RFM information. The output data-frame 
(outf) produces the model comparison analysis. 
library(MASS) 
library(formula.tools) 
## Loading required package: operator.tools 
outf <- NULL; 
id <- unique(custsv$id) ## Unique ids of all customers 
 
for (l in 1:11) 
{ 
  custf <- custsv[custsv$r== (l-1)*tf,] # 
  dsim1 <- matrix(NA,total,past) ## matrix to store smoothed spending 
path 
  dsim2 <- matrix(NA,total,past) ## matrix to store smoothed spending 
velocity  
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  dsim3 <- matrix(NA,total,past) ## matrix to store smoothed spending 
acceleration  
  print(paste("  ",l)); 
  #h <- NULL 
  for(h in 1:11) ## Interations for values of smoothing parameter 
  { 
    print(h) 
    spa = (h - 1)/ 10 ## smoothing parameter needs to be changed  
    for(i in 1:total) 
    { 
      cust <- custf[custf$id==id[i],]  
      ws <- (cust$s)  
      vs <- (cust$f)  
      x <- cust$prior  
      sws <- smooth.spline(x,ws,spar = spa) ## cumulative spending  
      svs <- smooth.spline(x,vs,spar = spa) ## cumulative spending  
       
      dsim1[i,1:past] <- sws$y  
      dsim2[i,1:past] <- svs$y 
    } 
     
    dspc1 <- princomp(dsim1[,1:(past)]) ## principal component of spen
ding path 
    dspc2 <- princomp(dsim2[,1:(past)]) ## PCs of spending velocity  
    #dspc3 <- princomp(dsim3[,1:(past)]) ## PCs of spending accelerati
on  
     
    top = 0.98 
    stopc <- topcomp(dspc1, top) 
    #pcplot(cpcs) 
    spcs <- NULL 
    spcs <- dspc1$scores[,1:stopc]; 
    spcs <- data.frame(spcs) 
     
    vtopc <- topcomp(dspc2, top) 
    stopc2 <- topcomp(dspc2, top) 
     
    #pcplot(cpcs) 
    vpcs <- NULL 
    vpcs <- data.frame(dspc2$scores[,1:stopc2]) 
     
    colnames(vpcs) <- paste0("VCS", 1:(stopc2))  
    colnames(spcs) <- paste0("PCS", 1:(stopc))  
     
    #colnames(vpcs) <- sapply(colnames(vpcs),function(x)paste("V",x,se
p="")) 
     
    rms <- matrix(NA,total,6) ##matrix to store scores and other custo
mer related variables  
    for(i in 1:total) 
    { 
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      cust <- custf[custf$id==id[i],] ## Change the customer data set 
here 
      rms[i,1] = cust$Q0[1] ## Maximum holding capacity for the custom
er  
      rms[i,2] = cust$cm[1] ## Base consumption rate for the customer  
      rms[i,3] = sum(cust$s) ## Monetary value of spending 
      rms[i,4] = cust$y[1] ## Total spending during promotion  
      rms[i,5] = sum(cust$f) ## Frequency of spending  
      rec <- which(cust$f==1) 
      rms[i,6] = past 
      if(length(rec)!=0) 
      { 
        rms[i,6] = past - rec[length(rec)]## Recency of spending  
      } 
    } 
    rms <- data.frame(rms) 
    colnames(rms) = c("Q0","cm","mon","y","fre","rec") 
    rms <- cbind(rms,spcs) 
    rms <- cbind(rms,vpcs) 
     
    rmsp <- NULL 
    rmsp <- rms[801:1000,] ## split into training and prediction sampl
e  
    rms <- rms[1:800,]   
     
    ##--- Model Selection rms traning set and rmsp prediction set  
    pc <- paste0("PCS", 1:(stopc))  
    vc <- paste0("VCS", 1:(stopc2))  
     
    formula1 <- as.formula(paste("y"," ~ ", paste(pc, collapse= "+"),"
+",paste(vc, collapse= "+"))) 
    ft <- lm(formula1 ,data = rms) 
    step <- stepAIC(ft,direction = "both",trace = FALSE) ##library MAS
S 
    step <- step$anova 
    f <- which(attributes(step)$heading=="\nFinal Model:")  
    if(attributes(step)$heading[f+2]!="\n") 
    { 
      fit1 <- lm(paste(attributes(step)$heading[f+1],attributes(step)$
heading[f+2]) 
                 ,data = rms) 
    } 
    if(attributes(step)$heading[f+2]=="\n") 
    { 
      fit1 <- lm(attributes(step)$heading[f+1],data = rms) 
    } 
    formula2 <- as.formula(paste("y"," ~ ","mon + fre + rec")) 
     
    fit2 <- lm(formula2,data = rms) 
     
    predict1 <- predict(fit1,rmsp) ## predictION for 2SFDA  
    attributes(predict1) <- NULL 
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    predict2 <- predict(fit2,rmsp) ## prediction for RFM 
    attributes(predict2) <- NULL 
    mape1 <- NULL 
    mape2 <- NULL 
    for(i in 1:nrow(rmsp)) 
    { 
      yp <- rmsp[i,"y"]  
      mape1[i] = (abs(predict1[i]-yp))/(yp) 
      mape2[i] = (abs(predict2[i]-yp))/(yp) 
    }     
     
    out1 <- NULL 
    out1$AICFDA <- AIC(fit1) 
    out1$BICFDA <- BIC(fit1) 
    out1$RSQFDA <- summary(fit1)$adj.r.squared  
    out1$MAPEFDA <- mean(mape1[mape1!=Inf])  
    out1$AICRFM <- AIC(fit2) 
    out1$BICRFM <- BIC(fit2) 
    out1$RSQRFM <- summary(fit2)$adj.r.squared  
    out1$MAPERFM <- mean(mape2[mape2!=Inf]) 
    out1$Randomness <- unique(custf$r); 
    out1 <- data.frame(out1); 
     
    #out1 <- data.frame(out1) ## Change this with change is DV 
    outf <- rbind(outf,out1) 
    #print(h); 
  } 
} 
> outf 
AICFDA     BICFDA    RSQFDA MAPEFDA AICRFM    BICRFM   RSQRFM MAPERFM Rand 
# 14456.83 14522.42 0.71 0.78 15015.98 15039.41 0.41 1.06 50 
# 14454.62 14515.52 0.71 0.77 15015.98 15039.41 0.41 1.06 50 
# 14451.32 14502.85 0.71 0.78 15015.98 15039.41 0.41 1.06 50 
# 14460.33 14521.23 0.71 0.76 15015.98 15039.41 0.41 1.06 50 
# 14558.71 14605.55 0.67 0.83 15015.98 15039.41 0.41 1.06 50 
# 14774.78 14812.26 0.57 0.95 15015.98 15039.41 0.41 1.06 50 
# 14899.21 14932.00 0.49 0.97 15015.98 15039.41 0.41 1.06 50 
# 14999.43 15022.86 0.43 1.01 15015.98 15039.41 0.41 1.06 50 
# 14999.81 15023.23 0.43 1.01 15015.98 15039.41 0.41 1.06 50 
# 14999.83 15023.25 0.43 1.01 15015.98 15039.41 0.41 1.06 50 
# 14999.83 15023.25 0.43 1.01 15015.98 15039.41 0.41 1.06 50 
 
 
 
 
